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Retirement Security Through Asset
Protection: The Evolution of
Wealth, Privilege, and Policy
John K. Eason*
This Article examines post-1974 progressions in congressional and
judicial thinking about asset protection as it relates specifically to
the attainment offederal retirement policy goals. The Article first
considers the link between historical trust protections and modern
federal retirement policy. That analysis reveals a more recent trend
towards defining the scope of retirement plan asset protection by
reference to statutory rules that grant favorable treatment to certain
"retirement" savings devices. Those rules provide an incentive for
funding future retirement through current savings. This Article
explains how, and why, asset protection could be similarly tailored
to foster retirement income security goals. Inconsistencies in the
protections currently afforded, however, call into question the logic
of the existing retirement plan asset protection framework. This
Article ultimately argues that Congress should incorporate a more
comprehensive view of asset protection into federal retirement
policy. After explaining the objectives offederal retirement policy
and the modern evolution of retirement plan asset protection, the
author develops this argument by evaluating the usefulness of
retirement policy objectives as a benchmark for establishing asset
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protection boundaries-both within the retirement plan setting and
in the context ofmore traditional trust devices.
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. Introduction
When the fraudulent activities of corporate executives recently decimated
the retirement savings of thousands of employees, a media frenzy erupted and a
legislative response ensued.' Popular support and pressure for this response
originated from the widely held belief that workers should "not lose the
retirement benefits that they ha[ve] worked for throughout their lifetimes.
2
Calls for the partial privatization of the primary public source of retirement
income-Social Security-also are appearing more prominently on the agenda
1. This reference is to the Enron Corporation and the thousands of Enron employees who
lost over $1,000,000,000 in retirement savings when corporate scandal led to what was, at the
time, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. See S. REP. No. 107-226, at 2-18 (2002) (setting
forth the history of the Enron debacle as background to one of the more significant legislative
responses, the Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong.). See
generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-745SP, ANswERs To KEY QuEnoNsABour
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS iii-iv (2002) [hereinafter GAO-KEY QUESTIONS] ("The financial
collapse of the Enron Corporation and other recent corporate failures, and their effects on the
companies' workers and retirees, have prompted policymakers and the public to want to know
more about private pensions and the benefits these plans provide."), available at
http://www.gao.gov.
2. S. REP. No. 107-226, at 3. The broader concept of retirement income security as a
component of federal policy is discussed infra Part Ill.
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of federal policymakers.3 Such privatization plans most often envision the
diversion of Social Security tax revenues into individual worker accounts that
produce retirement benefits gauged by investment returns. 4 Privatization
opponents object on grounds that a diversion of funds into such accounts would
jeopardize the dependability of Social Security as a source of retirement
income, given the unpredictability of private investments not underwritten by
the federal government.5
Equally important, though perhaps less sensational than the blatant fraud
underlying the Enron debacle or the partisan attacks attending Social Security
privatization, is another pervasive risk to the security of retirement incomes.
The risk is that unanticipated financial circumstances will result in the forced
diversion of retirement assets from their intended use to the payment of creditor
claims.6 That risk is a particular concern when the assets at issue are available
to tempt creditors precisely because the individual debtor has diligently taken
advantage of federally supported savings devices in order to better provide for
her retirement.7 Where time (for those currently working) or another source of
3. For an example of legislative proposals taking opposing stances on the issue of Social
Security privatization, compare the Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts Act of
1999, H.R. 874, 106th Cong. (supporting the privatization of Social Security) with the Rejecting
Social Security Privatization Act of 2002, H.R. 5541, 107th Cong. (opposing the privatization
of Social Security). The Social Security program and its relation to private retirement
arrangements are discussed infra Part lIl.A.
4. For details on the privatization plans, see the legislative proposals cited supra note 3
and see Symposium, Social Security: Can the Promise Be Kept? A Conference on the Legal,
Economic, and Practical Implications of Social Security Reform, 58 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1197
(2001). See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of the means by which
Social Security is financed.
5. See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answerfor Social Security
Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287, 1306-16 (2001) ("As a mandatory social insurance
program, Social Security should not be structured to reward the most fortunate [investors].");
Greg Hitt, Social Security Plan Stalls: Stock Market's Slide Undermines Support for
Privatization, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at A4 (noting reports that individuals would have lost
a collective $31 billion if 2% of Social Security tax revenue had been invested in private
accounts since 1998).
6. See, for example, the remarks that Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) makes in
support of greater protection for retirement savings in bankruptcy. 147 CONG. REc. 52151
(daily ed. Mar. 12, 2001). Senator Kennedy explains by example that "retirement money that
has been paid in over a lifetime.., can be eliminated, wiped out, in 4 days of catastrophic
illness in a hospital." Id. Senator Kennedy further notes in the context of this bankruptcy
debate that "[o]ne of the greatest domestic policy challenges facing Congress is the challenge of
ensuring that elderly Americans do not live in poverty. After a lifetime of hard work, senior
citizens deserve a secure and comfortable retirement." Id. at S2149.
7. Infra Part III discusses the federally-sanctioned retirement devices referred to and the
specific federal incentives granted to those who utilize those devices.
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income (for those already retired) to replenish retirement funds is lacking, the
concern is magnified and becomes an issue for society in general.8
Congress is attuned to this concern and expressly embraces the idea that
individuals should have adequate income during their postemployment years.9
Federal policies promote this "retirement income security" objective through
the implementing mechanisms of Social Security, employer-sponsored pension
plans, and private personal savings.' 0 Among the myriad of tax, labor, and
entitlement legislation enacted in furtherance of this retirement income security
goal, Congress included the seemingly straightforward rule that an individual's
interest in certain retirement arrangements is inalienable-that is, protected
from the claims of the individual's creditors by virtue of a specific limitation
upon the individual's right to transfer the interest, either voluntarily or under
compulsion from creditors." This rule provides a means of"asset protection"' 
2
comparable in form and substance to the restraint on alienation typically found
8. When creditor claims force a diversion of retirement assets that cannot realistically be
restored by the individual, the burden of supporting the retiree would fall entirely upon public
programs. See infra Part III (discussing public and private funding of retirement).
9. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001b(a), (c) (2000) (discussing pension plans). The Act
states:
The Congress finds that ... pension plans have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce and are affected with a national interest... [and that] the continued
well-being and retirement income security of millions of workers, retirees, and their
dependents are directly affected by such plans .... It is hereby declared to be
[congressional] policy.., to encourage the maintenance and growth of... pension
plans... [and] to increase the likelihood that participants and beneficiaries ... will
receive their full benefits."
This federal policy is explained more thoroughlyinfra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. The
quoted language introduces one of the more complex and pervasive statutory regimes currently
in force. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (labor provisions) and 26
U.S.C. (tax provisions)) (implementing ERISA).
10. See infra Part Ill (explaining in detail these mechanisms, which are commonly
referred to as the three legs of the retirement income security stool).
1I. See 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a)(] 3) (2000) (defining the assignment and alienation of trusts);
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000) (same). These sections are more fully discussed infra notes 28-
33 and 103-28 and accompanying text.
12. The term "asset protection" used here refers to the idea that property or interests in
property are to some extent immunized from seizure by, or liquidation on behalf of, an
individual's creditors. Among other approaches, asset protection often is achieved through
careful selection of the type, location or governing terms of the assets or interest sought to be
sheltered. Asset protection planning therefore requires knowledge of many distinct disciplines.
See generally Asset Protection Strategies: Planning with Domestic and Offshore Entities, 2002
A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L. xxiii (Alexander A. Bove Jr. ed.) ("A well thought-out
asset protection plan requires expertise in property law, domestic and international tax law,
estate planning, the law of trusts and estates, bankruptcy, and debtor-creditor law.").
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in state trust doctrine and historically referred to as a spendthrift provision. 3
This protection is comparable, but not identical, because the last decade of
jurisprudence has distinguished the retirement plan restraint on alienation as a
protective device entitled to heightened deference. 14 Where protection from
creditors fails because such deference is not forthcoming or because a restraint
is simply absent as a feature of the retirement plan, other protective
mechanisms like bankruptcy exemptions may yet shield the interest from the
grasp of creditors." Regardless of the particular avenue to retirement plan asset
protection, the legal stakes are high. Federally endorsed private retirement
arrangements now hold over $7 trillion in assets and represent a significant
source of financial security for the aging American population.' 6 Retirement
plan asset protection is therefore becoming an increasingly important aspect of
the broader retirement income security goal.
13. See infra note 18 regarding the nature and enforceability of anti-alienation restraints
in traditional trust doctrine. Traditional spendthrift trust doctrine and the policy debates
surrounding asset protection in that context are explained infra Part 11.
14. See infra Part IV regarding the judicial development of a relationship between
historical spendthrift trust analysis and the application of restraints on alienation in the context
of retirement plans.
15. Bankruptcy exemptions are discussed infra Part IV.A.2.
16. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., JCX-9-02, PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND OTHER
RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 34 (Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter JCX-9-02] (noting that, as of
December 31, 2000, defined benefit plans held $2.06 trillion, defined contribution plans held
$2.53 trillion, and individual retirement accounts held $2.65 trillion), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-9-02.pdf. These variations on the types of retirement savings
vehicles are described in detail infra Part IV. The term "retirement plan" is used in this Article
to refer generically to a trust, plan, account or similarly identifiable mechanism that is:
(I) voluntary; (2) tax-favored in some manner, such as the availability of pre-tax funding and
tax-exempt earnings growth; and (3) purportedly granted preferential tax status in order to
encourage its use as a means of savings for retirement. Thus, "retirement plan" as used here
does not distinguish in each instance between defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans,
individual retirement accounts, or plans for self-employed persons. Where such distinctions are
of particular importance, the distinction will be directly stated or clearly implied from the
context.
As to the aging of America, demographic trends provide another objective measure of the
growing importance of these retirement policy concerns. See SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., SOCIAL
SECURITY: WHY ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON 5-7 (rev. ed. 2001) (discussing demographic
trends in America over the next seventy-five years), available at http://www.ssab.gov/action
shouldbetaken.pdf. Those trends show that the number of persons intimately and immediately
affected by the security of their retirement income is on the verge of a significant upswing. For
example, the first of the "baby boom" generation will retire at age sixty-five in 2011, and by
2030 over 20% of the United States population will be over sixty-five years of age and have an
average life expectancy-meaning period for which retirement income must be sufficient--of
twenty-one years for women and eighteen years for men. Id. at 6.
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This Article argues that Congress should incorporate a more
comprehensive view of asset protection into federal retirement policy.
Specifically, retirement policy objectives should serve as the benchmark for
defining asset protection boundaries, thus placing the concept of asset
protection in direct service to retirement policy goals. That benchmark should
guide: (1) the grant of federally sanctioned asset protection within the
retirement plan setting; and (2) the denial of such protection in the context of
more traditional trust devices that do not further any discernable federal
purpose.
Part 1I begins the development of these arguments with an explanation of
the association between the availability of asset protection for retirement plans
and the protections historically afforded to more traditional wealth management
arrangements under state trust laws. Part I then details the particular policy
considerations and implementing legislation that underlie the American
approach to ensuring that citizens have adequate income during their
postemployment years. The basic antipoverty objective of Social Security
begins that consideration. One's attention quickly turns, however, to the more
troublesome private pension and individual savings components of the system.
Pensions and savings are more troublesome because those retirement plans help
retirees maintain-at considerable taxpayer expense-preretirement standards
of living that vary drastically across income levels and, in many settings, only
loosely serve the stated goal of retirement income security.
Part IV explores the asset protection attributes of retirement plans, with a
focus upon the legislative protections afforded retirement plan interests over the
last quarter century. This exploration reveals that a lack of overt coordination
between the legislative efforts that govern the intersection of asset protection
and federal retirement policy have resulted in serious judicial dilemmas. As
explained in Part IV, those interpretive dilemmas caused the modern rules of
retirement plan asset protection to evolve in two very distinct progressions.
Part IV characterizes and evaluates those progressions. Part IV reveals that an
important third step in the evolution of retirement plan asset protection
currently is underway. Specifically, Congress now believes that retirement plan
asset protection should be more closely linked to a retirement plan's status as
"tax-qualified."' 7 The federal laws that convey such status provide an incentive
for funding future retirement through current savings, although the incentive is
expensive and sometimes inequitably provided. Part V considers the
implications of linking asset protection to the rules that embody that imperfect
incentive. This endeavor ultimately fuels an examination of how, and why,
17. The term "tax-qualified" is explained infra note 120 and Part 11I.C.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159 (2004)
asset protection might be more effectively tailored to foster the broader goal of
retirement income security.
I. Protection Through Restrained Alienability: Context and Doctrine
Where a direct restraint on alienation protects a trust interest, the
beneficiary retains the prospect of further enjoyment of her interest
notwithstanding a thwarted creditor's efforts to reach that interest.' 8 The
resulting prospect of continued enjoyment of otherwise sheltered property
presents one of the more significant foundations for a long-running policy
debate over asset protection.' 9 That debate found early life in traditional trust
18. See, e.g., IIA AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAWOF
TRUSTS § 150 (4th ed. 1987) (distinguishing anti-alienation provisions from other trust
protections by reference to the beneficiary's ability to continue to enjoy the trust property where
protection is obtained through the anti-alienation route, versus other possible trust protections).
The anti-alienation characterization reflects the fact that such provisions present a classic
restraint on the ability to transfer an interest in property. Such restraints generally are deemed
void, with the spendthrift trust provision being a noted exception to that outcome. See generally
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1985) (discussing restraints on alienation). A "spendthrift trust" is most
basically defined as a trust that is subject to a provision that states simply, for example, "that
the interest of the beneficiary is inalienable and that creditors cannot reach the interest in
satisfaction of their claims." See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959)
(determining that a trust's terms can prevent a creditor from accessing a trust's assets). The
spendthrift restraint might be included in the trust instrument as an expression of the trust
settlor's intent that the beneficiary's interest be so restricted and thus protected. The provision
might also apply, for example, by operation of some statute that deems the particular type of
trust at issue to be subject to such a restriction. To be truly effective, such a provision must
operate to preclude both voluntary alienation at the behest of the beneficiary, as well as
involuntary alienation at the behest of the beneficiary's creditors. See infra note 21 (explaining
the vulnerability of beneficial trust interests). The specific status of protected trusts in
bankruptcy is developed more fully in Part IV.A.
19. The policy debate concerning the merits and demerits of spendthrift trusts is addressed
in scores of scholarly articles. That debate will be referred to in this Article-although without
wholesale repetition or revisitation-in order to provide context to the retirement policy debate.
The arguments for and against recognition of spendthrift trust protections are summarized in
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 223 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. a, reporter's note
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT]; and IlA ScoTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 18, § 152.
Concerning the ongoing nature of this policy debate, see, for example, DRAFT
RESTATEMENT, supra, ch. 12 Introductory Note: "The philosophical and policy debate about
spendthrift trusts ... has continued for generations, still without consistent or enduring
resolution . . . ." The debate recently was at the forefront in Mississippi, where the legislature
stepped in to reverse a prior state supreme court decision that curtailed spendthrift trust
protections. See infra note 37 (discussing the course of events that led to the Mississippi
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doctrine, when the Supreme Court in 1875 endorsed the idea that an individual
(the settlor) should be permitted to place assets in a trust, to designate a person
(the beneficiary) as entitled to enjoy the benefits of the trust assets, and to
preclude that beneficiary's creditors from forcing a transfer of the trust interest
or assets in satisfaction of their claims.20 State law enforcement of trust
legislation supporting spendthrift trust protection). The Ohio Supreme Court's 1991 reversal of
its prior position denying the validity of spendthrift trusts also evidences the ongoing nature of
this century-old debate. See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1084 (Ohio 1991)
(overruling Sherrow v. Brookover, 189 N.E.2d 90 (Ohio 1963)). This Article provides a
rationale for resolving the spendthrift trust debate on the side of curtailed protection. This
Article's rationale differs from many that have come before it because the argument is grounded
in objectively discernable federal policy goals that contra-indicate the continued viability of this
protective device.
20. The specific reference is to Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875), in which the
Supreme Court opined "that [trust] property may ... be enjoyed by.. . an individual without
liability for his debts being attached as a necessary incident to such enjoyment. . . ." The case
presented a bankruptcy issue and the endorsement of protected trust interests was mere dictum
regarding an area traditionally considered the province of state law. Noted commentators
nevertheless have characterized Nichols as "the greatest single factor in the establishment of
spendthrift trusts in the United States." ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRFT TRusTs § 26(1) (2d
ed. 1947); see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 58 cmt. a, Reporter's Note (quoting
Griswold on this point); Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore
Trust, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1195, 1197 (2000) ("As spendthrift trusts gained recognition at the turn
of the nineteenth century, their primary foe, John Chipman Gray, acknowledged defeat without
surrendering his objections." (footnote omitted)); Willard M. Bushman, The (In)validity of
Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REv. 304, 307 (1968) (pointing to Nichols as "the foundation upon
which the American spendthrift-trust doctrine is built"); Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts:
It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REv. 179, 179 n.1 (1993) ("1 date the
[spendthrift trust] controversy from the dictum by Justice Miller in Nichols v. Eaton ....");
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547,582 (1964) ("The decisive cases
validating the [spendthrift] clause fall into a relatively narrow time-span, beginning about 1880,
following in rapid succession for about 25 years, then tapering off, since most jurisdictions had
by then settled the major issue.").
Griswold goes on to note that shortly after the Nichols decision, influential text writers of
the day had revised their works to embrace the Nichols dictum as law. GRISWOLD, supra, at
§ 30(4). In fact, the leading critic of the day proclaimed the Nichols decision a "startling
novelty" and went so far as to conclude that the tide likely would have turned against the
acceptability of such protected trusts had Justice Miller's arguments been levied with equal
force in the negative. JOHN C-IPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY V
(2d ed. 1895). With regard to subsequent decisions, see Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection
Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035, 1042 n.46 (2000)
("Judicial enforcement of spendthrift trusts can be traced to two leading decisions." (citing
Nichols and Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882))). One should also note
other dynamics of the legal, financial and social fabric of the day. See generally Alexander,
supra note 18, at 1201-08 (discussing the Nichols decision in the broader context of restraints
on alienation as evolved during the period 1875-1900); Friedman, supra, at 582-83 (discussing
the broader economic and social climate of the day in relation to the development of the
spendthrift trust doctrine). With regard to the specific definition of a "spendthrift trust," see
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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provisions that facially purported to prohibit any transfer of a trust beneficiary's
interest provided the direct path to this protected enjoyment.2 Although not
generally recognized prior to the 1875 Supreme Court endorsement in Nichols
v. Eaton, by the close of the nineteenth century this "anti-alienation" or
"spendthrift" trust variant of asset protection was an established fixture in the
United States legal framework.22
Critiquing the resistance to this means of asset protection, one early
commentator noted that "[i]t seems that it is not so much that the common law
wants creditors paid [as a self-justifying proposition] ... but that [the law] is
opposed to having debtors refuse to pay creditors and still retain the
property."23 John Chipman Gray posited a more demonstrative statement of
opposition to this form of asset protection in his oft-quoted nineteenth century
treatise conclusion that "[t]he general introduction of spendthrift trusts would
be to form a privileged class, who could indulge in every speculation.., and
yet.., roll in wealth., 24 Gray's objection retains its vitality today when applied
21. Absent specific limitation, the beneficiary likely would have full power to transfer her
beneficial rights and interests in the trust-including the right to receive distributions. For
example, the beneficiary could transfer her right to receive distributions of income from the
trust, but could not transfer any legal interest in the underlying trust property by virtue of which
income is earned in support of such distributions. Thus, those rights could be taken away from
the beneficiary, either at the beneficiary's doing or through involuntary transfer such as that
occasioned by creditor requisition. The concept of asset protection is interjected when the
arrangement is crafted such that both the beneficiary and the beneficiary's assignees or creditors
are denied the ability to effect a transfer of the beneficiary's interest. The most direct means to
this end is found where the interest is subjected to a direct restraint on alienability, as explained
supra note 18. With respect to the distinction between direct and indirect restraints on
alienation, see IIA ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 18, § 150.
As to the manner in which a creditor actually might liquidate or realize the value of a
beneficiary's interest in a trust that lacks an enforceable spendthrift restraint, see EUGENE F.
SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 627 (6th ed.
2000). For the same analysis in the specific context of a retirement plan interest, see infra note
243.
22. See the commentaries discussed supra note 20 regarding the enforceability of anti-
alienation provisions around the turn of the nineteenth century.
23. George P. Costigan Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift
Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REv. 471, 480 (1934) (emphasis added).
24. GRAY, supra note 20, § 262. As another early commentator put it:
[Tlhe need of the protection for the [beneficiary] was not stressed in the spendthrift
trust cases, but the supposed freedom of the donor to protect his own acquired
property from the creditors of his donee was emphasized, with the result that...
[spendthrift trust settlors] ... were permitted to provide for the beneficiaries of
such trusts... incomes of any amount-no matter how large-free from the claims
of the beneficiaries' creditors .... [And regardless of] the need of the beneficiaries
for protection ....
Costigan, supra note 23, at 483.
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to a traditional trust. In that context, the availability of asset protection
generally has become disassociated from any required showing of particular
need or other beneficiary infirmity that might justify the protection as anything
other than a tool of wealth preservation. 5 Moreover, the primary historical
defense of such protection has little to do with furthering broader social policy
objectives like providing a fresh start to debtors or ensuring that an elderly
person has some measure of postemployment financial stability.26 Instead,
early proponents of spendthrift trust asset protection asserted most forcefully
that a donor should be free to dispose of her property for the benefit of a
specified individual, without the courts usurping that freedom by including the
individual's creditors in the class of persons entitled to benefit from the donor's
largess.27
A. Expanding the Scope of an Ongoing Debate
Interestingly, it was also in 1875 that corporate America established the
first private retirement plan.28 At the time, little connection appeared to exist
between this milestone and the emerging acceptance of the "traditional"
spendthrift trust asset protection vehicle. Yet, almost a century later, in 1974,
Congress undeniably connected the two mediums by enacting sweeping
changes to federal pension laws that subjected scores of retirement plan
interests to the same anti-alienation language that dominated the realm of the
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (tracing this disassociation to the decisions
embracing spendthrift protections in the late 1800s and the arguments posited in support of this
view). A primary argument of the day was based upon respect for a trust settlor's freedom of
disposition, as discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 26-27.
26. See infra Part IV.A.2 (regarding the bankruptcy policy of promoting a debtor's fresh
start). The "fresh start" moniker denotes the idea that no debtor should emerge from insolvency
destitute and on the public dole, but rather the debtor should be able to preserve some base of
resources sufficient to allow the debtor to "get back on her feet." Id. As to spendthrift
protections furthering such ideas, see, for example, William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption
Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 790-91 (1974) (contrasting bankruptcy exemption policies with
policies underlying recognition of spendthrift restraints). The postemployment financial
security of former wage-earners is considered in Part III.
27. See, e.g., Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 718 (1875) (stating this argument);
Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882) (same); Scott v. Bank One Trust
Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio 1991) (citing the freedom of disposition argument proffered
in Nichols as "most persuasive" in reasoning that prior Ohio precedent rejecting spendthrift
trusts should be reversed).
28. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, TE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 8 (1982) (discussing
this history). The plan was established by American Express Corporation. Id.
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traditional spendthrift trust.29 Indeed, for many years after Congress passed this
new pension legislation, traditional spendthrift trust principles served as the
benchmark for resolving matters of asset protection for many retirement plan
interests.3a The lack of congressional guidance accompanying the federal anti-
alienation provision, coupled with the seeming lack of coordination between
the new retirement plan laws and the wholesale revisions to federal bankruptcy
laws enacted a few years later 3 however, led to much disagreement in the
academic commentary and in the federal courts.3 2 A focal point of that
disagreement concerned the entitlement of a retirement plan participant to avail
herself of the same protections clearly afforded to traditional spendthrift trust
beneficiaries under federal bankruptcy laws.33 Retirement plans that shared
some similarities with the congressionally spendthrifted interests, but which
were not subject to the 1974 federal spendthrift mandate, complicated the
debate. 4
B. A Doctrinal Framework for Evaluation
Despite a rash of commentary and seemingly conclusive judicial decisions,
the increasingly important concept of asset protection as it relates to federal
retirement policy continues to present inconsistent and sometimes ill-conceived
outcomes. 35 The resulting legal framework is disjointed and reflects a narrowly
29. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C. (labor provisions) and 26 U.S.C. (tax provisions)) (modifying federal
pension laws). The anti-alienation provision is mandated at ERISA § 206(d)(l), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (2000), and also appears at 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a)(13) (2000), as more fully discussed
infra notes 103-28 and accompanying text. Title 26 of the United States Code is hereafter
referred to as the Internal Revenue Code or I.R.C. With regard to equating the ERISA anti-
alienation mandate to the language typically associated with traditional spendthrift trusts, see
supra note 18 and infra note 109 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part IV (focusing on the legislative protections for retirement plan interests
since ERISA's enactment).
31. The reference is to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat.
2549 (codified at I 1 U.S.C.).
32. These disagreements are discussed in detail beginning at infra Part IV.B of this
Article.
33. Part IV.A discusses in detail this aspect of federal law.
34. See infra Part IV.B (addressing ERISA's effects on spendthrift trusts).
35. Post-ERISA evolutions in retirement plan asset protection are detailed infra Part
IV.B. That evolution is affected by the Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 504
U.S. 753 (1992), discussed infra Part IV.B.2. With respect to the federal circuit court split that
inspired Shumate, see generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 102D CONG., JCS-16-91,
PRESENT LAW AND IssuEs RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS IN
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 6-7 (Comm. Print 199 1 ) [hereinafter JCS-16-91 ]. For commentary on
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conceived patchwork of congressional pronouncements that appear to address
asset protection as an afterthought, if at all. Quite simply, Congress has failed
to account for the broader interaction across the multiple contexts in which
contemporary asset protection is pursued. For example, an examination of the
current asset protection environment reveals: (1) the emerging prominence of
offshore and domestic asset protection trust devices for those seeking to create a
protected base of assets for personal enjoyment;36 (2) the codification and re-
posturing of protections for more traditional spendthrift trusts historically used
to protect assets given to third-party beneficiaries like children and
grandchildren; 37 and (3) an increasing emphasis on asset protection for a vast
array of retirement arrangements that purportedly further an individual's
income security during retirement years.38
the underlying issues across two decades, see generally, for example, Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden
in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355 (1999); Donna Litman,
Bankruptcy Status of"ERISA Qualified Pension Plans"-an Epilogue to Patterson v. Shumate,
9 AM. BA .R. INST. L. REV. 637 (2001); Anthony Michael Sabino & John P. Clarke, The Last
Line of Defense: The New Test for Protecting Retirement Plans From Creditors in Bankruptcy
Cases, 48 ALA. L. REv. 613 (1997); Donna Litman Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified
Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims?, Part 1, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219 (1987); Daniel Spitzer,
Comment, Contra Goff. OfRetirement Trusts and Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2), 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1266 (1985); Laurence B. Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social
Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 3 (1985); Lisa M. Smith, Note, ERISA Qualified Pension Plans as
Part of the Bankruptcy Estate After Patterson v. Shumate, 21 C~ARozo L. REv. 2119 (2000).
36. See generally, e.g., Sterk, supra note 20 (discussing the implications of domestic asset
protection trust legislation). That domestic trust legislation is addressed in this Article at infra
notes 52-55 and the accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 501-07, 7C U.L.A. 174 (Supp. 2003) (codifying
many common law rules pertaining to trust asset protection), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/utcO0.pdf; see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (Supp. 2001) (codifying
protection of certain trust interests, without exception for tort claimants, in the wake of a
controversial Mississippi Supreme Court decision allowing tort creditors to reach spendthrift
trust assets); Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 412-13 (N.H. 2001) (holding that a tort
judgment debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust is protected under statute, and deeming public
policy arguments based on the criminal nature of the beneficiary's sexual assault upon a minor
plaintiff beyond the court's purview to consider); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, §§ 57-
60 (providing a modem interpretation of conventional spendthrift trust protections). The noted
Mississippi court decision came in Sligh v. First Nat 'I Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997). In
Sligh, the state court opined that a trust beneficiary's gross negligence bordering on intentional
conduct was a sufficientjustification to override the discretionary-spendthrift nature of the trust
at issue so as to permit the tort victim to satisfy his judgment against the trust beneficiary out of
trust property. Sligh, 704 So. 2d at 1028. The Mississippi legislature subsequently disagreed.
See MIss. CODE. ANN. § 91-9-503 (codifying protection of certain trust beneficiary interests).
38. See, e.g., Peter Spero, Impact of Bankruptcy Reform Legislation on Asset Protection,
28 EST. PLAN. 291, 295 (2001) (discussing the impact of pending amendments to federal
bankruptcy laws on retirement arrangements). That pending legislation is considered in detail
infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
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Focusing upon these three asset protection situations is helpful. The
segmentation emphasizes differences in the origins of and purposes served by
the protection in each context. 3 9 This segmentation also provides a construct
for evaluating retirement plan asset protection concerns. More specifically,
these three opportunities to shelter assets grew out of the "Traditional Model"
of asset protection. Under the Traditional Model, applicable state law permits a
trust settlor to create a creditor-protected trust to be enjoyed by a third-party
beneficiary.40 The "Self-Settled Model" differs from the Traditional Model.
An individual settlor operating under the Self-Settled Model may, under
applicable state or offshore jurisdictional law, establish and fund a creditor-
protected trust to be enjoyed by that funding individual settlor.4 ' Finally, the
"Federal Retirement Model" warrants independent consideration. Under the
Federal Retirement Model, an individual, acting directly or through an
employer, may establish and fund a tax-favored, creditor-protected trust or
related arrangement to be enjoyed by that individual, typically under the ambit
offurthering such individual's financial security during retirement years.42
39. The separate identification of these three models crystallizes certain distinct rationales
and implications of protecting assets from the reach of creditors. These "models" could perhaps
more generously be called "paradigms" in that each implicates a particular set of rules.
Alternatively, they could more practically be called simple "vehicles" through which assets
might be held where protection from creditors is desired. One could quite readily call all three
mere variations on the traditional spendthrift trust, but such simplistic analysis obscures the
evolution of retirement plan asset protection as something unique and subject to its own set of
concerns and rationales, the implications of which are precisely the point of this Article. As to
other possible models of asset protection, perhaps the most obvious is "bankruptcy exemption
planning." See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale ofTwo Solutions,
71 AM. BANXR. L.J. 221, 227-33 (1997) ("'Exemption planning'.., entails the deliberate effort
on the part of a financially beleaguered debtor to liquidate assets that are not exempt from the
claims of general creditors and then use the proceeds... to purchase, make improvements upon,
or pay down existing encumbrances on assets that are exempt ....").
40. Recognition of the Traditional Model, as discussed supra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text, inspired the policy debate described supra Part II.A.
41. As discussed in the text accompanying infra note 49, the Traditional Model denies
protection where the trust settlor also is the beneficiary of the arrangement.
42. Although the trust form dominates arrangements in the employer-sponsored retirement
plan context, retirement-associated vehicles like the Individual Retirement Arrangement
(IRA)-which may or may not take the form of a trust and which may or may not be employer-
sponsored-also factor into the broader model, though necessitating more discerning analysis.
The retirement trust vehicle and the specific placement of IRAs, Keogh plans and similar
arrangements within the context of the Federal Retirement Model are discussed more thoroughly
in Parts Ilil-V, and the distinctive features of those arrangements as they relate to the focus of
this Article will not be overlooked. The conceptualization of the three models here is
undertaken in furtherance of framing the larger analysis, and the boundaries of each model are
made clear for such pursuits. In that regard, it is sufficient to note here that the bulk of
employer-sponsored retirement plans necessarily embrace the trust form, and the Federal
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Federal laws and policy affirmatively encourage the establishment of the tax-
favored arrangements that comprise the Federal Retirement Model, and this
encouragement serves as a particular source of distinction relative to the other
models.43
These asset protection models share the idea of beneficial property
enjoyment coupled with some limitation or restraint upon the alienability of the
beneficiary's interest. 44 "Beneficial enjoyment" denotes a person's equitable
interest in a pool of assets-such as those held in a trust or retirement plan-by
virtue of which distributions might be made to that beneficiary.4 s At least in
the traditional trust setting, by definition the equitable nature of the
beneficiary's interest implies that the beneficiary lacks any legal authority to
transfer the underlying pool ofassets." Such authority instead resides with the
person or entity (the trustee) charged with managing the property with the best
interests of the beneficiary in mind.47  From a practical standpoint, this
distinction sometimes breaks down in the context of the Federal Retirement
Model, because the retirement plan participant (i.e., the employee-beneficiary)
may have meaningful access to the underlying funds by virtue of federal laws
that regulate distributions from such plans.48
Additional considerations affect the merits of asset protection within the
Self-Settled Model. In particular, courts have long denied enforcement to anti-
alienation provisions and other protections included in "self-settled"
arrangements-those involving the same individual as both settlor and
beneficiary.49 Such self endowment is a bit too indicative of Gray's privileged
Retirement Model is intended to encompass not only those arrangements, but also alternative
vehicles which similarly serve (in theory, at least) the retirement income security objective
discussed in Part Ill.
43. The referenced federal policy and its implementation are the subject of infra Part Ill.
44. This generalization is qualified in detail infra Parts Ill and IV.
45. See In re Barnes, 264 B.R. 415,432 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001) (discussing essential
characteristics of a trust relationship).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See infra note 216 regarding these federal laws. For recent commentary explaining,
and to varying degrees, critiquing these federal laws, see generally, for example, Marcia
Chadwick Holt, New! The 2001 Proposed Regulations for Qualified Plans and IRAs, TR. &
EST., May 2001, at 20; Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and
Their Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qual/ifed Plan Wealth, 2000 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 587; and Mark J. Warshawsky, Further Reform of Minimum Distribution Requirementsfor
Retirement Plans, 91 TAx NOTES 297 (Apr. 9, 2001).
49. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 20, at 1043 ("[E]ven more entrenched than spendthrift
trust doctrine itself is the rule that a spendthrift provision for the settlor's own benefit is
unenforceable." (footnote omitted)). In fact, the origins of this prohibition against self-settled
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class, 50 and the retained interest falls short in appeal to the historical freedom of
disposition justification for protection.5' In a clear but quite recent break from
the historically discernable parameters of the Traditional Model, however,
many jurisdictions now permit by statute a trust settlor to create, fund, and
enjoy the benefits of a trust that is immune from the claims of the settlor-
beneficiary's creditors.5" From a purely domestic perspective, this Self-Settled
Model blossomed in 1997 when Alaska enacted domestically unprecedented
legislation aimed at encouraging the creation of self-settled asset protection
trusts. 3 Reflecting the pace of recent evolutions in asset protection thinking,
spendthrift trusts can be traced to at least 1487. See IIA Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 18,
§ 156 (tracing the origin of this rule to the 1487 Statute of King Henry VII, 3 Hen. 7, c.4 (1487)
(Eng.), which voided conveyances in trust for the use of the transferor). See the text
accompanying supra note 20 regarding the "settlor" as the individual funding a trust.
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (quoting Gray's assertion that widespread
use of spendthrift trusts will result in the rise of a privileged class).
51. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text regarding the freedom of disposition
argument. The argument fails in the self-settled context because the settlor also is the recipient
of the beneficial trust interest, thus undermining the argument that there has been any
meaningful disposition. See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 20, at 190-91 (discussing this aspect of
the freedom of disposition rationale).
52. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing states' adoption of asset
protection legislation). Self-funded, protected enjoyment would be the likely result with respect
to an action controlled by the laws of one of these jurisdictions. Instances exist, however, in
which a forum court may apply the laws of the state in which it sits and refuse to recognize the
laws of a more protective jurisdiction, which purportedly govern the trust. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971) (addressing the validity of a trust
when the applicability of the laws of multiple jurisdictions is at issue); Id. § 273 (addressing the
more specific question of whether a spendthrift provision restraining a beneficiary's ability to
alienate an interest in the trust property will be given effect); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 19,
§§ 291, 301 (identifying and avoiding conflict of law problems); V.A SCOTr & FRATCHER,
supra note 18, § 573 (discussing the effects of ajudgment by a non-primary court in a different
state). This would likely be the case, for example, when the laws of ajurisdiction designated by
the settlor in the trust instrument would recognize self-settled protections but would offend the
public policy of the forum state in which a legal action concerning the trust is brought. See I 7A
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.31 (4)(c)(i) (3d ed. 1999) (noting
that choice of law provisions will not be given effect when "[a]pplication of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state... that has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue"). Determining
the law that governed the effectiveness of self-settled protections was a pivotal issue in Marine
Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), and in Sattin
v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. Conn. 1998). For discussion of these cases and
the conflicts of law issues that arise in the context of self-settled asset protection trusts, see, for
example, John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives
Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 69-72
(2000); Sterk, supra note 20, at 1081-89.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 2000). The Alaska legislature pursued this
objective through statutory language that expressly permits a person to transfer property to an
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Delaware, Nevada, and then Rhode Island quickly followed suit in adopting
domestic APT legislation.5 4 Such developments relate to federal retirement
policy because in many instances commentators easily characterize the plans
that comprise the Federal Retirement Model as self-settled, and sometimes
judge the resulting protections accordingly."
C. The Promise of Perspective
The interaction between asset protection and federal retirement policy
today presents a divided landscape. Specifically, certain retirement
arrangements simply receive blanket asset protection without further inquiry.
Other retirement arrangements, however, continue to receive careful scrutiny
based upon criteria derived from analysis typically ascribed to the Traditional
Alaska-sitused trust and to provide in the trust agreement that the beneficiaries' trust interests-
including specifically the interest of the settlor as beneficiary-may not be voluntarily or
involuntarily alienated. Id. The term "situs" generally refers to the place at which a thing-in
this case, a trust-is deemed to be located for legal purposes. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392
(7th ed. 1999).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3573 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.040-050
(2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1-18-9.2-7 (Supp. 1999). These subsequent laws bear
substantial similarities to the Alaska model in both form and substance. A mirror image of the
Alaska legislation was proposed but not acted upon in the 1999 session of the Texas House.
H.B. 1553, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (introduced Feb. 17, 1999), http://www.
capitol.state.tx.us. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). It is sometimes said that Missouri and Colorado might be self-settled asset protection
trust jurisdictions, but this claim is questionable. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.080 (West 1992)
(providing what appears to be limited asset protection for self-settled spendthrift trusts, dating
back to 1983); A. JAMES CASNER & JEFFREY N. PENNELL, I ESTATE PLANNING § 4.1.4 n.23 (6th
ed. Supp. 2002) (discussing COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-10-111). The pertinent legislation in
Missouri is of debatable legal and practical impact in the context of the Self-Settled Model,
particularly in light of the domestic asset protection trust movement so clearly initiated by
Alaska's 1997 adoption of comprehensive asset protection trust legislation. For an equally
equivocal assessment of the Missouri statute, see Boxx, supra note 20, at 1203 n.30 ("Missouri
may also recognize self-settled trusts as enforceable to some degree.").
55. See the discussion of this issue infra Part IV.B. For early, pre-ERISA recognition of
this issue, see, for example, Friedman, supra note 20, at 582 (noting that Social Security and
private pension plans create a creditor-protected fund, but then questioning the soundness of
this result in light of the self-settled nature of the arrangement); Note, Legal Problems ofPrivate
Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. REV. 490, 499 (1957) (discussing the self-settled nature of private
pensions and the corresponding rule that spendthrift provisions are not effective as to self-
settled trusts). Where employer contributions are involved, the fact that they are made in
consideration of services provided by the employee and as an alternative to cash paid directly to
the employee renders these arrangements subject to consideration as self-settled, despite the fact
that the funds never actually passed through the employee-settlor's hands. For further
exposition of this issue, see infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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and Self-Settled Models or to bankruptcy exemption laws more generally. 6
This Article seeks a broader perspective from which to evaluate the relationship
between the noted asset protection models as they affect the attainment of
federal retirement policy goals. The fundamental policies and implementing
mechanisms that define those goals are the subject of Part III.
III. The Policy Underpinnings of the Federal Retirement Model
The idea that workers should have adequate income to provide for their
needs during their postemployment years is central to federal retirement
policy. 7 While the determination of how to define, achieve, and motivate
persons toward this objective continues to garner much debate, the broad
framework in the United States for pursuing the goal of retirement income
security is a tripartite system often analogized to a three-legged stool. The three
"legs" are Social Security, private employer-sponsored pension plans, and
personal savings.5 Each leg or aspect of the system represents one of the
primary sources of income available to an individual after retirement, when
income from wage earnings presumptively has ceased as a primary source of
56. This assertion is explored in detail infra Part IV. Regarding bankruptcy exemption
laws specifically, see infra Part IV.A.2.
57. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 106TH CONG., JCX- 16-99, OVERVIEW
OF PRESENT-LAw TAx RULES AND ISSUES RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT
PLANS 20 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter JCX- 16-99] ("Retirement income policy has as its
goal the delivery of adequate retirement benefits to the broadest possible class of workers.");
NAT'L COMM'N ON RET. POLICY, THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN (1999)
[hereinafter 21ST CENTURY] (addressing the problems of the current system and proposing a
solution), available at http://www.csis.org/retire/NCRPFina.pdf; MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 7
(noting that the Social Security and private pension systems "are alternative ways to accomplish
the same goal-namely, providing an adequate retirement income").
58. With respect to the three-legged stool analogy, see Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking
Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker
Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 435,501-02 (1987) (discussing this analogy); Michael J. Graetz, The
Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 851, 852-53
(1987) ("Commentators typically describe a tripartite system that enables and encourages the
provision of income security for individuals in the years following retirement. ").
Sometimes the elements are cast differently. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION
POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARDS A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 11-13 (1981)
[hereinafter COMING OF AGE] (noting three-legged stool components as described herein, but
also discussing additional aspects of public assistance); PENSIONS AND THE ECONOMY xii (Zvi
Bodie & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 1992) (describing "a three-tiered system of retirement income
maintenance" comprised of: (I) public welfare programs like SSI; (2) mandatory public
programs like Social Security; and (3) "private provisions for retirement, which include
individual saving as well as supplementary employer-sponsored pension plans").
RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH ASSET PROTECTION 177
support. 59 The tri-part system reflects the utilization of "a full spectrum of
policy initiatives" to achieve this objective: (1) the broad public federal
program that is Social Security; (2) private savings, which represent "an
individualistic program dependent principally upon... self-reliance";6 ° and
(3) employer-sponsored pension plans, which most often involve the meshing
of federal tax incentives, employer sponsorship, and voluntary employee
participation.61
Conceptually, commentators and policymakers evaluate the attainment of
this retirement income security objective by reference to two related criteria:
(1) ensuring a basic standard of living upon retirement; and (2) facilitating
some added degree of lifestyle maintenance upon retirement.62 The three legs
of the U.S. retirement system work in conjunction to affect this broad policy
objective, as considered in light of the referenced criteria, by providing a means
of replacing preretirement wages during the retirement years. 63 Employer-
59. JCX- 16-99, supra note 57, at 17.
60. Graetz, supra note 58, at 854.
61. See id. (identifying employer pension plans as the balance between the two extremes
of a broad federal program and private action).
62. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 19-28 ("Once a minimum level of income
support is assured, a replacement rate-the ratio of benefits to preretirement earnings-is
actually a more appropriate criterion against which to assess wage-related benefit programs.");
21 ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 25 (listing among its guiding principles for national retirement
policy the ideas of a retirement income floor coupled with initiatives to facilitate additional
retirement income above such a floor); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS I l l
(1997) (discussing dual roles of Social Security as providing retirement income at a floor level,
with private pensions providing a supplement thereto); Altman, supra note 58, at 501 ("[Tihe
promise of retirement is illusory if the retirement income is inadequate."); Graetz, supra note 58,
at 855 (noting "basic adequacy of income" and "lifestyle maintenance" components of
retirement policy); Wohl, supra note 35, at 36 (noting that Congress felt something more than a
bare retirement income floor was necessary).
63. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 104TH CONG., JCS-3-95, DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF TAX PROPOSALS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS 9 (Comm. Print 1995)
[hereinafter JCS-3-95] (determining that numerically, "[t]he adequacy of retirement income is
commonly measured by the replacement rate, that is, the ratio of retirement income to income
during working years"), available at http://www.house.gov.jctls-3-95.pdf. It is generally
acknowledged, however, that a replacement of 100% of preretirement earnings is neither
necessary nor realistically attainable. Id. A specific percentage replacement as numerically
indicative of successful accomplishment of the goal is elusive. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note
28, at 23 (estimating that retirees need between 50% to 80% of preretirement income to
maintain their standard of living); 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 18 (indicating that a 60% to
80% wage replacement would be needed for most people to maintain their preretirement
standard of living); Altman, supra note 58, at 495-96 (noting that the precise percentage varies
by worker, and that full wage replacement is probably not needed, and then assuming 80%
replacement would indicate success); Graetz, supra note 58, at 856 n.9 (noting that retirement
security objective would be ideally achieved where 100% of preretirement earnings are
replaced). This narrow conception, however, ignores other public policy concerns such as
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sponsored pension plans further this objective by "bridging the public anti-
poverty/basic income adequacy function of Social Security and the private
lifestyle maintenance function of individual savings... .,"64 Understanding the
Social Security system is, therefore, the first step to understanding the broader
issue of retirement income security.
A. Social Security
The benefits provided to former wage earners and their survivors through
the Social Security system represent the most basic source of postretirement
income, and the first "leg" of the United States' tri-part retirement fiamework.65
Since its inception in 1935, Social Security has reflected the idea of securing a
"floor" level of income during retirement. This idea is based upon the notion
that some degree of social insurance is needed to stave off poverty at retirement
when a worker typically forfeits income earned through regular wages.66 One
health insurance coverage or poverty law generally, as well as issues that arise when 100% wage
replacement still leaves some individuals with income below some standard delineating poverty.
Id.
64. Graetz, supra note 58, at 858.
65. See COMING OF AGE, supra note 58, at II (stating that Social Security grew out of an
increasing perception, fostered by the Great Depression, that the federal government had a role
to play in providing economic security to the elderly and concluding that Social Security now
represents a broad-based public mechanism furthering the pursuit of that objective); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEHS-98-33, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING
PROGRAM SOLVENCY 24 (1998) [hereinafter PROGRAM SOLVENCY] (same). The Social Security
system has several aspects. The system includes the provision of insurance benefits for old-
age/retirement, survivors and family members of covered workers, and for disability and
hospital care. Viewed from the standpoint of the payroll taxes which provide the bulk of its
funding, infra note 71, the system breaks down into two major components: (1) the Old Age,
Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) component; and (2) the Health Insurance (HI) or
Medicare component. See generally SOCIAL SEcuRITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1-2
(2002) [hereinafter SSA ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR02
/tr02.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION No. 05-10006 (2002), available at http://www.ssa.gov
/pubs/ I 0006.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
"The... ('OASI') program provides benefits for retired workers and their spouses and children
and to survivors of deceased workers. The Disability Insurance ('Dl') program provides
benefits for disabled workers and their spouses and children and pays for rehabilitation services
for the disabled." Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially Privatized Social
Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 969, 969 n. 1 (1998). For purposes of this Article, "Social
Security" means the OASDI aspect of the Social Security system. See, e.g., PROGRAM
SOLVENCY, supra, at 2 n. I (making a similar simplification); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P.
McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1209 n. I (same);
Moore, supra, at 969 n. I (same).
66. See MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 13 ("With the Social Security Act of 1935 the federal
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must keep in mind that, for many workers earning a relatively low wage during
their working years and lacking an independent source of accumulated wealth
to finance their retirement lifestyles, Social Security retirement benefits provide
a base level of income that is both a shield against impoverishment and the sole
means of maintaining a semblance of their preretirement standard of living.67
While the sufficiency of Social Security in this regard is debatable, the stated
role is clear enough, and Americans widely regard the program as being
successful in the strict sense of curtailing poverty among the aged.6
It would be inaccurate, however, to characterize the program as a form of
publicly financed social welfare. In fact, commentators sometimes describe the
base level of retirement income promised through Social Security as an "earned
government assumed responsibility for maintaining a floor of income protection for the retired
elderly."); Burke & McCouch, supra note 65, at 1211 (describing the Social Security system as
a hybrid one, consisting of elements of a private insurance program and a social welfare
program); Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the
Problems of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1083
(1997) ("The income redistribution provided in the Social Security benefit formula seeks to
slow the decline into poverty of elderly persons who can no longer work and improve their own
financial condition."). Dilley notes that the purposes underlying Social Security are both
"prophylactic" and prospective, in that the program permitted work-force management through
the inducement of voluntary retirement at a specified age. Id. at 1107, 1133; see also COMING
OF AGE, supra note 58, at 13 ("Social security is designed to provide a floor of income
protection to retired and disabled workers and their families."). The referenced "floor" must be
understood as not fixed across all workers, because the benefits paid to a particular retiree
actually are calculated on a case-specific basis by reference to the retiree's average career
earnings. See 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 36-37 (simplifying Social Security benefit
calculation to a three-step process); Altman, supra note 58, at 476-78 (discussing the mechanics
of the determination of Social Security benefits). Average career earnings as used here include
only those earnings up to the Social Security wage base, which in 2003 means the first $87,000
of wage earnings. See infra note 74 (stating the wage ceiling). Earnings above this amount are
neither subject to the FICA tax nor counted as part of a worker's average career earnings for
benefit level calculation purposes. With respect to this floor concept, Social Security benefit
levels are said to reflect "an implicit social judgment concerning the minimum amounts of
income that workers should receive at retirement." Altman, supra note 58, at 494.
67. See PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 65, at 12 (stating that Social Security provides
over 40% of all income for persons aged sixty-five and older, with over 60% of this group
looking to Social Security for at least half of their income). As to the balance of income sources
among this group, pensions and annuities provide 20%, personal assets provide 20%, and post-
retirement earnings comprise 18% of income. Sharon A. DeVaney & Yi-Wen Chien, A Model
of Savings Behavior and the Amount Saved in Retirement Accounts, J. FIN. SERv. PROF., Mar.
2001, at 72,72. The distribution among income groups is more telling, however, as in 1998 the
lowest income quintile group received almost 90% of income from Social Security, whereas the
figure dropped below 20% for the highest quintile group. Id. at 73.
68. See, e.g., PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 65, at 78 ("The program has been highly
effective at reducing the incidence of poverty among the elderly.... ."). With regard to the
adequacy of the program and the need for supplemental sources of income after retirement, see
infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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entitlement" that ensures not so much a specific level of benefits, but rather a
source to which covered individuals may look for payment of benefits.69
Participation is mandatory for most workers,70 and the primary funding
mechanism for Social Security is the "payroll tax" imposed upon workers, their
employers, and the self-employed.7
69. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 65, at 1213 (discussing the "widely-held
perception" of Social Security as an "earned right," but also discounting that perception as
becoming more symbolic than real as the redistributional aspect of Social Security has grown);
Dilley, supra note 66, at 1107-08 ("The entire structure of retirement income sources in the
United States is based on individually-earned entitlements .... ).
70. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS 16 (5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS] (asserting that workers populating
approximately 95% of wage-paying jobs are subject to the Social Security system).
Approximately forty-four million people currently receive Social Security benefits, financed
primarily by payroll taxes collected from 147 million current workers. PROGRAM SOLVENCY,
supra note 65, at 12.
71. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 311 1(a)-(b) (2000) (setting the "payroll tax" liability for
employees and employers to finance old-age and survivors insurance and disability insurance
benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2000) (providing for the determination of the Social Security
contribution and benefit base); SSA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 65, at 5 (reporting that in 2001
86% of the income of the OSAI, DI, and OSADI trust fund consisted of taxes paid by employees
and employers on earnings covered by social security). Payroll taxes account for over 90% of
the program's funding, with the balance being derived from interest earned on the surplus fund
assets and taxes imposed on Social Security benefits paid to higher income beneficiaries. See
I.R.C. § 86 (including Social Security benefits in taxable gross income if the sum of a taxpayer's
modified adjusted gross income and one-half of Social Security benefits received exceeds a base
amount); PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 65, at 12-13 (reporting that in 1997 the Social
Security program's revenues consisted of about 90% from payroll taxes, about 1.7% from
income tax on Social Security benefits, and about 10% from interest on trust fund assets). The
funding occurs on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, meaning generally that the Social Security trust
fund-from which current benefits are paid to today's retirees-is financed through current
payroll tax collections from today's workers. See generally 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 8
(discussing impending Social Security shortfalls and possibilities for reform); PROGRAM
SOLVENCY, supra note 65, at 15-20 (discussing pay-as-you-go financing and impending
shortfalls implicated by changing demographics which indicate a reduction over the next several
decades in current workers relative to elderly benefit recipients).
The funds collected often are referred to as comprising the "Social Security trust fund." In
reality there is neither a fund nor a trust, though the analogy is apt in the sense that employees
effectively are beneficiaries seeking to realize upon an interest administered by the federal
government as trustee. Actually, the "massive account into which the annual [Social Security
tax collections in excess of current benefits owed] are ostensibly deposited exists largely as a
budgetary artifice instead of a pool of actual assets." Id. at 13. This "budgetary artifice"
basically consists of a series of government obligations backed by the promise to tax workers in
the future such that, upon current workers' retirement, adequate benefits might be paid. See id.
at 13-15 (discussing pending shortfalls in Social Security funding as baby boomers retire and
fewer workers remain to support the pay-as-you-go funding of Social Security); see also Allan
Sloan, The Social Security Crackup, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 2000, at 18 (presenting a similar,
although less technical, analysis of the trust fund "myth" and the pay-as-you-go nature of the
system).
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From an equity standpoint, although current payroll taxes are proportional
in that the wages of all covered workers are taxed at the same flat rate of
6.2%,72 the burden of this funding mechanism is regressive in that it often
requires lower wage earners to contribute a greater percentage of their earnings
towards the payment of the tax than do higher wage earners.73 Specifically,
regressivity results because the first dollar of a worker's wages is subject to the
tax at the flat rate, but once wages for a given year reach a certain dollar
amount, all earnings above this wage ceiling are exempt from the tax. 4
72. The total FICA tax rate is actually 15.3%, of which half (or taxes attributable to a tax
rate of 7.65%) are paid by the employer in the case of individuals who are not self-employed.
See Soc. SECURITY & MEDICARE BD. OF TRS., Soc. SECURITY ADMIN., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAM: A SUMMARY OF THE 2003 ANNUAL REPORTS 2 (2003)
(calculating the total FICA tax rate), at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr03summary.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of the worker's
contribution, the taxes above the 6.2% rate go towards funding Hospital Insurance popularly
known as Medicare. See id. at 2 (stating that the 2003 tax that funds Medicare is set at 6.2% for
2003); see also RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 556 (2002) (defining
"proportional tax" as "a tax which takes the same proportion of each taxpayer's income, often
called a 'flat tax"').
73. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 790,827 (1988) (stating that "[s]ocial
security funds are collected in a regressive fashion. . . ."); Graetz, supra note 58, at 864-65
(describing the Social Security tax burden as regressive because the payroll tax does not provide
an exemption for wages that fall below a certain level but does contain a maximum level of
wages that are subject to the tax).
74. For 2003, that ceiling is $87,000, and wage earners will pay FICA taxes up to that
amount at a rate of 6.2% towards the OASDI component of Social Security. See SOCIAL
SECURITY ONLINE, OASDI CoNRmIBUTION AND BENEFIT BASE (explaining that the 2003
contribution and benefit base has been set at $87,000 and that the OASDI tax rate is set at 6.2%
for both employees and employers), at http://www.ssa.gov/OACF/COLA/CBB.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). With respect to regressivity
in the funding mechanism for Social Security, consider that a worker having wages of $50,000
in 2003 will pay FICA taxes on all wages earned for a total tax liability attributable to Social
Security OASDI benefits of $3, 100, or 6.2% of her wages. In contrast, a worker having wages
of $200,000 in 2003 would pay FICA taxes on only the first $87,000 of wages (i.e., only wages
up to the 2003 wage ceiling amount are taxed), resulting in an OASDI tax liability of $5,394-
which although greater in amount, represents only 2.7% of such worker's wages. For more on
this regressivity analysis, see Graetz, supra note 58, at 864-65, noting that the "fundamental
problem" with the payroll tax lies in the upper and lower bounds of the wages subject to
taxation. In evaluating the true magnitude of the regressivity, it should be kept in mind that
"[e]conomists generally agree that both the employers' and the employees' shares of Social
Security taxes are borne by employees in the form of reduced wages." Graetz, supra note 58, at
867; see supra note 72 (regarding the employer versus employee share of the tax); see also
STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 20-
24 (1993) (discussing the idea of who bears the "incidence" of a tax, which may ultimately be
someone other than the party nominally required to pay the tax). A relatively straightforward
approach to mitigating this negative aspect of Social Security funding would be to repeal the
wage ceiling such that all wages of higher income workers are subject to the tax, while
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The progressive nature of the Social Security retirement benefit structure,
however, mitigates the regressivity in the Social Security funding mechanism.
75
First, the formula for calculating benefit payments considers only that portion
of a worker's average annual earnings that were subject to the payroll tax each
year. 76 Higher wage earners therefore get no credit in the benefits formula for
wages earned in excess of the applicable ceilings during their working lives.
Second, the rate at which benefits are paid decreases as the amount of average
annual covered wages increases." The combination of these two factors results
in Social Security replacing a lower percentage of higher lifetime preretirement
wage earners' wages than lower lifetime wage earners. Stated differently, the
benefits paid to former lower wage earners upon retirement generally should
replace a greater percentage of their preretirement wages than the benefits paid
to former high wage earners.78 Consequently, commentators acknowledge this
benefits structure as both progressive and positively redistributional.79 In less
correspondingly imposing a wage floor below which the tax would not be imposed. See Graetz,
supra note 58, at 864-74 (advocating this approach).
75. See ALAN L. GUSTMAN & THOMAS L. STEINMEIER, How EFFECTIVE IS REDISTRIBUTION
UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT FORMULA? I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7597, 2000) [hereinafter NBER No. 7597] (describing the Social Security benefit
formula as progressive, replacing a higher share of earnings for individuals with lower incomes),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7597.
76. See SOC. SECURI'Y ADMiN., SOCIAL SECURITY: How YOUR BENEFITS ARE CALCULATED
1-2 (2003) (instructing that actual earnings, but not more than a maximum amount, are to be
entered into the calculation of estimated retirement benefits), at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
10070.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); supra
note 74 and accompanying text (regarding the wage ceiling). The rate considers the worker's
earnings over the worker's thirty-five years of highest earnings. See PROGRAM SOLVENCY,
supra note 65, at 13-15 (stating that benefits are currently calculated using the thirty-five years
of highest earnings instead of total lifetime earnings).
77. For example, benefits recently were paid at the rate of 90% of the first $6,372 of
average annual earnings, 32% of the next $32,052, and 15% of the excess earnings. See NBER
No. 7597, supra note 75, at 5 (describing how the Social Security benefit formula works in
general). These are the actual figures for the year 2000, when the FICA wage ceiling stood at
$76,200. See id. (providing the specific benefits formula for the year 2000). It also could be
noted that a special minimum benefit is provided for certain workers having an adequate work
history, but low average wages. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1 )(C) (2000) (providing a minimum
primary insurance amount of $1 1.50 multiplied by the individual's years of coverage in excess
often); Moore, supra note 65, at 972-73 (discussing this aspect of Social Security in terms of
social adequacy).
78. See, e.g., Burke & McCouch, supra note 65, at 1212 ("[A] progressive formula...
ensures that the 'replacement rate'-the ratio of benefits to preretirement wages-varies
inversely with the level of preretirement wages. High earners receive larger benefits in absolute
terms, while low earners receive a larger percentage of their preretirement wages." (footnotes
omitted)).
79. See NBER No. 7597, supra note 75, at 5-6 (describing the calculation of Social
Security benefits and stating that by applying a progressive formula, benefits are redistributed to
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relative terms, Social Security retirement benefits constitute the major source of
income for two-thirds of Social Security beneficiaries, and the only source of
income for one-fifth of beneficiaries. 80 This fact emphasizes the important role
such benefits play for a substantial segment of the former working population.
Given these realities and the base income maintenance objective at issue,
it is not surprising that creditors of a worker covered by Social Security are
precluded from collecting on their claims out of the worker's Social Security
"entitlement. ', 8' Despite the individual equity aspect of Social Security-which
suggests that these promised "government" benefits are in fact calculated by
reference to the recipient's own earnings history and thus could be
characterized as being in the nature of a self-settled entitlement-this
legislatively-granted protection has generated neither serious debate nor
objection. In light of the progressive nature of the Social Security benefits
structure and the status of persons most dependent upon such benefits, the
protection at issue generally does not present significant equity concerns. The
misnomer that would be "Social Security wealth protection," coupled with the
poverty and resulting public burden that could result should such benefits be
subjected to creditor claims, further evinces the lack of any significant
overriding equity or other objection to the protection of such benefits from the
claims of a worker's creditors. 82 While the characterization in this Article of
the Federal Retirement Model is most concerned with the tax-favored vehicles
associated with private pensions and personal savings, a simplistic view
(though a mischaracterization on some fronts) might posit an individual's
Social Security entitlement as a beneficial interest in the Social Security trust
fund, decisively shielded from creditor claims by virtue of the congressional
individuals with low covered earnings over their lifetimes); Burke & McCouch, supra note 65,
at 1213 ("Social security has become massively redistributive .... "); Graetz, supra note 58, at
872 (describing the first fifty years of Social Security as "a very successful redistributive
program").
80. 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 16; see also supra note 67 (discussing the balance of
income for persons aged sixty-five and older).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (providing that no portion of an individual's Social Security
benefits shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, bankruptcy law or any other legal
process); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413,416-17 (1973) (finding that 42
U.S.C. § 407 bars all claims, including claims made by a state, against an individual's Social
Security benefits).
82. But see, e.g., RiCHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 62-
74 (1997) (discussing the Social Security "wealth effect," which some commentators posit as
historically having motivated earlier retirement decisions through provision of greater than
expected benefits).
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conclusion that the purpose and policies underlying that interest outweigh any
concern for creditors.8 3
The point here, however, is not to deconstruct that characterization. The
purpose of this Article is to explain the Social Security model, its anti-poverty
function, and its asset protection component as aspects of the larger retirement
income security objective. This discussion serves as a precursor to more
difficult inquiries relating to asset protection for the remaining legs of the
triadic retirement income security stool. In that vein, one must note that Social
Security benefits are of less monetary significance in terms of basic retirement
income adequacy for those former workers who managed to accumulate other
rights or assets during their working years to serve as a source of income during
retirement. While the retirement system embraced by Congress actually
inspires the accumulation of such other rights and assets (purportedly for
retirement uses), the creditor-protected status of those assets is much more
complicated in both its technical detail and theoretical justification. As
explored below, it is this more wealth-enabled group of persons and their
accumulated rights and assets that the Federal Retirement Model affects most
directly. With the foregoing discussion of Social Security and its anti-poverty
function as a backdrop, the mechanisms of retirement policy-including the
asset protection component thereof-begin to take on a somewhat different
flavor.
B. Something More: Private Pensions and Personal Savings
Commentators have long recognized that Social Security alone is not
sufficient to achieve the broadly stated objectives of federal retirement policy,
particularly when considered in light of the lifestyle maintenance facet of those
objectives.8 4 Commentators have therefore recognized that a supplemental
source of retirement income is both desirable and necessary." The need for
83. See supra note 71 regarding the misconception that Social Security is a trust fund.
84. See MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 13 (noting how inadequacies in Social Security led to
the push for private pensions); COMING OF AGE, supra note 58, at 11-13 (discussing the growth
and design of Social Security and stating that "[w]hile Social Security alone is not sufficient at
any income level to maintain preretirement living standards... benefits do provide a basic
foundation of income support"); SASS, supra note 62, at 140 (noting in evaluating the early
success of Social Security: "But to union members approaching retirement, Social Security
benefits that replaced just one-third of their pre-retirement incomes were hardly satisfactory.");
Altman, supra note 58, at 494 ("[F]rom its inception, Social Security has generally been
recognized as inadequate by itself to maintain the standard of living of all but the very poorest
recipients.").
85. See, e.g., 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 17 ("[R]etirement security requires that
RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGHASSET PROTECTION 185
that supplement is more pronounced in the case of former high wage earners.86
The reason-as suggested by the limited Social Security benefits paid under the
system's progressive benefits formula-is that the higher a worker's average
preretirement earnings, the more substantial the decline in the worker's
standard of living upon retirement if the worker was dependent solely upon
Social Security as the source of her retirement income.87 Private pension plans
and personal savings affect that supplement in varying degrees, operating as the
last two "legs" of the triumvirate of federal retirement income security
programs.
88
Private retirement plans come in a variety of forms.89 Many are employer-
sponsored, while others are individually directed and tend to resemble private
savings arrangements as opposed to purely retirement-oriented devices. The
"pension plan" designation, however, generally refers to a voluntary and
employer-sponsored plan of deferred employee compensation.9" The
public pensions be supplemented by individual savings and private pension benefits."). With
respect to this concern in the crafting and adoption of ERISA, see, for example, the discussion
of congressional intent and legislator comments set forth in Wohl, supra note 35, at 28-29
("Congress also sought through ERISA to provide benefits to a wider group of citizens and to
assist retirees in maintaining at least a minimal standard of living by securing greater benefits
for retirees than would be available under Social Security." (footnotes omitted)).
86. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing the progressive and
redistributional nature of the Social Security benefits structure).
87. This statement is somewhat of an overgeneralization because the worker's
preretirement standard of living, relative to that in retirement, is likely to be gauged by reference
to the standard of living enjoyed in the working years closest to retirement, as opposed to some
average of that enjoyed over the person's working life. See MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 25
(noting the larger role for private pensions in providing a Social Security supplement to higher
lifetime wage earners, particularly as gauged by earnings at retirement); 21 ST CENTURY, supra
note 57, at 17 ("The average monthly Social Security benefit for a retired worker in July 1998
was $767, less than the gross monthly salary from a minimum wage job." (footnote omitted));
SASS, supra note 62, at 140 (discussing inadequacies of Social Security benefits to unionized
laborers); see also supra note 67 regarding the relative distribution of Social Security benefits.
88. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 13 (discussing the early recognition of Social
Security as inadequate and the role of private pensions in addressing that inadequacy from 1935
forward); SASS, supra note 62, at 139-41 (discussing organized labor's role in private pension
movement during the 1940s-1970s as driven in part by recognition of inadequacies of Social
Security); supra note 85 (discussing the need for a supplemental source of retirement income).
89. See supra note 16 regarding the use of the generic term "retirement plan" in this
Article.
90. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 25
(3d ed. 2000) (characterizing private pension plans as voluntary, employer-sponsored, and tax-
favored). More technically, ERISA distinguishes between "employee welfare benefit plans,"
which generally include employer sponsored plans that provide medical, vacation and similar
nonretirement oriented benefits, and "employee pension benefit plans" (a/k/a "pension plans"),
which generally include employer-sponsored plans that provide retirement income to employees
or otherwise provide for deferral of employee income until after termination of employment.
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employer's sponsorship typically consists of the employer establishing and
maintaining the plan for the benefit of its employees. From the employees'
perspective, "[t]he pension fund serves during the years of employment as a
means of conducting a savings program for retirement... shift[ing] income
from years of employment to years of retirement."9' Most often such plans
enjoy certain tax advantages granted by the federal government in order to
encourage employee participation and employer sponsorship. Tax incentives
therefore play a pivotal role in the implementation of federal retirement
policy.92 Related provisions of federal law designed to enhance the security of
the retirement promise-as that promise is supported by the funds set aside in
the various plan types-also play a pivotal role in this implementation. This
Article discusses these matters next. It first gives brief attention to private
pension plan types, and it then gives more detailed consideration to the issues
of security and incentives.
1. Private Pension Plan Types
There are two broad categories of tax-favored pension plans that an
employer might sponsor: defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans. 93 With a defined benefit (DB) plan, the employer promises to provide a
certain level of benefits at retirement.94 The employer backs that promise by
contributing funds to a trust based upon actuarial assumptions about the level of
funds needed to finance the promised future benefit.9 The employer does not
ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-
(2)(A) (2000)). The general definition of a pension plan under the ERISA labor title, however,
is not limited to those plans of deferred compensation which are tax-favored. With respect to
tax incentives and plans of deferred compensation that are not eligible for such tax advantages,
see infra note 130.
91. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 4.
92. See infra Part III.C regarding the tax incentives.
93. See JCX-16-99, supra note 57, at 5 (describing the allocation of benefits under
defined benefit and defined contribution plans); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEHS-00-207,
CASH BALANCE PLANS 7-9 (2000) [hereinafter GAO-CASH BALANCE PLANS] (discussing defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans as types of tax-qualified pension plans), available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00207.pdf; Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The
Changing Face of Private Retirement Plans, in THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE:
INCREMENTAL ACTION OF FUNDAMENTAL REFORM? 121, 122-23 (Edelman et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing the differences between defined benefit and defined contribution plans).
94. The benefit typically is determined by reference to the employee's average pay in the
last few years of work. The benefit instead might be tied to some other salary average, such as
during the three years of most highly compensated employment.
95. See VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 93, at 122 ("Employers offering DB plans
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maintain a specific account for any individual participant. Instead, the trust is
in essence a "general fund" out of which the plan pays each employee's
promised benefit as the pension promise comes due.96 The employer thus bears
the risk that the contributed funds and investment returns thereon may be
insufficient to fund the promised benefit, in which event the employer would
have to make unanticipated additional contributions to make up any shortfall.9 7
In contrast, a central aspect of a defined contribution (DC) plan is the
allocation of a portion of the employee's compensation to a separate account
maintained on behalf of that individual employee.98 The benefit paid at the
employee's retirement depends upon the investment performance of the
separate account rather than upon some promise of a specified level of benefit.
The employee bears the risk (or reaps the reward) if the investment
performance of the account deviates from expectations." Thus, the prospect of
significant assets accumulating in a fund earmarked solely for a specific
employee is inherent in the DC plan model.'0°
must make contributions based on federal funding rules... in order to maintain the plan's
qualified (tax-favored) status."). With regard to the use of a trust, see infra notes 112-14.
96. VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 93, at 122 (describing defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans as types of tax-qualified pension plans).
97. See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA.
TAX REv. 607, 610-11 (2000) (discussing how the sponsoring employer in a defined benefit
plan is liable for the payment of benefits and therefore bears the risk of having insufficient
assets to cover the promised payment at retirement).
98. The contribution may be made by the employee, the employer, or both. See JCX- 16-
99, supra note 57, at 5 (stating that under a defined contribution plan "an employee may elect to
have the employer make payments as contributions to a qualified plan on behalf of the
employee, or the employee directly in cash"); GAO-CAsH BALANCE PLANS, supra note 93, at 8
(stating that a defined contribution plan is expressed as an individual account balance to which
either the employer, the worker, or both employer and worker contribute); VanDerhei &
Copeland, supra note 93, at 122-23 (describing defined contribution plan contributions made
by both employers and employees as being placed in individual accounts). Perhaps the most
well-known and prevalent type of DC plan is the tax code denominated "§ 401(k) plan," which
provides generally that a specified percentage of an employee's pay can be set aside in a
separate account for that employee, with the contribution coming from either or both of the
employee or employer. The plan name comes from the I.R.C. provisions that authorize certain
favorable tax consequences for this type of plan. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000) (providing the tax
consequences for a cash or deferred arrangement qualified pension plan).
99. See GAO-CASH BALANCE PLANS, supra note 93, at 8 ("Retirement benefits are not
guaranteed, and employees bear the risk of poor investment performance."); Jefferson, supra
note 97, at 611-12 (discussing how the individual participant in a defined contribution plan
bears the risk of having insufficient assets for retirement because the benefit is determined by
account balance and not by a fixed amount). Plans permitted for self-employed individuals,
known as Keogh or HR- 10 plans, generally fall into this category of DC plans. See LANGBEN &
WOLK, supra note 90, at 54 (describing the origins of Keogh plans for the self-employed).
100. This prospect foreshadows the wealth accumulation dimension of the retirement plan
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2. Concern for Workers' Retirement Security
A definite trend exists in the area of employer-sponsored pension plans.
That trend reflects movement away from DB plans and towards DC plans, and
in particular towards cash or deferred arrangements (CODAs), such as the
§ 401(k) plan.'0 ' In reference to such trends, one might emphasize the
congressional authorization of the § 401(k) plan as important in the wealth
accumulation/asset protection dynamic, but that focus would be too narrow. 
02
The broader and more significant view reveals that congressional concern for
the security of workers' retirement savings prompted the 1974 adoption of
pervasive new pension legislation, popularly known as ERISA, which today
serves as the foundation of the private pension system.'0 3 Several highly
publicized scandals involving lapses in the vesting of pension plan benefits and
inadequate management and funding of the plans motivated Congress to enact
this "intricate and comprehensive statute" that expressly codifies as among its
overriding purposes the protection of pension plan participants and their
beneficiaries.' °4 Congress granted this protection through the imposition of
asset protection dilemma, as discussed infra Part V.C. This possibility also harks back to the
wealth accumulation and self-settlement objections attendant the more traditional spendthrift
trust policy debate touched upon in supra Part 11.
101. Profit sharing plans, stock bonus plans and other plans which include cash
now/deferred compensation options are sometimes also referred to as a qualified cash or
deferred arrangements (CODAs). See generally JCS-3-95, supra note 63, at 15 (discussing
special rules that apply to qualified cash or deferred arrangements). As to the trend, see
generally Jefferson, supra note 97, at 614-15, listing reasons for this shift as: (1) less onerous
administrative burdens and costs for DC plans; (2) more frequent changes in the laws relating to
DB plans; and (3) employee preference for flexibility, vesting schedules, and participant
involvement in DC plans.
102. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §135, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785-2787
(codified at I.R.C. § 401(k)) (amending I.R.C. § 401 and authorizing new § 401(k)).
103. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); see JCX-16-99, supra note 57, at 2 ("The present-law rules
governing qualified plans originated in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974... [which] forms the basis for the current private pension system."). "Retirement income
security" generally refers to the broad objective of insuring adequate retirement income, and
should not refer to the more narrow idea of protecting retirement assets from creditor claims.
See supra Part lIl.A (discussing Social Security benefits as providing a floor for insuring
adequate retirement income).
104. See ERISA § 2 (declaring the policy of the statute to include protecting the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (same);
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (discussing ERISA as an "intricate, comprehensive
statute" whose provisions provide detailed protections to the spouses of plan participants); see
also LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 90, at 68-84 (discussing the Studebaker incident and the
legislative history of ERISA); SASS, supra note 62, at 191-202 (discussing incidents preceding
the enactment of ERISA); William J. Chadwick & David S. Foster, Federal Regulation of
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minimum requirements for reporting, disclosure, participation, vesting,
funding, and fiduciary conduct with respect to covered plans.'05 These
requirements are set forth in dual and often overlapping labor and tax
provisions. *°6
3. The ERISA Labor Mandate
Although ERISA is directed most specifically at assuring that employee
benefit plans are financially sound and fair in their treatment of employees,
10 7
ERISA also requires that covered pension plan benefits be facially sheltered
from employees' creditor claims by the umbrella of an anti-alienation
provision.'0 8 As set forth in the statutes, this anti-alienation provision "looks
strikingly like language describing a traditional spendthrift trust."' 9
Specifically, in ERISA § 206(d)(1), Congress mandated that "[e]ach pension
plan shall provide that benefits.., under the plan may not be assigned or
Retirement Plans: The Questfor Parity, 28 VAND. L. Rv. 643, 668-81 (1975) (tracing the
origins and operation of ERISA).
105. See ERISA § 2 (declaring that ERISA interests will be protected by requiring
disclosure, establishing standards of conduct, and providing for remedies); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(same).
106. Codification in Titles 26 and 29 of the U.S. Code reflects the dual nature of ERISA as
both a labor and a tax statute, with the tax provisions now appearing with the rest of the Internal
Revenue Code in Title 26 and the Treasury Department regulations thereunder. Regulations
promulgated by the Department of Labor accompany the labor provisions in Title 29. The labor
provisions identify various types of plans and the standards to which they are subject, while the
tax provisions specify attributes required in order for a plan to qualify for the favorable tax
treatment that is so fundamental to many such plans. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (providing
the ERISA labor provisions); I.R.C. §§ 401-420 (2000) (providing a sampling of ERISA tax
provisions); see also In re Sewell, 180 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1999) ("ERISA is a largely
parallel, dual system, jointly administered by the Department of Labor and the Department of
the Treasury, and statutorily bifurcated into Titles 26 and 29 of the U.S. Code."); JCX-16-99,
supra note 57, at 25 (discussing the dual aspects of ERISA). A review of the various reporting,
disclosure, participation, vesting, funding, and fiduciary requirements of ERISA is beyond the
scope of this Article.
107. See ERISA § 2 (finding it desirable to assure "the equitable character of such plans
and their financial soundness"); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (same).
108. The anti-alienation provision set forth in the ERISA labor title is found in ERISA
§ 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), and is hereinafter referred to in the text as "ERISA
§ 206(d)(1 )." The comparable tax provision is found in I.R.C. § 401 (a)(13), as discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 123-26.
109. Wohl, supra note 35, at 16; see also Sewell, 180 F.3d at 709 ("Among other typical
ERISA provisions, the Plan contains.., an anti-alienation or 'spendthrift' clause...."). Supra
notes 18-21 discuss spendthrift trusts and the anti-alienation provisions that underlie their
protective nature.
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alienated." 0o The technical definition of"pension plans" is broad,"' and thus
the anti-alienation mandate applies to the bulk of private employer-sponsored
retirement arrangements established to benefit employees. In most instances,
the provision of benefits must be accomplished via utilization of a trust that
holds the assets from which such benefits ultimately are paid." 2 The
association between employer-sponsored pension plans and traditional
spendthrift trusts therefore was an easy one to make in the formative stages of
the Federal Retirement Model's asset protection dynamic.
Exceptions exist, however, to the ERISA labor title's coverage, its trust
requirement, and its anti-alienation mandate. "3  Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs)-which are more like tax-favored individual savings
accounts than pension plans-are important among the arrangements excepted
from ERISA § 206(d)(1). 114 ERISA also excepts plans established by the self-
110. ERISA § 206(d)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). It also should be noted that a handful of
specific but limited types of assignments are still permitted, even when ERISA § 206(dX1) does
apply. Specifically permitted are: (1) voluntary and revocable assignments of not more than
10% of any benefit payment; (2) assignments relating to qualified domestic relations orders as
described in I.R.C. § 414(p) or 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B); and (3) certain assignments made as
security for a limited class of loans made from the plan to a participant or beneficiary. See
ERISA §§ 206(d)(2)-(3) (setting forth the permitted assignments); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(2)-(3)
(same); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13)(A)-(B) (providing that a trust will not be qualified if it is
assignable but also setting forth permitted assignments).
111. As discussed supra note 90, for purposes of the labor title, "pension plan" as defined
under ERISA encompasses private employer-sponsored plans that provide retirement income to
employees or otherwise provide for deferral of employee income until after termination of
employment. See ERISA § 3(2)(A) (defining "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension
plan"); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (same); ERISA § 3(3) (providing that "employee benefit plan"
includes "pension plan"); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (same); ERISA § 4(a) (delineating ERISA
coverage); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (same); see also infra note 123 (discussing the term "qualified
trust").
112. See ERISA § 403(a) (providing that all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be
held in a trust); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (same).
113. The most important exceptions to the trust requirement relate to assets held under
certain types of insurance contracts, individual retirement accounts that are custodial in nature,
and I.R.C. § 403(b) annuity contracts. See ERISA § 403(b) (providing exceptions to the
requirement that all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in a trust); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(b) (same); see also infra note 128 (regarding trust status under the tax provisions of
ERISA). Some courts, however, have read the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area, as
discussed infra Part IV.B.2, as expanding the scope of ERISA's protection to retirement
vehicles that are not in trust form. See, e.g., In re Barnes, 264 B.R. 415,421-29 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich 2001) (discussing cases that support the notion that any plan subject to ERISA
§ 206(d)(1) can be excluded from the bankruptcy estate under 1I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) without
regard to whether or not the plan is in the form of a trust).
114. The IRA is a type of tax-favored personal savings plan originating in 1974 under
ERISA as a tax-favored retirement savings opportunity to those individuals not participating in
an employer-sponsored plan. See ERISA § 2002 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to
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employed (Keogh plans) where partners or sole owners, but generally not
employees, are the only participants. 51s ERISA also excepts other unfunded or
employer-specific plans such as those for governmental, church, and charitable
employees." 16 The ERISA § 206(d)(1) mandate therefore is quite pervasive,
but leaves many arrangements to other protective considerations."' Fully
grasping the nature and import of this complex asset protection scheme requires
an understanding of the ERISA labor title's anti-alienation mandate in context
with a corresponding mandate set forth in the ERISA tax title, as is discussed
next.18
C. Tax Qualification and the Incentive Trade-off
In contrast to the mandatory Social Security program, employer
sponsorship of a pension plan is voluntary, as is an individual's decision to
save." 9 The federal government does, however, provide certain incentives
designed to encourage these activities. Internal Revenue Code provisions
reflect the primary incentives. Those provisions grant favorable tax treatment
include IRAs). Part 2 of Title I of ERISA-which includes the § 206(d)(1) spendthrift mandate
of the labor title-excepts these arrangements by operation of ERISA § 201(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1051(6).
115. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3(b)-(c) (2002) (excepting plans without employees); see
also infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text (regarding Keogh plans).
116. See ERISA § 403(b) (excluding from scope of § 206(d)(I) the enumerated types of
plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (same). ERISA § 403(b) also excepts certain insurance policies or
contracts and for amounts held in qualifying custodial accounts. ERISA's entire labor
provisions exclude annuity plans of certain charitable employers such as educational
institutions, as well as "excess benefit" plans established to permit contributions and to provide
benefits in excess of tax code limitations. See ERISA § 4(b) (providing broader exceptions to
coverage under any of the ERISA labor title); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (same). As seen infra Part
IV, these distinctions are directly relevant to defining the paths to asset protection under the
Federal Retirement Model.
117. Such considerations are discussed more fully infra Part IV.B.3.
118. See supra note 9 regarding the codification of ERISA in Title 29 (labor provisions)
and Title 26 (tax provisions) of the U.S. Code.
119. See GAO-CASH BALANCE PLANS, supra note 93, at 11 ("Federal law does not require
that employers sponsor pension plans nor does it mandate the value of the benefit provided by
plans that the employer voluntarily sponsors."); COMING OF AGE, supra note 58, at 11-13
(discussing the voluntary nature of the pension system and the influences upon worker
participation); Peter M. van Zante, Mandated Vesting: Suppression of Voluntary Retirement
Benefits, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 125, 128-41 (1995) (same); Paul J. Yakoboski, Retirement
Plan Design and Policy into the 21st Century, 56 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N 2-1, 2-5-2-6
(Supp. 1998) (detailing statistics on voluntary participation in pension plans since enactment of
ERISA).
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where funds are set aside in a "tax-qualified" pension or retirement savings plan
that conforms to certain requirements and limitations. 20 Accepting these
requirements and limitations is in effect a trade-off for workers-and in the
case of employer-sponsored pension plans, for the sponsoring employer-of
receiving the favorable tax treatment.
1. The Immediate Trade-off: Conditioned Tax Incentives
Commentators therefore describe Congress's approach to the private
pension and retirement savings plan area as grounded in a "carrot and stick"
mentality. The "carrot" represents the tax incentives, and the "stick" represents
the requirements and limitations that adhere to the favorably treated plan in
order to ostensibly further the underlying goals of retirement income security.'
For most plans, a prerequisite to receiving such favorable tax treatment is that
plan contributions be made to a trust meeting certain delineated
requirements. 2 1 Of particular interest in this regard is the anti-alienation
requirement embodied in the ERISA tax title at I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). That
provision specifies that a retirement "trust shall not constitute a qualified trust
[eligible for favorable tax treatment]... unless the plan of which such trust is a
120. The author uses "tax-qualified" here to describe generally a retirement plan that
conforms to the tax code prerequisites for receiving the favorable tax treatment described in Part
lII.C. Specifics may be found in I.R.C. §§ 401-420 (2000). See ERISA § 2 (noting revenue
loss to government attributable to preferential tax treatment accorded certain retirement plans),
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (same); JCX-16-99, supra note 57, at 4 (discussing the use of tax policy to
motivate pension funding as a source of retirement income); COMING OF AGE, supra note 58, at
I I (same). With regard to the distinction between "tax-qualified" and "ERISA-qualified," see
infra notes 223-227 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Daniel l. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should it
Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1993) (stating that "[a]t the same time as the stick
(restrictions) has become heavier, the carrot (tax relief) has become less sweet"); IPPOLITO,
supra note 82, at 174 (noting favorable tax treatment coupled with conformity to certain rules
necessary to receive this treatment: "Two aspects of the tax code dominate the treatment of
savings for retirement"); see also GAO-CASH BALANCE PLANS, supra note 93, at 6 ("Congress
has used the [Tax] Code to encourage employers to sponsor pensions to help workers achieve
adequate income for retirement. In exchange for providing preferential tax treatment, Congress
has imposed requirements that plans must meet for tax qualification ...."); Dilley, supra note
66, at 1141 ("In effect, the Code uses a carrot-and-stick approach to encourage employers to set
up pension plans for their work forces--the carrot is the tax benefit of establishing a qualified
pension plan and the stick is the limit on that benefit ...."); van Zante, supra note 119, at 134
("[T]he price of qualification for this income tax treatment is conformity to a system of minute
regulation ...").
122. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (setting forth the requirements for qualified trusts).
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part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated."' 2 3 In contrast to the anti-alienation language that must be included
in a plan that is subject to § 206(d)(1) of the ERISA labor title, however, no
trust is required to include the anti-alienation language described in the tax title
at I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).124 Moreover, no enforcement mechanism exists if the
I.R.C. § 401 (a)(13) restraint is violated or simply omitted. 25 Instead, the I.R.C.
§ 401 (a)(l 3) anti-alienation provision is a price to be voluntarily paid (i.e., the
"stick") only by those who desire favorable tax treatment (i.e., the "carrot"). 126
Some arrangements, however-most notably IRAs and non-employee Keogh
plans-may qualify for favorable tax treatment notwithstanding the absence of
an I.R.C. § 401 (a)(1 3) anti-alienation provision. 127 Limited exceptions exist as
to the trust requirement as well.'
123. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13 (1988) ("Under section
401 (a)(I 3), a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of which the trust is a part provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be ... assigned ... alienated .... "). While the trust
technically qualifies by virtue of the spendthrift restraint and the plan then qualifies by virtue of
the utilization of a qualified trust, the terms "tax-qualified plan" and "tax-qualified trust" are
used interchangeably here, consistent with common parlance identifying a plan which conforms
to the tax code prerequisites for receiving such favorable tax treatment as a "qualified plan." See
supra note 120 (defining tax qualified). For similar short-hand phraseology, see, for example,
BORIS L. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
§ 61.2 (2d ed. vol. 2, 1990).
124. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (providing that a trust will not be a qualified trust unless it
meets the requirements for an anti-alienation provision); Treas. Reg. § !.401 (a)-] 3 (1988)
(providing that a trust must provide that benefits may not be alienated in order to be qualified).
125. But see infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing how the L.R.C. § 401 (a)(13)
anti-alienation provision still may be given effect).
126. Although the legislative history is devoid of content on the point, it seems clear that at
the time enacted, Congress envisioned the anti-alienation provision requirements
correspondingly set forth in the ERISA tax and labor titles to be a "stick" of general (though not
universal) applicability. See Dilley, supra note 35, at 396-98 (stating that Congress included
the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA as part of the vesting requirements which represent a
clear constraint on employer behavior). The delineation of the I.R.C. anti-alienation provisions
within the context of qualified trust requirements supports this characterization as a "stick" in
the overall incentive scheme. Further supporting this view is the association of the ERISA
spendthrift mandate with the vesting rules attendant covered plans, and in particular, as a
reinforcement of the limitation on employee access to plan funds under the dominant DB plan
type at the time of ERISA's enactment. For analysis that supports this view, see Dilley, supra
note 35, at 396-99.
127. For additional insight into this treatment of IRAs and Keogh plans, see the text
accompanying infra notes 135-4 1.
128. Like the ERISA labor provisions, the tax code provisions focus on the trust as the
pervasive vehicle for retirement plan asset management. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(a) (providing
tax deferral for contributions to qualified trusts); id. § 401(a) (setting forth requirements for
qualified trusts). However, as under the labor title, the provisions make exceptions for certain
insurance policies or contracts and for amounts held in qualifying custodial accounts. See supra
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As to the "carrot," the tax incentives operate on three fronts. First,
workers receive a significant and immediate tax incentive via the ability to
exclude from gross income the amounts set aside in a tax-qualified retirement
plan. 2 9 Simply stated, the employee can defer tax liability upon the amounts
set aside until those amounts actually are distributed to the employee, which
often is decades in the future. 130 The second key tax incentive pertains to the
note 113 (discussing exceptions under the labortitle); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 404(a)(l)-(5) (setting
forth tax deduction provisions for contributions to qualified trusts, annuity plans, and other
arrangements). Despite the absence of a formal trust, however, the statute may accord such
arrangements treatment comparable to that of a qualified trust, including treatment indicating
the inclusion of the anti-alienation provision called for under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 401(0 (stating that custodial accounts, annuities, and other contracts issued by an
insurance company "shall be treated as a qualified trust" if the requirements pertaining to such
trusts are otherwise met); id. § 404(a)(2) (establishing compliance with I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) anti-
alienation provision as requirement for tax-qualified employee annuities); see also BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 123, §§ 61.2, 61.15 (discussing qualified trust and qualified plan
requirements); MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 7.3 (2003 ed. vol. 1,2002)
("However, the custodian [of an account created in lieu of a trust] will be treated as trustee ....
[A] qualified annuity plan does not need to have a trust .... However, a common practice with
a plan in which individual annuity policies are issued is to have a trust agreement .... "
(footnotes omitted)); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 222 ("Annuity plans.., do not have
a trust [but nevertheless] must meet essentially all of the requirements of I.R.C. § 401 (a) ....
Accordingly, we shall ignore any distinction .... ."). The author will pursue further exploration
of these finer distinctions and non-trust vehicles in the specific context of the applicable asset
protection legal framework described infra Part IV. The Federal Retirement Model is grounded
in the spendthrift trust type arrangement, but is more appropriately conceived as encompassing
related vehicles ostensibly authorized and encouraged to promote retirement income security
objectives. See In re Barnes, 264 B.R. 415,421-29 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 2001) (discussing cases
that support the notion that any plan subject to ERISA § 206(d)(1) can be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate under I I U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) without regard to whether or not the plan is in
the form of a trust).
129. This is the case even though the tax-qualified plan may be funded and the employee's
rights are therein vested. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (providing for the taxation of the amount
distributed under an exempt employees' trust in the taxable year in which it is distributed). See
generally JCX- 16-99, supra note 57, at 5-8 (discussing operative tax treatment of tax qualified
plans and similar arrangements).
130. Otherwise applicable U.S. income tax rules generally dictate that earnings from
employment are included in gross income and therefore taxed to the employee in the year
received by or set aside for the benefit of the employee. The employee's liability for taxes due
on such earnings therefore would serve to reduce the net amount of earnings ultimately retained
by the employee for investment to support retirement. The exclusion from gross income
provided under the retirement plan tax incentive, in contrast, abrogates such tax liability with
respect to contributions to the plan whether the contributions are made by the employee or by
the employer on behalf of the employee. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(l) (providing that gross income
includes compensation for services rendered); Id. §§ 83(a),(h) (coordinating employee's
inclusion of property received in exchange for services with employer's deduction); Id. § 402(b)
(providing that employee is currently taxable on contributions made to a trust that is not tax-
qualified); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (discussing tax inclusion issues of constructive
receipt and economic benefit). These rules generally mean that amounts paid to or set aside for
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amounts set aside. Specifically, earnings on contributions to the plan
accumulate on a tax-free basis until withdrawn, thus permitting compounded
growth of the fund without annual reduction for taxes due on investment
earnings."' These employee-targeted tax incentives are believed to motivate
employees to pressure employers for the payment of some portion of wages
through a tax-qualified deferred compensation arrangement.'
The third tax-incentive focuses more directly upon employers.
Specifically, for an employer contributing funds to a tax-qualified plan on
behalf of an employee, an incentive is provided in the form of an immediate tax
deduction for the contribution as compensation paid, even though the amount
contributed will not be included in the employee's gross income until
an employee under a nontax-qualified deferred compensation arrangement (a "nonqualified
deferred compensation" (NQDC) arrangement) will be taxable to the employee in the year the
services are performed, despite the absence of immediate cash compensation, unless the plan is
unfunded or the employee's interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. See generally
CANAN, supra note 128, § 2.3 (discussing taxation of employee compensation generally, and in
particular NQDC arrangements); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 249-70 (discussing
taxation of NQDC arrangements); Chadwick & Foster, supra note 104, at 690-91 (discussing
taxation of NQDC arrangements after ERISA); Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax
Expenditures: A Reply to Professor Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225, 226-27 (1991)
(discussing taxation of unfunded deferred compensation arrangements). Note that, in some
situations, an employee may be taxed at the time of an employer contribution to a NQDC plan,
and then can be taxed again when distributions relating to that contribution are received from
the plan. CANAN, supra note 128, § 2.3 (discussing the collective operation of I.R.C. §§ 72,
83(a), & 402(b)).
131. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (setting forth the requirements for qualified trusts); id. § 402(a)
(providing tax deferral for qualified trusts); id. § 408(e) (exempting individual retirement
accounts); id. § 501 (a) (exempting qualified trusts). It is possible to set up an unfunded plan of
NQDC, which results in neither a current outlay by, nor deduction to, the employer, as well as
no current gross income to the employee. Such an arrangement, however, lacks the attribute of
tax-free earnings accumulation, and therefore the value of the future benefit will presumptively
be less. Outside the tax-qualified arena, interest or similar earnings on investments generally are
subject to, and thus reduced by, taxes each year, again serving to reduce the amount that would
ultimately be available for retirement needs. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 61 (a)(4)-(7) (stating that gross
income includes interest, rents, royalties and dividends). Of course, the funds could be invested
in assets which produce tax-exempt earnings, but the promised investment return on such assets
is generally acknowledged to be lower by virtue of their tax-free nature. To the extent the
employee's preferences and circumstances leave room for other than current consumption of
earnings, the unique tax treatment of both the deferred wage and savings elements of the tax-
qualified arrangement provide a definite incentive relative to the otherwise available
compensation and savings options. As to current consumption needs and the ability to take
advantage of the tax incentive, see infra notes 145-148.
132. The significance of this belief is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 155-
158, and again from a more evaluative point of view in Part V.B. 1.
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withdrawn from the tax-qualified plan.'33 The special tax treatment therefore
lowers the relative cost to the employer of paying deferred compensation.1
34
Tax incentives of similar import exist outside the employer-sponsored plan
context. Self-employed persons, for example, may elect to participate in Keogh
plan arrangements that offer tax benefits comparable to those described above
with respect to employer-sponsored plans. 35  Tax-free contributions and
133. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (providing for deduction of employer's contributions to an
employees' trust or annuity plans). The employer's contribution is in the nature of
compensation to the employee, since the contribution is made in recognition of services
provided to the employer by the employee-in other words, the employer's contribution is the
equivalent of a choice of deferred compensation in lieu of current cash compensation by the
employee. See Stein, supra note 130, at 242-43 (noting that the special tax rules reduce costs of
paying deferred compensation, essentially equating the cost of paying deferred compensation to
that of paying immediate compensation by virtue of the availability of an immediate tax
deduction in either case); supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing tax consequences
of employee compensation and NQDC arrangements). All other things being equal, the tax
incentive leaves the employer indifferent as between paying current cash compensation or tax-
qualified deferred compensation. In either case, an immediate deduction is available for the
amount paid to or contributed on behalf of the employee. See Bruce Wolk, Discrimination
Rulesfor Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L.
Rnv. 419, 430 (1984) ("Whether as a $1,000 wage payment or as a $1,000 contribution to a
qualified retirement plan, the employer can deduct the total amount as a business expense.") All
other things are not equal, however, as employers may have nontax reasons for establishing a
retirement plan of deferred compensation. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, How Federal
Pension Laws Influence Individual Work and Retirement Decisions, 54 TAX LAW. 143, 165-70
(2000) (discussing the impact of federal laws upon retirement decisions); Halperin, supra note
121, at 7-9 (making similar observations); Stein, supra note 130, at 240-43 (discussing
employer and employee preferences for deferred compensation that are motivated by non-tax
considerations); van Zante, supra note 119, at 144 (noting employer motivation of increased
employee tenure coupled with facilitation of retirement for less productive older workers).
134. Moreover, an employer contributing funds on behalf of an employee to a plan of
deferred compensation that is not tax-qualified (a "nonqualified deferred compensation"
(NQDC) plan) typically would not receive a deduction until the contributed funds are included
in the employee's gross income. This generally occurs only when the employee receives the
contributed funds or the economic benefits thereof. See I.R.C. §§ 404(a)(5), 404(b) (providing
that outside the tax qualified plan context, the employer's deduction is delayed until the amount
contributed is included in the employee's gross income). With respect to NQDC plans and the
time at which such amounts might be included in the employee's gross income and therefore
subject to tax, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. Regarding Keogh plans, also see the text accompanying supra note I 15. A statutory
artifice that renders such persons both employer and employee for purposes of receiving the tax-
favored deferral/deduction treatment noted above confers the noted benefits. See I.R.C.
§§ 401 (c)(I ), 401 (c)(4) (treating self-employed individuals, sole owners, and members of a
partnership as employees); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 223 (noting that these I.R.C.
provisions treat such individuals as employees for qualified plan purposes, while simultaneously
deeming such individuals an employer for contribution purposes-"The net result is that
contributions to the plan are currently deductible and income is deferred until distribution").
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earnings also are an essential characteristic of the IRA. 36 The exact placement
of Keogh plans and IRAs in supporting the three-legged stool of retirement
income security is debatable, however, despite similarities to the tax incentive
approach applicable to employer-sponsored plans. On the one hand, Keogh
plans and IRAs are not typically employer-sponsored, often have no employees
apart from the owner/settlor, and most often are subject to unilateral participant
control.'3 7 These arrangements therefore appear to be nothing more than a tax-
136. See I.R.C. §§ 219, 408(a) (defining and setting the qualifications for an IRA and
allowing a deduction for retirement savings). Here, the key incentive to a contributing
individual is in the nature of a deduction for gross income which ultimately serves to reduce the
amount of income subject to taxation on a dollar-for-dollar basis. This essentially means that
before-tax dollars can be set aside in a tax-free investment vehicle, just as in the case of an
employer-sponsored plan. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(7), 219 (providing deduction provisions relevant
for contributions to IRAs); id. §408(e)(1) (exempting IRAs from taxation). A key variation on
this theme is the relatively recent addition of the "Roth IRA," in which after-tax dollars are set
aside in an account meeting certain conditions, but thereafter the funds may grow and be
withdrawn without reduction for taxes due, thus providing a similarly (but back-loaded) tax
incentive-laden savings vehicle. See I.R.C. § 408A (defining and providing the qualifications
for a Roth IRA). See generally Regina T. Jefferson, A Farewell to Pension Policy: The Impact
of Flexible IRAs on Current Tax Policy, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 1451, 1456-57 (1996) (describing
the function and purpose of the Roth IRA); Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the
Curious Evolution of Individual Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 287-88 (1999)
(discussing tax consequences of the Roth IRA); Gary S. Lesser, The New Roth IRA Rules: A
Small Price for the Benefits, 6 J. TAx'N EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 147 (1998) (discussing the benefits
of the Roth IRA). Other variations on the IRA theme include the SIMPLE plan (which can exist
in either IRA or 401(k) form) and SEPs. See JCX-1 6-99, supra note 57, at 5-6 (describing the
SIMPLE and SEP retirement plans).
Excepting only a period of liberalization in the early 1980s, the rules governing IRAs have
remained fairly constant since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, although recently passed legislation
raises the annual limit on the amounts an individual may contribute to such an arrangement
gradually from $2,000 to $5,000 through 2008. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 61 1(dXl), 115 Stat. 3897,3897-
98 (codified at I.R.C. § 402(g)) (increasing the maximum dollar amount an individual can
defer). With respect to the history of IRA legislation and amendments thereto, see generally,
JCS-3-95, supra note 63, at 1; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 54-55; Chadwick &
Foster, supra note 104, at 692-97; Kaplan, supra, at 284-88. EGTRRA also provides for a
raising of the limits on annual contributions to other types of retirement arrangements. For
example, the annual limit on the amount which may be contributed by or on behalf of an
employee to a DC plan has been increased to the lesser of $40,000 or 100% of annual
compensation, and the amount of employee's elective deferral (upon which cost of living
adjustments will be made) will rise from a base of $10,500 in 2001 to $15,000 by 2006.
EGTRRA §§ 611 (b), 632 (amending I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)). With respect to DB plans, the statute
raises the annual limit on benefits payable in 2002 to $160,000 (thereafter adjusted for cost-of-
living increases), or 100% of the participant's average compensation over the participant's
highest three compensation years. Id. § 611 (a) (amending I.R.C. § 415(b)(l)(A)).
137. See DeVaney & Chien, supra note 67, at 72 (distinguishing IRAs and Keogh plans
from defined contribution plans). Variations such as the SIMPLE plan, which entails employer
sponsorship and may exist as either an IRA or 401(k) arrangement, and the SEP arrangement,
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favored personal savings opportunity. 138  On the other hand, Keogh plans
accord employer-sponsored plan equivalency to plans established by the self-
employed. 139 Congress similarly conceived the IRA as a fair alternative for
those not participating in employer-sponsored plans. 140 The IRA also is a
frequent receptacle for funds "rolled-over" from a tax-qualified employer-
sponsored retirement plan as a means of continuing the tax-deferral
opportunity.1
4 1
For reasons mentioned and others that the author will make apparent,
however, this Article treats non-employee Keogh plans and IRAs as distinct
from more traditional employer-sponsored retirement arrangements. Among
other concerns, the existence of tax-favored non-employee Keogh plans and
IRAs combined with the limits on the applicability of the ERISA anti-alienation
mandate produces a divided approach to asset protection within the Federal
Retirement Model. 142  One effect of that division is a continuing role for
traditional spendthrift trust concepts and bankruptcy exemption planning ideas
in resolving retirement plan asset protection issues. 43 Two other issues that the
federal tax incentive approach to motivating retirement plan participation raises
also are critical to evaluating asset protection within the Federal Retirement
Model. Those issues are the tax expenditure cost to the federal government of
whereby an employer contributes to an IRA on behalf of an employee, complicate such
generalizations. See JCX-16-99, supra note 57, at 5-6 (discussing employer involvement in
SIMPLE and SEP retirement plans).
138. See, e.g., 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 21 (considering IRAs as an aspect of the
personal savings leg of the stool).
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing a statutory artifice that treats
self-employed persons as both employer and employee).
140. The IRA originated in 1974 under ERISA as a retirement savings vehicle for those
individuals not participating in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. See ERISA, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 2002, 88 Stat. 829, 959-64 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 408, 219) (amending the
Internal Revenue Code to include a provision for individual retirement accounts); supra note
114 (discussing the origins of the IRA).
141. See I.R.C. § 402(c) (setting forth rules relating to rollovers from exempt trusts); JCX-
16-99, supra note 57, at 19 (summarizing the rules for "eligible rollover distributions");
DeVaney & Chien, supra note 67, at 73 ("In addition to acting as a substitute for employer-
sponsored plans, IRAs may be used as a means of rolling over a tax-deferred pension plan when
a worker is changing jobs or retiring."); VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 93, at 127 (noting
that 37% of participants removing assets from § 401(k) plans rolled the amounts over into an
IRA).
142. Supra Part III.B.3 discusses limits on the applicability of the ERISA anti-alienation
mandate. The divided nature of the Federal Retirement Model and the circumstances that have
led to that division are the topic of infra Part IV.B of this Article.
143. See Part IV.B.2 for an exposition of this result.
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providing the noted retirement plan tax incentives and the equity issues thereby
raised.
2. The Broader Trade-off: Equity and the Tax Expenditure
Despite the noted tax-based incentives for participating, not all workers
choose to fund a private retirement plan.'" Many workers do not participate
because they lack any discretionary income above the amount required to meet
current basic needs. In other words, they currently lack the resources to set
aside funds today for future consumption. These and other realities lead to
frequent criticism of the tax-incentive approach to promoting retirement income
security outside the Social Security context, because the incentives, which
come at significant cost to federal revenues, are meaningless to those unable to
take advantage of them due to a lack of resources. 45  Moreover, the tax
incentives are of different value to different workers. Specifically, high-income
workers subject to taxation at relatively higher marginal rates derive the most
value.'16 These tax payers value the incentive more because the benefit of tax
deferral increases as marginal tax rates rise based upon the greater amount that
would otherwise be paid in current taxes absent the favorable tax treatment.
47
144. Statistics in this regard are summarized in JCX-9-02, supra note 16, at 29-33. The
report notes that in 1999, 56% of full-time private sector workers participated in employer-
sponsored tax-qualified retirement plans, with 42% participating in DC plans and 25% in DB
plans, with some employees participating in both. Id. at 29. The growth of DC plans relative to
DB plans since 1978 is also shown to be significant. Id. at 32.
145. See Bankman, supra note 73, at 821 ("A large portion of the income earned by low-
paid employees goes to purchase necessities and near-necessities. Forced purchase of retirement
benefits might deprive such employees of funds currently needed to raise families or otherwise
maintain a barely adequate lifestyle."); Graetz, supra note 58, at 878 (noting that additional tax
incentives for deferred compensation plans are unlikely to entice those already contributing to
Social Security through payroll taxes and thus having little income to spare); Halperin, supra
note 121, at 14 ("Lower income employees cannot be expected to provide for the future when
current income is barely adequate for a minimum standard of living."); Stein, supra note 130, at
244-48 (discussing how current consumption motivations reduce the desire to set aside funds in
a deferred compensation plan); Wolk, supra note 133, at 430-31 (stating that current
consumption needs of lower wage earners impact their ability to save).
146. See Dilley, supra note 35, at 406 (stating that the private pension tax expenditure
favors "higher income workers, male workers, and white workers").
147. See id. at 406-07 (detailing the benefits of deferred taxation to upper income
taxpayers). For example, if Worker A is subject to a 40% marginal tax rate, but can receive
$1,000 tax-free by placing that amount in a tax-qualified plan, Worker A "saves" $400 in taxes
by doing so (i.e., $1,000 x 40% tax rate= $400 taxes otherwise due). In contrast, if Worker B is
subject to a 10% marginal tax rate, placing the same $1,000 in a tax-qualified plan only "saves"
Worker B $100 in taxes (i.e., $1,000 x 10% tax rate = $100 taxes otherwise due).
Consequently, the tax incentive is "worth" $300 more to Worker A. The example is accurate
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The result of this tax-incentive approach to promoting retirement income
security is that the federal "retirement income system produces two discrete
classes of retirees: those who rely solely on Social Security and those who
receive employer provided pensions or some other supplemental source of
income."148
Such considerations raise equity and fiscal concerns regarding the
incentives provided for the pension and savings aspects of the retirement
income security system. From the employees' perspective, a distortion in
vertical equity occurs because "the higher paid participate in greater numbers,
are entitled to larger benefits per person and save more in taxes for each dollar
contributed."' 149  On the federal budgetary side, the noted tax incentives
constitute a "tax expenditure." This means that instead of affirmatively funding
the incentive through an exercise of its spending power-for example, by
providing a government "match" for all dollars set aside in a favored plan-the
incentives come in the form of a reduction or waiver of taxes that a "normal"
tax structure suggests the IRS should otherwise collect. ° In other words, the
but oversimplified, for example, by the failure to take into account the marginal rates at which
the $1,000 will be taxed to each taxpayer in the future upon withdrawal and related time-value
of money issues-which are likely to be unknown with any degree of specificity to either
taxpayer when the value of the incentive is currently being weighed.
148. Altman, supra note 58, at 435; see also COMING OF AGE, supra note 58, at 21
("Currently, there is concern that the retirement income system and federal retirement policies
are contributing to a two-class system of retirement.").
149. Halperin, supra note 121,at 48.
150. See Congressional and Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (defining "tax expenditure"). The Joint Committee on
Taxation and the Treasury Department each produce annual estimates ofthe tax expenditures for
various matters, although the estimates differ slightly based upon certain underlying
assumptions. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 107TH CONG., JCS-1-02, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2002-2006 (Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter
JCS-1 -02] (providing a detailed discussion of the nature and calculation of tax expenditures),
http://www.novoco.com/Legislations/JCT Tax Expenditures02-06.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Indeed, this idea actually is codified
in the express purposes underlying ERISA. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 829,
959-64 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 408, 219) ("The Congress finds that... employee benefit
plans... substantially affect the revenues of the United States because they are afforded
preferential Federal tax treatment .... "); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (2000) (same). For an even more
recent and detailed treatment of the tax expenditure concept, see generally ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 101-40
(2003), available at http: //www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf. For
additional academic treatment of the concept of tax expenditures in the retirement plan context,
see Altman, supra note 58, at 440-42 (discussing tax expenditure concept in context of tax
qualified retirement plans); Dilley, supra note 66, at 1147 (same); Graetz, supra note 58, at 852,
874-75 (same); van Zante, supra note 119, at 141-42 (same); Wolk, supra note 133, at 422-25
(same).
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incentive or "expenditure" is in the nature of foregone tax revenue, which if
collected, could then be affirmatively spent in pursuit of encouraging the
desired conduct. As a result, the government incurs substantial costs in
providing this type of retirement plan tax incentive.' Moreover, the favorable
tax treatment afforded tax-qualified retirement plans constitutes the largest of
the tax expenditures, surpassing even the "cost" of the tax breaks granted to
homeowners and charitable donors." 2 Because of the great cost to the
government, this federal subsidy is justifiable only if it serves some significant
public purpose.
5 3
As to justification, policymakers defend this tax expenditure on the basis
that the federal government has a strong interest in promoting retirement
income security. 5 4 They see the tax code as the best avenue towards achieving
the desired end result short of more pervasive paternalism in mandating
adequate retirement set asides or a more generous Social Security system.'"
Interestingly, however, Congress specifically employs this inequitable reality-
that the tax incentives will be viewed more favorably by higher wage earners-
to further leverage the utility of such incentives in the context of employer-
sponsored plans. This leverage derives from the operation of the tax-
qualification nondiscrimination requirement. 5 6  Congress designed the
15 1. See, e.g., Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage:
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security
Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1369, 1373 (2001) (stating that the retirement plan tax
incentive results in $100 billion in lost tax revenues). For a contrary (and quite ideological)
view rejecting the tax expenditure concept, see 147 CONG. REC. S2151 (daily ed. Mar. 12,2001)
(remarks of Sen. Grassley (R-lowa)) ("I do not buy the philosophy of tax expenditures because
that implies every penny working men and women in America earn belongs to the Federal
Government and we are going to let them keep some of their own money.").
152. See JCS- 1-02, supra note 150, at 20-28 (providing tax expenditures for each budget
function for Fiscal Years 2002-2006 in table format).
153. See Stein, supra note 130, at 225 ("The tax treatment of qualified deferred
compensation plans is generally reckoned to give rise to tax expenditures that can be justified
only insofar as they contribute to our national retirement policy goals.").
154. ERISA § 2(a) (setting forth in detail the national interest in employee benefit plans);
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (same).
155. With regard to paternalism and more universal, mandatory retirement provisions
emanating from the federal government, see Altman, supra note 58, at 502-08 (discussing the
alternatives to the current three-legged stool approach, including expanding Social Security or
mandating employer-sponsored pensions); Bankman, supra note 73, at 814-27 (discussing
paternalism and the forced retirement savings approach to retirement income security).
156. See I.R.C. § 401 (aX4) (2000) (setting forth that one of the requirements of a qualified
trust is that the contribution or benefits provided cannot discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees); id. § 4 10(b) (providing the rules for nondiscrimination in coverage);
id. § 414(q) (stating the definition of a highly compensated employee). A detailed discussion of
the nondiscrimination rules is beyond the scope of this Article and has been adequately
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requirement "to ensure that [tax-]qualified plans benefit a significant portion of
an employer's rank-and-file employees compared to the portion of highly
compensated employees benefiting under the plan."'57 The general idea is that
higher wage earners will pressure employers to establish tax-qualified plans.
The nondiscrimination rules then channel that pressure to inspire more broad-
based plans that cover both high and low wage earners, resulting in a more
defensible tax expenditure.' This nondiscrimination mechanism expressly
recognizes the vertical equity shortcomings in the tax incentive approach but
then attempts to blunt that distortion through a nondiscrimination tag-along
view of who ultimately benefits from the incentives.'59 One should also note
that the broad-based employee coverage justification for the tax expenditure
does not apply to sole-owner Keogh plans and IRAs because there is no
nondiscrimination or other requirement that employees be included in such
arrangements. 160 Yet, the tax incentives attendant such devices remain, and the
rationale for that discrepancy affects not only considerations of tax equity but
also questions about the degree of asset protection that should be afforded the
different arrangements.
D. A New Model?
The foregoing explanation of tax incentives and equitable concerns is
important to understanding the broader issue of asset protection as it relates to
addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 58, at 456-70 (discussing pension plan anti-
discrimination provisions); Bankman, supra note 73, at 795-800 (same); van Zante, supra note
1 19, at 187-202 (same).
157. See JCX- 16-99, supra note 57, at 8 (explaining the operation of the nondiscrimination
rules).
158. Graetz, supra note 58, at 887; see Altman, supra note 58, at 440 (explaining how tax
expenditures are "justified as a mechanism to promote worker security through its ability to
induce employers to provide pensions to rank-and-file workers").
159. See Dilley, supra note 66, at 1139-42 (noting that the nondiscrimination rules provide
a redistributive element to the private pension system, but then discussing ways in which that
objective is undercut by other rules). Many have criticized the effectiveness of the tax-incentive
"carrot" as coupled with the nondiscrimination "stick" in this regard. See Burke & McCouch,
supra note 65, at 1249 (noting that the value of the tax incentive depends upon the composition
of the workforce as consisting of a sufficient number of high income employees who are willing
to channel benefits to low wage earners who place less value on the subsidy); van Zante, supra
note 119, at 190-91 n.215 (same); see also Altman, supra note 58, at 437 ("These
[nondiscrimination and integration] rules are outmoded and need to be rethought
systematically.").
160. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text (explaining the tax incentives
associated with Keogh plans and IRAs).
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retirement income security objectives. Understanding the trust law principles
presented in Part II also is helpful because Congress's succinct ERISA anti-
alienation mandate left many retirement plan asset protection questions
unresolved. For example, with respect to the bulk of private retirement plans,
did the seemingly straightforward ERISA anti-alienation language truly
represent a third model of asset protection to be defined by its own set of
unique policies and goals, or was that mandate merely a specific application
and codification of either or both of the Traditional and Self-Settled Models
such that traditional concepts come into play where asset protection for
retirement arrangements is at issue? 161 Part IV of this Article explains how the
answers to these alternative questions potentially conflict.
The ambiguity exists because courts have evaluated the creditor-protected
status of retirement plan interests at times by reference to traditional spendthrift
trust concerns and at other times by straightforward reference to the ERISA
anti-alienation mandate. 6 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court's most significant
foray into this arena crafted a landscape in which certain retirement
arrangements simply receive blanket protection without further inquiry while
others continue to receive careful scrutiny based upon criteria derived from
analysis typically ascribed to the Traditional and Self-Settled Models or to
exemption laws more generally.
61
Nevertheless, a decade after this Supreme Court treatment and
approaching three decades subsequent to ERISA's enactment, courts and
commentators still have difficulty characterizing ERISA's protective mandate.
Commentators have described that mandate as "prominent among
[ERISA's] ... provisions"' 4 versus a "minor and largely undocumented
addition to ERISA."'16 Such dichotomies permeate the federal treatment of this
asset protection issue at both the congressional and judicial levels. This
treatment evinces an interesting contrast of seemingly scant attention to detail
161. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing the distinguishing
characteristics of each model).
162. The duplicity in this answer belies the fact that the creditor-protected status of
retirement plan interests was at one point noted as "[o]ne of the most hotly litigated issues...
since the enactment of the [1978] Bankruptcy Code." DANIEL L. KEATrNG, BANKRUPTCY AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.4, at 390 (1995).
163. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the holding and implications of Patterson v.
Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992)).
164. In re Sewell, 180 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1999).
165. Dilley, supra note 35, at 387. Without question, however, the modem impact is
pervasive-the DB and DC plan universe alone account for a combined approximately $4.59
trillion in assets. See JCX-9-02, supra note 16, at 34 (noting that DB plans held assets valued at
$2.06 trillion and DC plans held assets valued at $2.53 trillion as of December 31, 2000).
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balanced against occasionally insightful analysis concerning asset protection.
The complex maze of laws and plan types that dominate the retirement plan
arena makes it no simple task to explore such issues, which continue today to
receive considerable judicial attention.'6 Moreover, Congress has now re-
entered the foray of creditor-protected retirement plan interests with an
approach that carries with it a degree of simplicity in the uniformity of asset
protection achieved, though at some cost to equity concerns and perhaps
deviating too far from the underlying ERISA objective of promoting retirement
income security. 167 Part IV presents these issues more directly through an
examination of the apparent reach of the ERISA spendthrift mandate by
focusing on both ERISA's technical aspects and the interpretive disagreements
that ERISA inspired.
IV Asset Protection and the Federal Retirement Model
One of the primary sources of confusion in the Federal Retirement Model
is the perceived lack of congressional guidance accompanying the adoption of
ERISA's dual anti-alienation requirements. 168 Particularly noteworthy is the
absence of any overt coordination between this aspect of ERISA and major
bankruptcy legislation that followed a few years after ERISA's enactment.' 69
The resulting issues have given rise to several distinct progressions in the
evolution of the asset protection that defines the Federal Retirement Model.
The formative stages of that evolution consistently pulled towards resolving
166. The continuing flow of cases addressing asset protection in the retirement plan context
demonstrate the ongoing judicial attention. For examples of such cases, see infra notes 227-
232.
167. Such matters are discussed in more detail infra Part V.
168. The characterization of a "perceived" lack of congressional guidance regarding ERISA
and bankruptcy law is intentional, and is intended to give due regard to the "plain language"
view reflected in the later judicial analyses that ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court in
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), as discussed infra Part IV.B.2. Notwithstanding
the plain language view, courts clearly found themselves adrift in reconciling retirement plan
asset protection with the analysis suggested under the Traditional and Self-Settled Models, as
evidenced by the federal circuit court split that brought the ERISA spendthrift issue to the
Supreme Court.
169. ERISA became effective for plan and tax years beginning after December 31, 1975.
ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 211 (b), 88 Stat. 829,959-64 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 408,219); 29
U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (2000). Significant portions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, now codified in
Title I I of the United States Code, became effective on October 1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § § 40 1 (a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. For other indications
of congressional inattention to the specifics of retirement plan asset protection, see, for example,
infra notes 202, 242-246, and accompanying text.
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retirement plan asset protection questions by reference to an analysis commonly
associated with the Traditional and Self-Settled Models.170 Through time and
judicial decision, however, the analysis has shifted, revealing a Federal
Retirement Model that now presents a bifurcated approach to asset
protection. 17' But, simple bifurcation is an understatement. Further splintering
occurs across tax-qualified retirement plan types, all of which are ostensibly
designed and rewarded around the unifying theme of promoting retirement
income security. Understanding the two key protective mechanisms that may
be utilized under the current bankruptcy framework to shield assets is the first
step towards appreciating these variations in retirement plan protection.
A. Core Bankruptcy Protections
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (the 1978 Code) 172 provides for two basic
mechanisms through which debtor assets might be protected from creditor
claims-exclusions and exemptions. Both mechanisms play a significant role
in the availability of asset protection within the Federal Retirement Model.
1. Exclusion and the Marshalling of Debtor Assets
A key policy goal of the federal bankruptcy system is to marshal debtor
assets for use in satisfying creditor claims. 173 Consistent with this goal, when
resolution of a debtor's obligations are subject to a federal bankruptcy
170. See infra Part IV.B. I (discussing in detail the Traditional and Self-Settled Model that
courts typically employed in asset protection cases).
171. See infra Part IV.B.3 (explaining the ambiguities of the bifurcated approach set forth
in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992)).
172. The 1978 Code is codified in Title I I of the United States Code. Supra note 169.
The first comprehensive and long-lived bankruptcy legislation in this country was the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-140)). Although subject to
important amendments along the way, the 1898 Act defined the bankruptcy landscape until it
was replaced by the 1978 Code. See generally Ven Countryman, A History of American
Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226, 228-32 (1976); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 23-37 (1995).
173. This goal competes with the fresh start objective discussed supra note 26 and in the
text accompanying supra note 187. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087 ("The historical purpose of [exemption laws] has been to protect a
debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public
charge.").
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proceeding, the bankruptcy court identifies a pool of debtor assets, the
"bankruptcy estate," and then oversees the administration of these assets to
facilitate the payment of creditor claims. 174 Courts vigorously pursue this goal
and broadly interpret the "bankruptcy estate.', 175 Consistent with that idea, the
1978 Code expressly nullifies restrictions that purport to limit the transferability
of a property interest.176 Thus, the Code ignores anti-alienation provisions and
requires the court to bring the affected interest into the bankruptcy estate for
application in satisfaction of creditor claims. However, 1978 Code § 541 (c)(2)
provides a single statutory exclusion for such interests. 177 Section 541(c)(2)
provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable
in a case under [the 1978 Code]."'178 Therefore, if a bankrupt debtor is the
174. See II U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (setting forth the list of assets that comprise the
bankruptcy estate); see also In re Moses, 167 F.3d 470,473 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The act of filing a
petition under the Bankruptcy Code commences bankruptcy proceedings and creates an estate
comprised of fall of the debtor's property]."). If neither the debtor nor any creditors initiate a
federal bankruptcy proceeding, the resolution of matters pertaining to satisfaction of the debtor's
obligations may be handled as a matter of insolvency under state law. However, given the
relevance and preemptive effect of federal bankruptcy laws in this setting, this Article focuses
on the federal bankruptcy proceeding as the forum of primary relevance for pursuit of the types
of creditor claims that implicate the models discussed here. A similar posture was taken by the
commentators in a recent roundtable discussion addressing asset protection trusts. See
Symposium, Roundtable Discussion, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 785 (1999) [hereinafter
Roundtable Discussion] (discussing asset protection trusts and noting that "bankruptcy courts
are really going to be the battle grounds on these things"). The focus here is on the bankrupt
debtor and the interplay between federal bankruptcy doctrines and relevant state laws, such as
the state exemption laws that still pertain in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. Two particular
debtor advantages of proceeding under the federal bankruptcy rubric are: (1) the automatic stay,
which generally halts all collection efforts and proceedings outside the bankruptcy forum; and
(2) the discharge, which generally serves as a release of the debtor (and the debtor's exempt or
excluded assets) from liability on all but a handful of specified debts which arose prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. See II U.S.C. § 362 (stating provisions for the automatic
stay); id. § 727 (setting forth provisions governing discharge in Chapter 7 proceeding); id.
§ 1328 (setting forth provisions governing discharge in Chapter 13 proceeding); see also John
K. Eason, Developing the Asset Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31
HOFSTRA L. REv. 23, 53 n. 122 (2002) (discussing the advantages of proceeding under federal
bankruptcy law as opposed to relevant state laws); infra note 178 (stating that the posture of a
proceeding under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 might make a difference in the debtor's
obligations).
175. Ii U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) provides that property of the bankruptcy estate consists of
"all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
[bankruptcy proceeding]."
176. 1d. § 541(c)(1).
177. Id. § 541 (c)(2). This provision is hereinafter referred to in the text as "§ 541 (c)(2)."
178. Id. Whether the proceeding is under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the 1978 Code can
make a difference as to the nature of the debtor's obligations in relation to a discharge of pre-
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beneficiary of a trust that includes an enforceable spendthrift provision, the
debtor's beneficial interest and the underlying property supporting that interest
remain beyond the reach of creditors. 1
79
The resulting protection under § 541 (c)(2) appears to be more attributable
to ideas of federalism and historical deference to state law recognition of
traditional spendthrift trust protections than to either constitutional mandate or
any overriding fairness concern. " While § 541 (c)(2) clearly embodies a rule
originally conceived against the backdrop of the Traditional Model, the rule
was hardly crafted so as to foreclose more expansive application, and Congress
gave little direction in that regard.' 8 ' In any event, when the exclusion is
bankruptcy debts, but the exclusion of property has a similarly protective effect in either event.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118-26 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079-87
(discussing the operation of Chapters 7 and 13 of the 1978 Code). For the exclusion'of
retirement plan interests from the bankruptcy estate under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the 1978
Code, compare In re Snipe, 276 B.R. 723,723-25 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2002) (discussing exclusions
under Chapter 13), with In re Parks, 255 B.R. 768, 770 (Bankr. D. Utah 2000) (discussing
exclusions under Chapter 7).
179. See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 233 F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom.
Taunt v. Gen. Retir. Sys. of Detroit, 533 U.S. 929 (2001) ("An inquiry under § 541(c)(2)
normally has three parts: First, does the debtor have a beneficial interest in a trust? Second, is
there a restriction on the transfer of that interest? Third, is the restriction enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law?"). Similar reasoning has been applied with respect to discretionary trust
interests. See, e.g., In re Blackwell, 142 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) ("Thus, until
that [discretionary distribution] decision is made, the pension trust is tantamount to a spendthrift
trust such that the property would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.").
180. As to federalism, see infra note 202 regarding references in the legislative history to
state spendthrift trust law. On the constitutional issue, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 4, which
confers upon Congress the power to promulgate "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies."
The noted result with respect to trusts under § 541 (c)(2) is consistent with the treatment of such
interests under § 70(a)(5) of the 1898 Act, formerly codified at 1I U.S.C. § 110. See DRAFr
RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 58, at 450, Reporter's Notes to cmt. a (noting that I I U.S.C.
§ 541 (c)(2) "continues a long tradition of giving effect to this particular restriction on transfer").
Under that provision, the excludability of a property interest turned upon its transferability or
leviability under state law, considered in light of the dual fresh start versus marshalling of assets
objectives of the bankruptcy laws. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 578-80 & 581 n. 19 (5th Cir.
1983), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (discussing spendthrift trust
treatment under current § 541(c)(2) and its predecessor under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898);
William J. Woodward Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OmO ST. L.J.
335, 347 (1982) (explaining that the 1898 Act defined "property of the estate" in terms of
transferability or leviability under state law). It also has been noted that the general rejection of
paying heed to such restrictions "emphasizes the increased independence of the [1978] Code
from nonbankruptcy law concerning [what debtor interests constitute] property of the estate." 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.24, at 541-99 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somner eds., 2001)
[hereinafter COLLIER].
181. Part IV.B, infra, discusses the applicability of the § 541(c)(2) exclusion to interests
falling within the Federal Retirement Model. For example, the exclusion would seem to apply
to interests falling within the Self-Settled Model, despite the general unavailability of self-
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unavailable, debtors must pursue a different avenue to sheltering property from
creditor claims in a federal bankruptcy proceeding.
2. The Exemption Avenue to Preserving a Debtor's Fresh Start
Exemptions present a second more broadly applicable mechanism for
sheltering property otherwise includable in the bankruptcy estate.
8 2
Operationally, 1978 Code § 522(b)(1) provides that a debtor may exempt
property described in a list of federal exemptions set forth in § 522(d) of the
1978 Code, "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor... specifically
does not so authorize ... ,,83 Approximately thirty-five states specifically do
not so authorize. In other words, those states have "opted out" of the § 522(d)
federal exemption list in accordance with the foregoing language.' 8 4 Section
settled APT protection at the time § 541(c)(2) was enacted, as discussed in the text
accompanying supra notes 49-55. This exclusion result likely would pertain so long as the
bankruptcy court hearing the matter applies the laws of the jurisdiction by reference to which
self-settled spendthrift provisions are deemed enforceable. The court's doing so is by no means
a foregone conclusion, particularly when the parties or transactions at issue seem more closely
related to a non-APTjurisdiction that deems self-settled protection from creditors violative of its
public policy. See supra note 52 (discussing the problem that arises when the laws of the
jurisdiction chosen by the settlor in the trust instrument offend the public policy of the forum
state).
182. The exemption issue only arises if no exclusion is available under § 541(c)(2). II
U.S.C. § 522(b); see S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82-84 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5868-70 (discussing the various provisions of§ 541); see, e.g., In re Moses, 167 F.3d
470, 474 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[E]xemption issues only arise if the court concludes that the
[property at issue] is part of the bankruptcy estate. In other words, ... an 'exemption
statute' ... does not effect [property that] ... is not part of the bankruptcy estate" by virtue of
the operation of I I U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2)). The focus of protections shifted from that of exclusions
under the 1898 Act to an emphasis upon exemptions under the 1978 Code, although much of
the same reasoning applied in both instances. See Wohl, supra note 35, at I 1 n.48 ("The same
analysis that applied to the Bankruptcy Act's notion of includability is appropriate in an analysis
of exemption under the Bankruptcy Code.").
183. I1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). Section 522(b) of the 1978 Code is hereinafter referred to in
the text as "§ 522(b)."
184. In the limited number of states that have not opted-out of the federal exemption
scheme, debtors may choose either the federal exemptions referenced under § 522(b)(1) and set
forth in § 522(d), or the state and nonbankruptcy federal law exemptions described in
§ 522(b)(2). This further dilutes the impact of the federal exemption scheme under the 1978
Code. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 180, 522.02(1) (discussing the uniform federal exemption
list in the context of the states' power to opt out). For a list of the "opt-out" states, see id.
522.01 n.2; see also NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS,
FINAL REPORT 299-301 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 FINAL REPORT] (setting forth state-by-state
designation of homestead exemption and opt-out status in table form). The 1997 FINALREPORT
reflects the findings of a more recent undertaking to study potential reforms to the federal
bankruptcy system.
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522(b)(2), in turn, limits debtors residing in one of these "opt-out states" to the
exemptions provided under that state's laws plus a handful of exemptions
called for under federal laws other than the 1978 Code.'
The longstanding tenet that exemptions are afforded to debtors for the
primary purpose of fostering the greater social good through granting debtors a
"fresh start" justifies this protection. 18 6 The fresh start objective dictates that,
notwithstanding bankruptcy, the law should shield certain property from
creditor claims so as to provide the debtor with a base of resources sufficient to
allow the debtor to pursue a productive lifestyle geared to a more successful
financial future. 8 7 Because such exemptions persist today in the face of the
185. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). As with the continued recognition of spendthrift restraints in
bankruptcy, federal deference to state law as to the particular property to be exempted-
maintained through this opt-out exemption scheme-is again attributable to historical and
federalism concerns. Congress consistently has rejected calls for uniformity in this regard. For
example, Congress created a special Commission on Bankruptcy Laws in connection with
pending bankruptcy reform. See S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970) (creating a commission to
study the bankruptcy laws of the United States). That Commission recommended in its 1973
final report that a set of uniform federal exemptions be adopted in lieu of the state exemption
opt-out scheme, but Congress chose to ignore this recommendation. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137
(1973), reprinted in B COLLIER, supra note 180, Part 4(c), at App. Part 4-421 [hereinafter 1973
Commission Report] ("As a result of the ... deference to ... state law as to exemptions,. . . the
exemptions available are not the result of reasoned policy but the happenstance of history and
location."). The 1973 Commission Report is discussed extensively in In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574,
581 n.19 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
Federal nonbankruptcy laws provide exemptions for Social Security benefits, 42 U.S.C.
§ 407 (2000), and other federal benefits such as those paid in retirement to civil servants, 5
U.S.C. § 729 (2000). See generally 4 COLLIER, supra note 180, 522.02(3) (listing the benefits
exempted under federal nonbankruptcy laws); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
For a discussion of the operation of these federal protections under the 1898 Act, see Vern
Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RLTGERS L. REv. 678, 738-40
(1960).
186. This justification pertains whether the exemption is granted under federal law or by
virtue of federal deference to state law decisions concerning the specific property exempted.
187. This outcome is in lieu of that debtor becoming a public charge by virtue of"losing
everything" to creditors. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087 ("The historical purpose of [exemption laws] has been to protect a
debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public
charge."); William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The "Opt Out " as Child ofthe First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BNJKR. L.J.
149, 163-70 (1997) (exploring the purposes underlying bankruptcy exemptions from both a
bankruptcy and general perspective); G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy
Exemption Reform, 74 AM. B~A',KR. L.J. 227, 228 (2000) (noting that the fresh start objective is
a "central justification for a consumer bankruptcy system. Productive but unfortunate
individuals might decline to contribute to society if the benefits of their productive energies
were completely captured by past creditors." (citations omitted)); see generally William T.
Vukowick, Debtor's Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 769
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competing federal bankruptcy policy of liberally marshalling the debtor's
assets, the exemptions demonstrate the efficacy of this fresh start objective and
its concern for the debtor's long-term financial recovery and well-being.
Interestingly, however, no such justification rises to the forefront when one
examines the exclusion under § 541 (c)(2).'s This dichotomy is merely one of
the many inconsistent asset protection rules affecting the Federal Retirement
Model, as explored next.
B. ERISA's Attendant Questions and Conflicts
Prior to ERISA's enactment, retirement plan interests and assets found
protection from creditors through state exemption laws and a degree of
deference under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to pre-ERISA anti-alienation
provisions applicable to some plans. 8 9 More specifically, if the debtor's
interest in a retirement plan was neither transferable nor leviable under state
laws, as was often the case when an anti-alienation provision applied, then the
1898 Act excluded the interest from the bankruptcy estate and thus protected
the interest from creditor claims.' 90 Not surprisingly, the resulting association
of such plans with spendthrift trusts raised questions about the protected status
of retirement plan interests, particularly given that many courts characterized
such interests as self-settled arrangements.' 9' One court described this
(1980) (discussing a debtor's exemption rights in the context of § 522 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978).
188. In fact, Congress specifically rejected limiting the § 541(c)(2) exclusion to any
defining standard that would have tied the offered protection to some concept of need. See infra
notes 244-48 and accompanying text (stating that both Houses rejected the "reasonably
necessary" cap on the amount to be protected from creditors under the § 541(c)(2) exclusion).
189. See Jeffrey R. Houle, ERISA-Qualifed Pension Plans as Property of the Bankruptcy
Estate: A Survey of Creditor's Rights to Participants 'Pension Assets Pre- and Post-Patterson
v. Shumate, 29 Hous. L. REV. 763, 773-75 & n.60 (1992) (discussing the status of retirement
plan assets under pre-ERISA law); Seiden, supra note 35, at 231-34 & nn.59-60, 74-76
(describing results under § 70(a)(5) of the 1898 Act both before and after the enactment of
ERISA and citing relevant cases); Wohl, supra note 35, at 6-11 (discussing the status of
retirement assets prior to 1978 Code). With regard to the 1898 Act, see supra notes 172 and
180 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 230-31 regarding the potential non-ERISA sources of a retirement
plan anti-alienation provision. See supra note 180 regarding § 70(a)(5) of the 1898 Act, the
precursor to 1978 Code § 541 (c)(2). For cases discussing retirement plan asset protection under
the 1898 Act, see In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984), abrogated by Patterson
v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); In re Baviello, 12 B.R. 412, 414-15 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981).
191. See supra note 55 and infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text regarding the self-
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retirement plan asset protection situation as presenting an "analytical
conundrum.092 This conundrum prompted yet another court to note that "every
lawyer who counseled debtors under [the 1898 Act] knows the question of
whether bankrupts kept their pension rights was a mess under the
transferability-leviability standard."'93
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted ERISA and its "terse" but
mandatory anti-alienation provisions. 194 By doing so, Congress "dramatically
increased the pension plan interests which courts could exclude" from creditor
claims under the 1898 Act. 195 Logic suggests that Congress intended to protect
retirement interests by bringing them more clearly within the ambit of asset
protection standards governing such matters at the time. The legislative history
of the ERISA anti-alienation mandate is brief, however, and includes only a
general statement of purpose to ensure that pension assets remained available
for retirement use. 196 Some explain the lack of any meaningful treatment of the
anti-alienation requirements in the legislative history of ERISA as "doubtless
on the ground that the [overriding] purpose is too obvious for words."'
97
Nevertheless, Congress caused confusion because it provided no insight on
such matters as the continued relevance of the self-settled nature of many
retirement arrangements or the necessity of a connection between such interests
and a debtor's fresh start needs. These uncertainties led others to conclude that
"[c]learly, Congress has not thought the issue through."'98 Moreover, this
perceived lack of congressional attention to detail regarding retirement plan
settled nature of many retirement plans.
192. In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 578.
193. In re Threewitt, 20 B.R. 434,437 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (quoting Doug Rendleman,
Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575,597 (1980)), revd,
24 B.R. 927 (D. Kan. 1982). For a recitation of the various outcomes under the 1898 Act and
prior to the enactment of ERISA, see the case summaries found in Houle, supra note 189, at
774-75 n.60. Houle notes that "[u]nder pre-Bankruptcy Code law, exclusion of plan benefits
from the owner-employee's bankruptcy estate was unsettled." Houle, supra note 189, at 775
n.60; see also Seiden, supra note 35, at 233-34 & nn.74-76 (describing results under § 70(aX5)
of the 1898 Act both before and after the enactment of ERISA and citing relevant cases).
194. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 n.28 (describing ERISA's anti-alimentation provisions
as "terse recitations").
195. Houle, supra note 189, at 775-76.
196. The only significant legislative history concerning ERISA's anti-alienation
requirements indicates that the provision was adopted in order "[t]o further ensure that the
employee's accrued [sic.] [retirement plan] benefits are actually available for retirement
purposes." H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 65 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4734.
197. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 90, at 575.
198. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of
Creditors'Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247, 271 (1980).
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asset protection became a glaring source of disagreement following the
enactment of the 1978 Code.199 Thereafter, retirement plan asset protection
analysis rested on the alternative protective mechanisms of exclusion under the
1978 Code § 541(c)(2) and exemption under § 522(b).20 Questions
concerning the proper application of each concept to retirement plan interests
left courts groping to define the rules of asset protection under the Federal
Retirement Model.
The overriding problem lies in the inherent conflict between the
bankruptcy policies of marshalling assets for creditors subject to a debtor's
fresh start needs versus the basic tenet of federal retirement policy that
encourages workers to set aside funds currently in order to facilitate a more
201secure retirement. Such future retirement needs most often implicate
considerations spanning beyond the immediacy of a fresh start. The more
specific problem is the original failure by Congress to grasp this conflict
between ERISA and the 1978 Code or, at best, to foresee, or at least forestall,
the interpretive issues that would almost certainly arise under the framework
established.0 2 In particular, divergent possibilities for the evolution of asset
protection within the Federal Retirement Model found roots in the
congressional preservation under 1978 Code § 541 (c)(2) of creditor-protection
provided through a valid spendthrift restraint. 20 3 Though this concept may
199. The 1978 Code replaced the prior Act's transferability/leviability test with a broad
marshalling of debtor assets concept, as discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 173-
75. The transferability/leviability test is discussed in supra note 180 and the accompanying text.
See Houle, supra note 189, at 773-74 (noting that the 1978 Code created conflict between
ERISA and bankruptcy laws). Regarding the policy of marshalling debtor assets for application
in payment of creditor claims, as pursued under the 1978 Code, see supra notes 173-175 and
accompanying text.
200. See Part IV.A (discussing bankruptcy exemptions and exclusions).
201. See, in this regard, the legislative history of ERISA § 206(d)(1), discussed supra note
196, and the Third Circuit's explanation of the issue as quoted in the text accompanying infra
note 208. See also KEATING, supra note 162, § 6.4.1 (noting the different arguments a debtor
could make in an attempt to exclude pension assets from the bankruptcy estate). The dual fresh
start and marshalling of assets policies are discussed supra Part IV.A.
202. There were other legislative gaps as well, including: (1) isolated reference in the
legislative history of§ 54 1 (c)(2) to only "state" spendthrift trust laws, as explained in In re Goff,
706 F.2d 574, 580-82 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753
(1992); (2) the lone reference by Congress to retirement plan interests as meriting a federal
exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) of the 1978 Code, as discussed infra notes 235-255; (3) the
lack of any reference to ERISA in the supplemental exemptions granted by "other federal law"
under § 522(b)(2)(A) of the 1978 Code, as noted in In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1444-45 (5th
Cir. 1991), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); and (4) the complete
absence of any other express coordination of the competing bankruptcy and retirement policies
in the 1978 Code or its legislative history.
203. See Part IV.A.I regarding § 541(c)(2) as it pertains to spendthrift restraints.
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seem simple in light of the ERISA anti-alienation mandate, Congress meted out
several avenues for interpretive uncertainty.
The primary source of disagreement lay in the text of § 541 (c)(2) itself,
which provides that an anti-alienation restraint on the transfer of a debtor's
beneficial trust interest that is "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law" is likewise enforceable in bankruptcy. 2°4 The specific question presented
was whether ERISA constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law," such that a
retirement plan interest subject to an ERISA-mandated anti-alienation provision
would be immune from creditor attachment.205 More generally, for almost
twenty years after ERISA's enactment, divergent perspectives as to the meshing
of bankruptcy law, traditional and self-settled spendthrift trust law, and ERISA
clouded progressions in the development of the Federal Retirement Model.
As discussed next, the resulting tensions ultimately produced two distinct
progressions in the analysis governing the question of retirement plan asset
protection and several important inconsistencies in that protection still remain.
1. The Initial Stage of Post-ERISA Protection
The post-ERISA evolution of retirement plan asset protection originates in
the question of whether the ERISA anti-alienation mandate truly presented
something unique. Specifically, did ERISA present a new model of asset
protection, or did ERISA simply fit neatly within the Traditional and Self-
Settled Models that came before it, perhaps distinguishable only in that in some
instances "the courts [might] be called upon to fashion a federal common law of
spendthrift trusts in connection with employee pension plans? '20 7 The Third
204. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory exclusion
under § 541(c)(2)).
205. As pointed out in supra note 202, the only references in the legislative history of
§ 541 (c)(2) on this language pertained to "state" spendthrift trust laws.
206. See Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he reported decisions are
in disarray, as to whether 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in this context was intended by
Congress to be limited to state spendthrift trust law, or whether it embraces federal law as
well.").
207. Sherman, supra note 198, at 260-61; see also Michael J. Collins, The Federal
Common Law ofERISA, 59 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N 16-1, 16-2 (Supp. 2001) ("[C]ourts are
often tempted to address what they believe must be oversights in the [ERISA] statutory scheme
by invoking the federal common law of ERISA."); Seiden, supra note 35, at 233 ("If the plan or
trust contained a valid spendthrift clause, then the plan interest was not property of the
estate. ... [A]fter the enactment of ERISA, some courts looked to ERISA to determine
whether the interest was transferable (sic]." (footnote omitted)). Of course, the actual issue most
often was the fitting of a retirement trust within the bounds of existing state spendthrift trust
law. See David B. Young, The Pro Tanto Invalidity of Protective Trusts: Partial Self-
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159 (2004)
Circuit captured this conceptual "nothing new/something unique" dichotomy in
its assessment of the ERISA, bankruptcy, and federalism contrasts presented:
It is argued [on the one hand] that Congress cannot have intended to enable
persons to place their assets beyond the reach of creditors by placing [such
assets] in a trust for [such persons'] own benefit, except to the limited
extent that the laws of the various states would uphold the spendthrift
provisions .... But [on the other hand] there can be no doubt that
Congress has expressed a deep and continuing interest in the preservation
of pension plans, and in encouraging retirement savings, as reflected in the
statutes which have given us ERISA .... 208
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the circuit courts considering whether an
ERISA spendthrift retirement plan interest deserves asset protection split along
lines consistent with these possibilities. One primary viewpoint held that the
reference in § 541 (c)(2) to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was limited to state
spendthrift trust law, meaning that retirement plan interests could be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate only if they qualified for protection by virtue of
analysis consistent with that discussed above in the context of the Traditional
and Self-Settled Models. 209 But another competing viewpoint held that such
plan interests were straightforwardly excluded from the bankruptcy estate under
§ 541 (c)(2) of the 1978 Code by virtue of the ERISA anti-alienation mandate as
constituting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" within the "plain language" of
§ 541(c)(2).21 °
Settlement and Beneficiary Control, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 807, 825-26 (1995) ("This was an
instance of difficult cases frequently leading to harsh and confusing results. Relatively few state
court cases had dealt with retirement trusts in this light.. . ." (footnotes omitted)).
208. Velis, 949 F.2d at 82.
209. See, e.g., In re Reed, 951 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA is not
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," and that pension interest at issue failed as a spendthrift trust
under applicable state law), vacated sub nom. Reed v. Drummond, 506 U.S. 910 (1992); In re
Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753 (1992); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1984) (same), abrogated
by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983)
(same), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81,
84 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that ERISA does not constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law").
See generally In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597, 600-02 (6th Cir. 199 1) (discussing divergent judicial
opinions under theories (I) and (2) as noted in the text, supra, and holding that ERISA is not
"applicable nonbankruptcy law"). The standard analysis under the Traditional and Self-Settled
Models is discussed supra Part I1.
210. See, e.g., In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting a "plain
language" interpretation and finding that ERISA constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
pursuant to which a pension plan spendthrift provision resulted in exclusion of the interest from
the bankruptcy estate). Adoption of this view by the Supreme Court in 1992 ushered in what is
characterized here as the second major progression in the analysis of retirement plan asset
protection, as discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
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Most courts considering the matter prior to 1990 adopted the first noted
view of ERISA protection.2 1 Specifically, those courts held that the creditor-
protected status of retirement plan interests presented an evolutionary path for
the Federal Retirement Model that left the model ensconced within the
framework of traditional spendthrift trust principles, subject to the caveat that
self-settled or other beneficiary-controlled spendthrifted arrangements were not
shielded in the face of a creditor challenge.21 2 Although a court could
When neither of the theories set forth in the text supported the debtor's call for exclusion,
that debtor had to seek to protect the retirement plan interest as property that, although included
in the bankruptcy estate, was nevertheless shielded from creditors under the ambit of some
specific exemption law. The three primary theories in this regard deferred to: (1) the federal
exemption found in II U.S.C. § 522(d)(10XE) of the 1978 Code, as discussed in Velis, 949
F.2d at 81-82 and infra notes 235-55; (2) state law exemptions pertaining specifically to
retirement plan interests, as discussed in In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1438-40 (5th Cir. 1991),
abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); or (3) the supplemental exemption
under I I U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) of the 1978 Code. The latter provision permits debtors
proceeding under a state law exemption scheme to also exempt property specified under "other
federal law," meaning federal law that is not embodied in the 1978 Code. Although ERISA
seemingly meets that description, however, it was generally held that the reference to federal law
in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) did not intend to include ERISA. See, e.g., In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at
1444-46 (discussing judicial decisions on this issue and ultimately holding, as have most courts,
that ERISA did not constitute "other federal law" as contemplated under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(A)); In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274 (reaching the same conclusion), abrogated by
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). In this regard, note that while the legislative history
of I I U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) enumerated many federal laws as contemplated to fall within that
provision, ERISA was not on the list. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 75 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5861; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6316. In dealing with this issue, the Eighth Circuit noted that "the
provisions of some of the statutes on the list creating a federal exemption are similar to the anti-
alienation provisions of ERISA," but then concluded that "[t]he pensions.., in the illustrative
list are all peculiarly federal in nature." In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274. Although the
§ 522(b)(2)(A) "other federal exemption" argument met little success at the circuit court level,
lower federal courts reached "diametrically opposite interpretations of the scope of this
provision relative to ERISA-qualified pension plans." In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 583, abrogated by
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). For a discussion of the five theories advanced by
debtors prior to Shumate in arguing that plan assets are beyond the reach of creditors, see JCS-
16-91, supra note 35, at 6-8.
211. This view was the majority among federal circuits courts of appeal until a rash of
decisions immediately preceding Patterson v. Shumate rendered the split more even. See
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757 n. I (1992) (discussing the courts of appeals decisions);
In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1441 (discussing cases), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S.
753 (1992); Velis, 949 F.2d at 80-81 (same). The Fourth Circuit decision in In re Moore was
the first federal circuit court decision to reject the spendthrift trust analysis and hold that the
"plain language" of I I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) encompassed ERISA's anti-alienation mandate as
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478-79.
212. In other words, the ERISA anti-alienation clause would protect the retirement interest
unless state law considerations such as self-settlement or too much debtor access to and control
over the retirement fund dictated otherwise. See, e.g., In re Reed, 951 F.2d at 1050 (holding
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characterize most retirement plans as at least nominally self-settled because
funding is provided directly by the employee or in exchange for the employee's
efforts, most courts were lenient in this regard, at least with respect to required
employee contributions and employer contributions paid in consideration for
work performed.2 3  Therefore, the distinction between valid and invalid
arrangements tended to focus on voluntary debtor contributions and most often
that ERISA is not "applicable nonbankruptcy law," and that pension interest at issue failed as a
spendthrift trust under applicable state law), vacated sub nom. Reed v. Drummond, 506 U.S.
910 (1992); In re Litchstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490 (same), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504
U.S. 753 (1992); In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 589 (same), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504
U.S. 753 (1992). See generally In re Lucas, 924 F.2d at 600-02 (discussing divergentjudicial
opinions under theories (I) and (2) as noted in the text, supra notes 209-10, and holding that
ERISA is not "applicable nonbankruptcy law"). But see In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272-73
("The question of pension rights is dealt with as a matter of exemption."), abrogated by
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating a similar conclusion). See generally PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION LEcA PLANNING
STRATEGIES § 10.04(2)(d) (1994) (discussing spendthrift protecting and self-settled trust);
Young, supra note 207 states:
The general rule in the employee retirement trust cases, then, was that an ERISA-
qualified plan would be upheld in toto as a valid spendthrift trust if: (I) the
employer had funded the entire plan; and (2) the debtor-beneficiary was a mere
wage employee with no significant equity ownership in or right of control over the
employer. Conversely, a plan would be held totally self-settled if either: (I) the
beneficiary enjoyed significant ownership and control over the employer; or (2) the
employee had in fact funded the entire trust out of her own pocket.
Id. at 831.
213. See In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 225-26 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991)(discussing cases
where either the employer's contributions in consideration for work or the employee's non-
voluntary contribution wholly funded employee benefit plans); SPERO, supra note 212,
§ I 0.04(2)(d) (providing an overview of cases and concluding that "the overwhelming weight of
authority is [that] ... [t]rusts have not been treated as self-settled merely because mandatory
contributions were made... and where deferred compensation was negotiated by the debtor
with his employer." (footnotes omitted)). The argument for self-settled status by virtue of the
employee's work efforts is summarized nicely in Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans,
supra note 55:
The employee is a settlor to the extent that his interest is attributable to his
contributions. If employer contributions are considered compensation for which
the employee has given consideration, the employee would seem also to be the
settlor as to these amounts. Thus, only if the pension is considered a gift which
confers no property interest on the employee or if the courts exempt pensions from
the normal trust rule on grounds of public policy can an employee's interest be kept
form his creditors.
Id. at 499; see also IIA ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 18, § 156.3, at 185 (noting that
employment trusts are arguably self-settled in that "the trust is created in consideration of
services rendered by the employees, and that the employees are therefore the settlors"); Young,
supra note 207, at 825-36 (discussing cases pertaining to the self-settled nature of retirement
trusts).
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turned on matters of debtor access to and control over the retirement plan
assets.214
Although matters of source-of-funds self-settlement were relevant, the
crux of this analysis ultimately focused upon the reality of the spendthrift
nature of the retirement plan interest at issue. In other words, if debtor control
or withdrawal powers rendered the anti-alienation mandate one in form only,
then no clear purpose akin to that motivating the spendthrifting of property
existed so as to justify shielding the interest from creditors.2' 5 In the retirement
plan context, the alleged justification is that of preserving assets for retirement
uses-a purpose that is not served when ready access to and control over the
fund for which protection is sought renders that fund available for
nonretirement-related consumption.21 6 This observation, derived from the
214. See, e.g., In re Moses, 167 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing self-settled trust
and debtor access/control issues in relation to pension plan protection under state spendthrift
trust laws, and finding both characteristics lacking under separate and distinct analyses); In re
Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1444 ("[A] beneficiary who enjoys 'access to and control over' a pension plan
is a settlor of the plan, even though another person or entity nominally created the plan."
(quoting In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1988))); In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162,
1167-68 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a retirement plan was a spendthrift trust after
determining that the trust was not self-settled, and that debtor had only restricted access to the
funds); In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting a "plain language"
construction of I I U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2), but nevertheless distinguishing earlier cases applying
state spendthrift trust law on the ground that "here, the beneficiaries do not control the plan,
cannot make unrestricted withdrawals from it, cannot borrow against it, and cannot amend it");
see also Houle, supra note 189, at 816-17 (discussing analysis under enforceable spendthrift
trust criteria as combining factors of debtor funding, access, and control); Wohl, supra note 35,
at 33 ("The primary reason courts have been unwilling to treat pension trusts as spendthrift
trusts... is ... that pension assets... can [be] reduce[d] to possession ... immediately after
the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings.").
215. See, e.g., In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1444 ("Not all ERISA-qualified retirement plans...
are spendthrift trusts: Those retirement plans which are self-settled do not qualify. And in
particular, if the beneficiaries of a plan enjoy access to and control over the funds in the plan,
then the plan is not a spendthrift trust."); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(noting, in denying protection to debtor-controlled pension plans that "[t]he reasons for creating
and enforcing spendthrift trusts would not be served if we were unwilling to look beyond legal
forms"), abrogated by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). For a post-Shumate
application of this analysis, see Part IV.B.
216. See the legislative history of ERISA § 206(d)(1) at supra note 196 and see the
discussion of "leakage" at infra notes 286-87 and the accompanying text. See Dilley, supra
note 35, at 389 (discussing the rationale behind the 1978 bankruptcy legislation); Houle, supra
note 189, at 813 (noting the difference between ERISA trust pension plans and ERISA savings
account pension plans, specifically regarding debtor access); see also Jefferson, supra note 136,
at 1456 (decrying evolution of IRAs from retirement-directed arrangements to more general tax-
preferred savings plans not necessarily destined for retirement uses).
Paradoxically, however, in most instances the debtor's access and control are grounded in
the federal laws which established the retirement arrangement with the blessing of favorable tax
treatment, ostensibly for purposes of retirement in lieu of current consumption. This realization
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original application of spendthrift trust principles to retirement plans, is
important. It suggests that asset protection for retirement plans should be
fundamentally grounded in service to the overriding goal upon which that
protection is granted-namely, the goal of retirement income security for
citizens.
2. Patterson v. Shumate and the Second Progression in
Retirement Plan Protection
But, in lieu of pursuing this policy-based analysis and the resolution
offered under longstanding trust principles, the Supreme Court chose a
different path. In Patterson v. Shumate,217 the Court subordinated the early
push to graft such considerations upon the development of the Federal
Retirement Model, and instead adopted the "plain language" view of ERISA
asset protection noted above. 218 The Court held that the § 541 (c)(2) exclusion
encompassed the ERISA anti-alienation mandate and was not limited to
protecting spendthrift trusts under state law. 219 The Court summarily dismissed
and its proper place in the asset protection analysis is discussed in detail infra Part V. With
regard to those federal laws and by way of example, both the employer and employee
contributions can be withdrawn from a profit sharing or stock bonus plan (each subject to both
the labor and tax anti-alienation provisions of ERISA) generally after two years or upon certain
other events which may or may not relate to retirement. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(l) (1988);
JCX-16-99, supra note 57, at 18. Although certain other types of plans may purportedly be
subject to more restrictive rules in this regard, employee contributions and the earnings
attributable thereto often may be withdrawn from such arrangements for reasons entirely
unrelated to retirement. See 2 BiTrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 123, § 61.12.2 (discussing
restrictions on early distributions from retirement plans). Taxable amounts withdrawn before
the employee-participant reaches age 59/ are generally subject to a 10% penalty tax, which
many courts regard as an insufficient penalty to negate the employee's control and access. See
I.R.C. § 72(t) (2000) (imposing 10% penalty on early distribution from qualified retirement
plans); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding 10% penalty insufficient to negate
debtor control and access); supra note 48 (discussing federal laws regulating access to funds in
retirement plans).
217. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1992).
218. See supra note 210 and accompanying text regarding the "plain language" view.
219. The facts, arguments and holding in Patterson v. Shumate have been analyzed
extensively in subsequent judicial decisions and academic literature, and will be addressed here
only to the extent that doing so sheds light upon the perspective pursued in this Article. The
case involved a plan that was subject to both the labor and tax ERISA spendthrift mandates and
as to which the debtor had significant control over the plan. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 762-63. The
court held that the plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate by virtue of § 541(c)(2),
without precisely clarifying the scope of its decision and with no mention of the control issue.
Id. at 760. For a good judicial overview of the decision, see In re Moses, 167 F.3d at 475. That
the Supreme Court ultimately resolved this matter by reference to the "plain language" of I I
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the alternative view espoused in prior lower court decisions that relied upon the
legislative history of the 1978 Code to equate the bankruptcy exclusion of
affected ERISA retirement plan interests with state spendthrift trust law and
analyses.22° This dismissal seemingly forestalled further policy-based inquiry
into the balancing of competing legislative objectives and the proper placement
of retirement plan interests relative to the protections offered through the
Traditional and Self-Settled Models. 2  Stated simply, such interests were
uniquely entitled to exclusion from the bankruptcy estate without further
U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code does not belie the premise posited above-that a
lack of clarity in the congressional edicts left open the nature and parameters of the Federal
Retirement Model-as attested to by the divergence ofjudicial opinions leading up to the 1992
decision. Rather, that divergence of opinion is indicative of the intimate tie between the
interests and creditor opportunities at issue, with the Supreme Court finally stepping in to cast
certain retirement plan interests in a unique light.
220. See Shumate, 504 U.S. at 761 n.4 ("The Courts of Appeals that have limited
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' to state spendthrift trust laws by ignoring the plain language of
§ 541 (c)(2) and relying on isolated excerpts from the legislative history thus have misconceived
the appropriate analytical task."); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1991)
("[The district court's] focus on state spendthrift trust law, which looks to the reality behind the
non-alienation provision, is misplaced."), affd, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); see also In re Wilcox, 233
F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 200 1) (holding that subsequent to Patterson v. Shumate, analysis of the
exclusion of a pension plan interest under II U.S.C. § 541(c)2) by reference to state spendthrift
trust rules, and in particular those pertaining to self-settled trusts, was error), cert. denied sub
nom. Taunt v. Gen. Retirement Sys. of Detroit, 533 U.S. 929 (2001); In re Meehan, 102 F.3d
1209, 1213 (1 Ith Cir. 1997) (stating that the Shumate decision implicitly forecloses state
spendthrift trust law analysis of a retirement plan interest that is subject to an anti-alienation
provision enforceable under nonbankruptcy law, such as ERISA or corresponding state law, and
that debtor's control over the retirement plan is thus a nonissue with respect to such plans). But
see In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1997) ("We do not read [Shumate] to say that
money readily available to participants for current consumption necessarily is unavailable to
repay debts .... But.. .we do not pursue the question." (citation omitted)). With regard to the
legislative history of 1978 Code § 541(c)(2) referencing both "applicable state law" and
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 176, 369 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136, 6325, as discussed in In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1479 (4th
Cir. 1990).
221. The competing legislative objectives were those underlying the broad marshalling of
assets in bankruptcy, versus the broad protection for such assets under ERISA. Without
expressly mentioning the 1978 Code's dual marshalling of assets/fresh start concerns, the
Shumate Court also noted that the 1978 Code's broad definition of "property," as reflected in
1978 Code § 541 (a), fell short of a "policy" that was in any way conflicted with ERISA on the
question of excluding retirement plan assets from the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)
(2000) (defining a bankruptcy estate); Shumate, 504 U.S. at 763-64 ('[W]e think that petitioner
mistakes an admittedly broad definition of includable property for a 'policy' underlying the
[Bankruptcy] Code as a whole."); see also In re Whetzal, 32 F.3d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1994)
("[T]he Court [in Shumate] emphasized its view that the more important policy is protecting
pension benefits."). Supra Part IV.A discusses the bankruptcy estate concept, marshalling of
assets, and fresh start policies. Supra note 175 sets forth § 541(a) of the 1978 Code.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159 (2004)
deference to other policy concerns. In fact, the Court adhered to its earlier
espoused view that ERISA policies were to be regarded as pre-eminent to
creditors' rights.222 Shumate thereby ushered in the second progression in the
evolution of the Federal Retirement Model, by establishing certain retirement
plan interests as deserving unique, unilateral protection from creditors in
bankruptcy via § 541(c)(2).
3. Bifurcation in the Post-Shumate Analysis
The apparent simplicity of blanket asset protection for plans that Shumate
covers, however, is deceptive. The line of demarcation between covered and
exposed plans is elusive. This unclear line of demarcation arises from the
ambiguous language chosen by the Shumate Court to articulate its specific
holding that "a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be
excluded from the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541 (c)(2)." '223
This "ERISA-qualified" phraseology has given rise to perhaps as many new
questions as it purported to resolve, and the further analysis undertaken to
answer that question has dominated post-Shumate developments in the Federal
Retirement Model. As the Fifth Circuit recently stated, the Shumate "Court
inadvertently opened another jurisprudential Pandora's Box" regarding the
import of the ERISA anti-alienation requirement in the seminal battleground of
bankruptcy.224 The confusion lies in the fact that "qualified plan" is a term
commonly utilized as a reference to tax-qualification in the context of
retirement plans, whereas the Court's chosen "ERISA-qualified" terminology
finds life in neither statute nor common parlance, though it might seem to
suggest tax qualification.225 Perhaps unwittingly, the Court focused attention
222. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,374-76 (1990)
(declining to create an exception to ERISA's prohibition on the blank of pension funds). In
Guidry, the petitioner embezzled funds from the union, and the lower courts imposed a
constructive trust on his pension plan benefits in favor of the union. Id. at 365. The Supreme
Court ultimately rejected this outcome on the strength of ERISA's § 206(d)(1) mandate. Id. In
so holding, the Court deferred to the overriding importance of ERISA's retirement income
security objective, noting "that the effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes
precedence over the desire to do equity between particular parties." Id. at 376.
223. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added).
224. In re Sewell, 180 F.3d 707, 711 (5th Cir. 1999); see also In re Baker, 114 F.3d at 638
("What is an 'ERISA-qualified' plan? The term does not appear in the statute, and its
provenance is mysterious.").
225. See In re Sewell, 180 F.3d at 711-12 ("[ERISA-qualified] is neither a term of art nor a
defined term for purposes of ERISA."); In re Baker, 114 F.3d at 638 (determining that the
phrase "ERISA-qualified" merely addresses the question of "whether a creditor can reach the
funds in bankruptcy"). See supra Part III.C regarding tax-qualification. The basic post-
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more directly upon the question of how tax-qualification should affect
226retirement plan asset protection.
The prevailing view today is that in using the term "ERISA-qualified," the
Shumate Court was referring to retirement plan interests subject to the anti-
alienation mandate set forth in § 206(d)(1) of the ERISA labor title without
regard to whether the plan satisfied the tax-qualification criteria that include the
ERISA tax title's I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) anti-alienation language. In this regard,
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit succinctly articulated both the
question raised by Shumate and its more accepted resolution:
What is an 'ERISA-qualified' plan? The term does not appear in the
statute, and its provenance is mysterious. Some plans are tax-qualified, a
term of art meaning that contributions to the plan are deductible at the
corporate level and not taxed to the employee until the plan distributes
benefits. Taxation has nothing to do with the question at hand, however.
Most likely, the Court used 'ERISA-qualified' to mean 'covered by
Subchapter I of ERISA'.... Understanding 'ERISA-qualified' to mean
nothing more complex than 'containing the anti-alienation clause required
Shumate split among the Bankruptcy Courts pertains to whether "ERISA-qualified" meant that a
plan: (I) was subject to ERISA; (2) was tax-qualified per I.R.C. § 401(a); and (3) included an
anti-alienation provision---or: (1) was subject to ERISA; (2) included an anti-alienation
provision; and (3) this provision is enforceable under ERISA. See, e.g., In re Bennett, 185 B.R.
4, 6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing the split of opinion among Bankruptcy Courts over
relevance of tax-qualification to Shumate's articulation of an "ERISA-qualified" benchmark);
see also Sabino & Clarke, supra note 35, at 615 (discussing the split of judicial opinion
regarding the relevance of tax-qualification to protected status). See infra notes 225-227 and
accompanying text for further examples of post-Shumate disagreements.
Simply equating tax qualification to coverage under that portion of the ERISA labor title
which includes § 206(d)(1) presents problems. This is due to the fact that some "tax-qualified"
retirement arrangements are not subject to § 206(d)(1) of the ERISA labor title, and some
arrangements subject to § 206(d)(1) are not tax-qualified. See supra notes 103-08 and 123-28
regarding plans subject to the dual ERISA anti-alienation mandates and exceptions to these
requirements. Interestingly, the Shumate court acknowledged that many arrangements would
fall outside of the I I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) exclusion under the Court's decision, specifically
referencing governmental plans and IRAs, but in doing so the court cited both § 206(d)(1) and
the regulations under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) without further clarifying the dilemma that would
confound subsequent courts left to wrest with the import of the Court's pronouncement.
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762 (1992). Arrangements subject to neither § 206(d)(!)
nor § 401 (a)(I 3) would include, for example, an individual retirement arrangement held in the
form of a qualified annuity, rather than a trust or custodial account arrangement falling within
the scope of I.R.C. § 401 (a)(l 3) (2000). See, e.g., In re Fulton, 240 B.R. 854, 862-68 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing this distinction).
226. Almost a decade later, this very concept is now driving congressional attention to this
area. See infra Part IV.C (discussing proposed bankruptcy legislation grounded in the criteria of
tax-qualification).
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by § 206(d)(1) of ERISA' makes the phrase mesh with the topic of the
opinion: [namely,] ... whether a creditor can reach funds in bankruptcy.
227
Thus, since Shumate, one can readily conceive The Federal Retirement
Model as bifurcated between plan interests that are entitled to a blanket
§ 541 (c)(2) exclusion under Shumate, and those that are not. The bulk of tax-
qualified Keogh plans and IRAs are important arrangements on the exposed
side of the post-Shumate bifurcation in retirement plan asset protection.228
These plans fall outside the scope of ERISA's § 206(d)(1) anti-alienation
mandate and must therefore find asset protection through other avenues, if at
all. The asset protection analysis applicable to these arrangements is
multilayered and warrants further exploration.229
First, an anti-alienation provision derived from outside of ERISA might
affect a plan that is not ERISA-qualified. So long as the anti-alienation
provision is deemed enforceable under traditional spendthrift trust principles
230
or some other governing statute, 23 1 an exclusion under § 541 (c)(2) will protect
227. In re Baker, 114 F.3d at 638. This case was the first Circuit Court opinion to address
the relevance of tax-qualification to a plan's status as "ERISA-qualified" within the meaning of
Shumate. In re Sewell, 180 F.3d at 712.
The term "ERISA-qualified" will hereafter be used to denote plan interests subject under
ERISA's labor title to the § 206(d)(1) spendthrift mandate, and the term "tax-qualified" will
continue to be used in the distinct manner described in supra note 120.
228. A Keogh plan is not subject to ERISA where the plan does not include employees
other than the business owner. Dep't of Labor Reg., 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1975). However,
if the plan does include non-owner employees then it will be covered under Title I of ERISA.
Id. Similarly, IRAs are excluded from coverage under Title I. Dep't. of Labor Reg., 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-2(d)(1) (1975). See supra note 123 and the discussion in supra Part IV.B regarding
IRAs and Keogh plans and their coverage under ERISA. Unfunded deferred compensation
arrangements would also fall outside the Shumate protection. With respect to unfunded and
other NQDC arrangements, see supra note 130.
229. As to the importance of examining asset protection for these arrangements that fall
outside the protection of Shumate, one need merely note that the sheer dollar amount held in
IRAs exceeds the amounts held in either the more traditional employer-sponsored DB plans or
the increasingly prevalent DC plans. See JCX-9-02, supra note 16, at 34 (reporting that as of
December 31, 2000, IRAs held $2.65 trillion, DC plans held $2.53 trillion and DB plans held
$2.06 trillion).
230. Outside the context of pension plans covered by ERISA, Shumate left intact the well-
established principle that non-ERISA trust interests otherwise protected under traditional state
spendthrift trust law doctrines remained within the ambit of the I I U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) exclusion.
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762 (1992) (noting that the legislative history of I I U.S.C.
§ 541 (c)(2) clearly indicates the congressional intent to continue the exclusion of spendthrift
trust interests protected under applicable state law); see also In re Wilcox, 233 F.3d 899, 904
(6th Cir. 2001) (addressing this aspect of the Shumate decision).
231. Plans not subject to ERISA § 206(d)(1) might still find protection in the nature of an
exclusion under § 541 (c)(2) if an anti-alienation provision enforceable under federal or state law
(other than ERISA) is present. This determination may hark back to pre-Shumate spendthrift
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the interest. For many plans not "ERISA-qualified," therefore, the same
traditional analysis underlying the reasoning of the dominant faction of the
circuit courts prior to Shumate may determine whether the retirement plan is
protected. For example, courts sometimes deem debtor interests in IRAs and
Keogh plans as excluded from the bankruptcy estate post-Shumate by virtue of
the interaction of state spendthrift trust law and § 541 (c)(2), giving new life
even to the I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) anti-alienation mandate that is not generally
regarded as unilaterally enforceable.232 As was the case for many plans prior to
trust analysis or may turn upon the implications of Shumate's construction of the phraseology
'enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Shumate, 504 U.S. at 758. For example,
some post-Shumate debtors have found blanket protection similar to that accorded to ERISA-
qualified plans by virtue of particularized statutes that impose enforceable anti-alienation
limitations upon certain retirement arrangements-thus constituting restrictions that are
"enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." See, e.g., In re Mueller, 256 B.R. 445,461
(Bankr. D. Md. 2000) ("Applicable nonbankruptcy law in the instant case is found in the
Annotated Code of Maryland...."). Indeed, a post-Shumate circuit split has arisen as to
whether such anti-alienation provisions must appear in the plan itself, or if the presence of an
anti-alienation provision in external law is sufficient to bring an interest within I I U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2). See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 233 F.3d at 904 (holding that anti-alienation provision
included in city charter was sufficiently enforceable to warrant exclusion under II U.S.C.
§ 541 (c)(2) as construed by Shumate), cert. denied sub noma. Taunt v. Gen. Retirement Sys. of
Detroit, 533 U.S. 929 (2001); In re Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the
creation of a circuit split by rejecting Meehan and Yuhas and holding that I I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)
as construed by Shumate requires that the transfer restriction be contained in the trust instrument
itself); In re Yuhas, 104 F.3d 612, 614-15 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a 1993 New Jersey
statute which looks very much like an exemption statute imposes a restriction on the transfer of
IRA holder's interest within Shumate, thus causing that interest to be excluded from the IRA
holder's bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2)); In re Meehan, 102 F.3d 1209, 1210-11 (1 th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that Georgia exemption statute excludes debtor's IRA from bankruptcy
estate despite the absence of an anti-alteration provision in the IRA documents); In re Zott, 225
B.R. 160, 163-64 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998) (rejecting the Meehan analysis and concluding that
the transfer restriction must be included in the trust itself and be enforceable for the exclusion
under II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) to pertain). For a decision excluding a debtor's interest in a
retirement plan by virtue of some federal law other than ERISA, see In re Whetzal, 32 F.3d
1302, 1304-05 (8th Cir. 1994) (relying on Shumate in holding that a federal employee's rightto
lump-sum distribution under the Civil Service Retirement System was excluded from a
bankruptcy estate by virtue of interaction of I I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) and 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a)).
With regard to I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) constituting a separately enforceable anti-alienation
provision, see supra notes 123-125 and infra note 232 and accompanying text.
232. See In re Moses, 167 F.3d 470, 472-74 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that debtor-
physician's interest in a Keogh plan was excluded under II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) by virtue of the
I.R.C. § 401(a)(l 3) anti-alienation provision and the plan's status as a spendthrift trust under
California state spendthrift trust law, where the debtor did not control the plan or sponsoring
physician practice group). The anti-alienation requirement for tax-qualification set forth in
1.R.C. § 401 (a)(l 3), however, is generally held to fall short of the unilaterally enforceable anti-
alienation requirement implicated by § 541(c)(2) under the reasoning of Shumate. See also
SPERO, supra note 212, § 10.04(l)(a) (noting cases on point and concluding that "[t]he I.R.C.
provision merely relates to controversies arising in connection with the IRS determination that a
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Shumate, however, these non-ERISA-qualified retirement plans often fail such
a traditional analysis by virtue of both the self-settled nature of the arrangement
and the liberality of the debtor-settlor's control over and access to the funds.233
The continued willingness of courts to look beyond the facial claim of
spendthrift protection in order to determine whether asset protection isjustified
on retirement policy grounds further compounds the post-Shumate contrast in
asset protection analysis.234
A second and final stop in the multi-layered quest for asset protection
outside the confines of Shumate is the recognition that, in many instances, an
exemption might shield a retirement plan interest from creditors.235 Once again,
potential asset protection discrepancies arise. These discrepancies are
attributable to the federal bankruptcy opt-out exemption scheme. Under that
scheme, either state or federal law may define the exemption. 6 Therefore,
many variations exist with respect to both the extent of the exemptions and the
trust holding plan assets is entitled to tax-exempt status .... Consequently, an l.R.C.-mandated
anti-alienation provision would not [in and of itself] constitute 'applicable nonbankruptcy law'
for... purpose[s of the § 541 (c)(2) exclusion]."); 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
2D § 156.5 (William L. Norton Jr. ed., 1997) ("However, since I.R.C. § 401(a), and, in
particular, the anti-assignment/anti-alienation provisions of l.R.C. § 401 (a)(l 3), do not appear
to have independent substantive effect (unlike ERISA § 206(d)(1)), it is not clear why tax-
qualification under I.R.C. § 401(a) should be relevant to a § 541(c)(2) exclusion."). Regarding
i.R.C. § 401(a)(13), see also supra notes 123-25 and 231 and accompanying text.
233. Compare In re Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d at 680-83 (holding that a sole owner plan was
subject to creditor claims as part of bankruptcy estate and specifically rejecting arguments that:
(1) the plan was excludable as ERISA-qualified; (2) a provision in a state law constituted a
restriction on transfer enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law; and (3) the debtor's
interest in the plan was a valid spendthrift trust under state law-with the debtor's access to and
control of the plan funds playing a significant role in rejection of this latter argument), with In re
Silviera, 186 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. D. Mass 1995) ("Thus, the element of control and access to
the retirement funds which featured prominently in the analyses of the courts [prior to Shumate]
is no longer determinative in situations where the applicable nonbankruptcy law is law other
than state spendthrift trust law.").
234. See, e.g., In re DeNadai, 259 B.R. 801, 808 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (refusing to
exclude incentive savings arrangements by analogy to ERISA-qualified plans protected under
Shumate, and noting that with regard to anti-alienation restrictions originally included in the
arrangement, "there is no evidence that those restrictions were for trust purposes akin to the
concerns surrounding, and protection of, retirement benefits").
235. The exemption analysis follows only where the interest fails the standards for
excludability under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). See supra note 182 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of exemptions for sheltering property in bankruptcy proceedings); see, e.g.,
In re Luttge, 204 B.R. 259, 263 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding SEP/IRA arrangement exempt
under Florida exemption statute).
236. The exemption opt-out scheme is discussed supra notes 183-85.
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nature of the arrangements protected. 237 For example, debtors subject to the
federal exemption scheme must contend with language that exempts:
The debtor's right to receive... a payment under a stock bonus, pension,
profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness,
disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor,
unless ... such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a),
403(a), 403(b) or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code .... 
238
Observers hoping to understand the post-Shumate variations in retirement
plan asset protection must note three important differences between this
exemption and the blanket protection afforded to an ERISA-qualified plan.
First, through specification of "similar plan" and five circumstantial criteria
(illness, length of service, etc.), the federal exemption statute protects only
those interests that are sufficiently tied to retirement or similarly unavoidable
needs.23 9 Second, the statute further limits the protection afforded a debtor's
retirement plan interest to that which is "reasonably necessary for support."
240
237. For a compilation of the protection afforded under the exemption laws of the various
states, see 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 184, at 299; 1 DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH
MORGAN SCHURING, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS
§§ 10.08-10.58(1997).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2000). See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762
(1992) (rejecting the proposition that the presence of an exemption under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(I 0)(E) somehow implicated the absence of an available ERISA exclusion under II
U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2), precisely reasoning that the former provision was broader in scope and thus
not rendered superfluous by the court's holding). Among the plans that might fall within I I
U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) but that are clearly outside the scope of ERISA are plans maintained by
governmental and church entities, IRAs, and certain plans covering only a sole owner but no
nonowner employees. Id. at 762-63. For a case applying the California exemption statute, CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 703.140(b), which mirrors Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(! OXE), see generally
In re McNown, 203 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
239. Courts generally interpret the statutory language to require that the interest be in "pay
status" or that the debtor be sufficiently close to retirement age that the debtor's ability to
provide for present needs would be hindered by the urgent need to restore a creditor-depleted
retirement fund. Some courts have held that only those benefits that a debtor has a present right
to receive (i.e., in "pay status") are subject to exemption, although the better reasoned view
focuses upon the debtor's immediate post-bankruptcy fresh start and the degree to which the
lack of asset protection would hinder that fresh start in light of the (impending) immediacy of
the retirement needs. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 240 B.R. 854, 875-76 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999)
(discussing contrary cases but resolving the issue by reference to retirement interest as
impacting relatively short-term needs for a debtor who was age fifty-five at the time of
bankruptcy filing). Thus, younger debtors are much less likely to avail themselves of any
exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 0)(E) because the need for retirement funds is not as
urgent, and thus the courts are less likely to grant any exemption. Id. at 876.
240. See In re Kramer, 249 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) ("It is helpful to
separate the analysis.., into three issues: (1) whether the IRAS may be considered 'similar
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Courts and commentators have construed this limitation in the retirement plan
context to mean protection only for rights necessary to maintain a minimal (i.e.,
Social Security floor type) standard of living in the near term, consistent with
the bankruptcy fresh start objective. This limitation is applied without regard to
a debtor's future retirement income needs or any standard of living to which the
debtor may have become accustomed.24'
plans or contracts'; (2) whether payments that may be triggered for reasons other than the five
'on account of' factors are protected; and (3) whether the payments are reasonably necessary for
support.").
The reasonably necessary criteria implicates several lines of analysis mooted by Shumate in
the context of an ERISA-qualified plan. For example, some courts have denied exemption to
IRAs on the basis of a debtor's essentially unfettered withdrawal rights, although the prevailing
trend seems to read the statute as favoring exemption for IRAs without regard to the debtor's
control over the withdrawal decision. In re Kramer, 249 B.R. at 15 1. In reluctantly finding the
exemption proper under the language of the statute, one court specifically noted that as applied
to IRAs, "this exemption protects a right to payment from a revocable, self-settled trust." Id.
The same court further questioned the degree to which IRAs truly serve any retirement
objectives in light of the liberality of the applicable withdrawal rules. Id. The court cites, in its
discussion, academic commentary raising similar concerns about the retirement orientation of
IRAs. See Dilley, supra note 35, at 415-29 (examining the rationale for affording protection to
IRAs in bankruptcy proceedings); Kaplan, supra note 136, at 303-09 (noting concerns
regarding preretirement withdrawals from IRAs).
The more technical arguments levied against exempting IRAs generally were that the
debtor's unilateral right to withdraw IRA funds prior to age 59/2 and the absence of similar
limitations meant that the IRA was either not similar to the enumerated types of plans or that
payment was not limited to the specified events. There are four basic arguments that courts
have offered in support of finding an exemption for IRAs: (1) Congress must have intended to
include such plans as similar to those enumerated, or else the exception of only certain IRAs
from exemption under II U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) would make no sense; (2) IRAs are
substitutes for future earnings because they were designed by Congress specifically to provide
retirement benefits; (3) to deny exemption would penalize those individuals not eligible for an
employer-sponsored retirement arrangement; and (4) the exemption is consistent with the
bankruptcy fresh start given the "reasonably necessary" limitation. See In re Brucher, 243 F.3d
242, 243 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the trustee's objections and summarizing the arguments in
favor of exemption); In re Carmichael, 100 F.3d 375, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
requirement that amounts be payable on account of the listed event criteria, but holding that the
debtor's access to and control over funds, which implicates that payments may be made for
reasons wholly unrelated to five stated events, does not disqualify IRA from exemption); In re
Kramer, 249 B.R. at 150 (discussing judicial disagreement on the issue of whether the five
enumerated events are an exclusive list of payment reasons, and reluctantly concluding that
statutory language dictates that a right to payment for reasons other than the five enumerated
events will not disqualify a plan for exemption, so long as a right to payment relating to the five
events is present); In re Hermes, 239 B.R. 491, 495-97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (discussing
the legislative history of I 1 U.S.C. § 522(d)(I 0)(E) and the protection of benefits which are akin
to future earnings, and also noting discrimination against the self-employed issue were the
protection to be denied to certain interests).
241. SeelnreTaff, 10B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (discussing the meaning of
"reasonably necessary" in a case of first impression for bankruptcy courts, and concluding that
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The presence of such a considered limitation outside the confines of an
excluded ERISA-qualified plan presents a stark legislative contrast.
Specifically, in developing the 1978 Code, the Senate attempted to impose a
"reasonably necessary" limitation upon the § 541 (c)(2) exclusion approach to
protecting traditional spendthrift trusts. 42 Any excess above the amount
necessary to satisfy this standard would have been subject to forced application
in satisfaction of creditor claims.243 The full Congress rejected the Senate's
"the... amount to be set aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient to sustain basic needs, not
related to his former status in society or the lifestyle to which he is accustomed"); see also
Dilley, supra note 35, at 410 (noting that II U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) is consistent with the idea
of protecting only a minimal stream of income upon retirement). Regarding lifestyle
maintenance as an aspect of the retirement income security goal, see supra notes 62-63, 75-77,
and 84-87 and accompanying text.
242. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869
(stating that the exclusion is limited to "income that is reasonably necessary for the support of a
debtor and his dependents"). Of course, as noted supra Part IV.B.2, § 541(c)(2) ultimately
became a direct means for protecting "ERISA-qualified" plans without regard to traditional
spendthrift trust analysis.
243. Congress created a special commission in 1970 to assist with the impending
bankruptcy reform that would ultimately culminate in the enactment of the 1978 Code. See
supra note 185 (noting the creation of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws). As part of its
1973 report, that Commission recommended to Congress that the spendthrift trust bankruptcy
exclusion (now embodied in § 541(c)(2)) be limited so as to protect only that amount of trust
property or interest necessary to provide for the reasonable support needs of the beneficiary and
her dependents. See supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text (explaining the exclusion of
spendthrift trust property under the prior 1898 Act). This recommendation is embodied in § 4-
601(b) of the Commission's proposed statute included in the 1973 Commission Report, supra
note 185, which was a focal point of debate concerning the impending new bankruptcy
legislation. The Senate endorsed the Commission's opinion that:
There is no sound justification for permitting a debtor to take advantage of the
[protections afforded under federal bankruptcy laws] and, at the same time, to
shield from his creditors assets because local law does not allow creditors to reach
his interest. The Commission generally recommends that these restraints not be
enforceable. However, in recognition of the possibility that the spendthrift trust
may be used to protect one incapable of providing for his own welfare, the debtor
should be allowed to retain sufficient income to support himself and his
dependents. But to the extent the beneficial interest is of a value in excess of the
reasonable support needs of the debtor and his dependents, the interest should be
available to the debtor's creditors.
1973 Commission Report, supra note 185, at 486. The notes to the Commission's proposed
§ 4-601 state that:
If the income exceeds such amount [as may be necessary to support the debtor and
the debtor's dependents], the [bankruptcy] trustee can sell the right to the excess
income, hold open the case so as to collect the income, or reach the principal to the
extent in excess of the principal needed to generate the support income ... subject,
of course, to the rights of any third persons in the principal.
Id. For additional explanation of how a creditor might realize upon a beneficial interest such as
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view, however, and enacted § 541(c)(2) without limit upon the amount
sheltered.244
The legislative history of the exemption granted under the 1978 Code
§ 522(d)(10)(E) is just the opposite. Both the Senate and House proposed
exemption provisions that conferred asset protection upon affected retirement
plans without any needs-based or other dollar limitation.245 Through the
reconciliation process, however, legislators added the "reasonably necessary"
limitation to the final version of § 522(d)(10)(E).246 Congress therefore
consciously rejected any "reasonably necessary" cap on the amount to be
protected from creditors under an exclusion that clearly embraced the wealth-
driven traditional spendthrift trust under state law.247 In contrast, retirement
plan interests emerged with: (1) uncertain and seemingly little considered
coverage under this broad § 541 (c)(2) exclusion, as evidenced by Shumate and
the antecedent circuit split;248 and (2) a federal exemption provision capped by
an asset protection limiting "reasonably necessary" standard under
§ 522(d)(10)(E). It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the proper scope of
retirement plan asset protection has proven so elusive.
The third difference between protection by exemption and protection
under Shumate is the degree of inconsistency that arises when similarly situated
debtors attempt to exempt retirement plan interests. For interests that fall
that held by a trust or retirement plan beneficiary, see supra note 21.
244. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367-69 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6323-6325. See 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)
(discussing limitations on § 541(c)(2)); 124 CONG. REC. S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini) (same). The legislative history of the completed
1978 Code contains no meaningful discussion of the issue.
245. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 361(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6317
(proposing bankruptcy legislation that allowed retirement plans to be protected from creditors in
bankruptcy without need-based limitations). The bill reported out of the Senate judiciary
committee actually deferred the entire matter to states, without federal limitation on states'
ability to exempt these interests. See In re Taff, 10 B.R. at 106 (discussing the Senate proposal
regarding exemptions in the context of § 522(d)(10)(E)).
246. Congress provided no explanation as to how that standard might be applied. For a
thorough discussion of the legislative history of I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(I 0)(E) and the co-existing
limitation under the Uniform Exemptions Act as promulgated in 1976, see the court's discussion
in In re Taff, 10 B.R. at 105-06. The Taffcourt concluded that Congress omitted any guidance
on the question of the "reasonably necessary limitation.., because it expected the courts to
evolve standards on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 106. For criticism of this case-by-case
approach, see infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
247. Regarding references in the legislative history of § 541 (c)(2) to protection for state
law denominated spendthrift trusts, see supra notes 202-05 and the accompanying text.
248. See supra Part IV.B. I and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
ERISA's impact on asset protection in bankruptcy).
228
RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH ASSET PROTECTION 229
outside the scope of Shumate, Congress has elevated federalism concerns over
national retirement policies by expressly permitting states to opt-out of the
federal exemption scheme of which § 522(d)(10)(E) is a part.249 While some
opt-out states have statutes that echo the language of the federal exemption,
many do not.25 ° Instead, some state exemption statutes grant unlimited
protection to "retirement" arrangements that are delineated by reference to the
various tax-qualification rules of the I.R.C.21 The arrangements so defined
typically include IRAs and other arrangements not "ERISA-qualified"-and
thus not otherwise entitled to such sweeping protection under any federal
law.252
Some have criticized the amorphous state of retirement plan asset
protection on the grounds that inconsistency in treatment of retirement plan
types leads to inequities as between persons eligible to participate in (and to
receive Shumate asset protection under) an ERISA-qualified plan, and those
ineligible for such coverage by virtue of, for example, their status as self-
employed. 3  Forcing IRAs and Keogh plans to fit within the sometimes
limited protective parameters of an exemption is not necessarily inconsistent
with ERISA's overriding purpose, however, given the individual participant's
control over funding and management of such plans and the absence of
employees generally.25 4 On the other hand, this discrepancy is a somewhat odd
result given that IRAs originated under ERISA as an alternative for such
ineligible individuals, and also in light of the I.R.C. provisions that equate the
funding of a Keogh plan to that of an employer-sponsored plan.255
249. As noted, approximately thirty-five states have opted-out of the federal exemption
scheme. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (describing the limitations imposed on
debtors in opt-out states with regard to exemptions).
250. For an example of a state statute that mirrors the federal exemption, see CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 703.140(b), as discussed in In re McKown, 203 F.3d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000).
251. Like the Shumate Court's imprecise use of the phrase "ERISA-qualified," this is but
another asset protection standard of varying applicability that highlights the question of what
role retirement plan tax-qualification should play in retirement plan asset protection analysis.
252. IRA exemption under 1978 Code § 522(d)(10)(E) is subject to a "reasonably
necessary" limitation.
253. See, e.g., In re Hermes, 239 B.R. 491,496 (E.D. Mich. 1999) ("Failure to treat IRAs
as 'similar plans' and thus exempt [under I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(l0)(E)] would be to penalize
individuals who are not in a position to participate in a pension plan or profit sharing plan, e.g.,
self-employed individuals.").
254. See, e.g., In re Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d 673, 681 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that no
ERISA protection is called for where the sole plan participant also is the plan administrator).
255. See supra note 123 and supra Part IV.B regarding IRAs and Keogh plans and their
coverage under ERISA. See also MUNNELL, supra note 28, at 55 ("In passing ERISA, Congress
recognized that a large segment of the working population was ineligible for the tax advantages
associated with private pension plans. Therefore, ERISA established individual retirement
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In sum, asset protection within the Federal Retirement Model is now
bifurcated between retirement plan interests that are unilaterally protected
under Shumate and those that are not. Particular points of departure are:
(1) the unquestioning asset protection available to ERISA-qualified and other
statutorily enforceable spendthrifted arrangements by virtue of the § 541 (c)(2)
exclusion; 256 versus (2) a myriad of sometimes inconsistent protection offered
to non-ERISA-qualified arrangements through traditional state law spendthrift
trust analysis;2 57 versus (3) broadly applicable but more demanding exemption
laws that refer to tax-qualification, reasonable necessity, or distance from
retirement as important criteria for protection;258 versus (4) state exemption
laws that offer blanket protection based solely upon a retirement plan's tax-
qualified status, without regard to the amount of assets protected or the real
likelihood of actual retirement use.25 9  Given the prominence of federal
retirement policy goals, 26° it is counterintuitive that a federal scheme would
permit variations in state law to provide for some (but not all) debtors
substantial retirement plan asset protection equivalent to that accorded ERISA-
qualified plans. Federalism is no answer because the federal goal of retirement
income security is affected by creditor access to retirement plan interests, and
that goal does not vary by state.
2 6'
Yet, Congress has endorsed a very complex system of retirement plan
designs. That system has developed into an arena peppered with a myriad of
approaches to both the degree of asset protection and the extent of policy-based
analysis undertaken in defining that protection. The reasons, apart from
federalism concerns, that such a system endures arguably lie in divergent
perspectives on the propriety of asset protection, coupled with a general
congressional failure to consider the broader asset protection landscape in any
accounts and liberalized contribution limits on Keogh plans for the self-employed.").
256. See supra notes 217-29 and accompanying text (discussing protection of ERISA-
qualified plans under the I I U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) exclusion).
257. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (discussing debtor protection from
creditors during bankruptcy for non-ERISA trusts interests).
258. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text (noting the protection afforded by
statutory exemptions).
259. See supra Part IV.A.2 regarding the "opt-out" bankruptcy exemption scheme, and
supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text regarding state exemption laws that do not impose a
"reasonably necessary" limit on the protection of retirement plan interests.
260. See supra notes 221-22 (discussing the legislative objectives and social policies
behind federal retirement law).
261. The tie between certain tax-qualified retirement plan interests and actual service to
retirement policy goals is a topic developed more thoroughly in Part V.
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focused or comprehensive manner.262 More practically, however, the judicially
perceived supremacy of ERISA doctrine where certain plan types are involved
and the lack of clear guidance otherwise are perhaps the best explanations for
the state of the law post-Shumate.263 Ultimately, a reasonable Shumate
corollary appears to be that outside the context of an ERISA-qualified plan
entitled to blanket exclusion under § 541 (c)(2), Congress has made no firm (or
at least consistently discernable) policy judgment about the proper boundaries
of asset protection. Congress has therefore deferred the question of asset
protection outside the confines of Shumate to the courts and/or states for
resolution by reference to the same spendthrift trust, bankruptcy, tax,
federalism, and retirement policy concerns that dominated the larger retirement
plan asset protection landscape prior to Shumate. It now appears, however, that
Congress has undertaken a fresh legislative approach to these issues.
C. A Third Legislative Progression in the Evolution of
Retirement Plan Protection
Recent congressional attention to the matter of retirement plan asset
protection indicates that a more expansive congressional policyjudgrnent than
that perceived by the Shumate Court is in the works.2" This judgment
promises a shift towards a wider array of retirement-oriented directives serving
as the basis for more broadly applicable asset protection. Specifically,
proposed revisions to the 1978 Code (the Bankruptcy Amendments) have made
several recent forays through Congress and presage what should be
characterized as the third significant progression in the evolution of asset
protection under the Federal Retirement Model.265 It appears that Congress too
262. The assertion that the asset protection variations are coherently tied to differences in
plan type breaks down through simple reference to the variations in the treatment afforded
similarly situated retiree-debtors, as discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 249-55,
and also is undermined by the circuit splits that have arisen in the post-Shumate era, as
discussed, for example, supra note 225.
263. Regarding the Shumate Court's conclusion that Congress deemed ERISA policy to
trump creditor rights concerns, see supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
264. Regarding the Shumate Court's perception of congressional policy, see supra notes
221-22.
265. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2001, H.R. 333,
107th Cong. (proposing numerous revisions to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978). The House of
Representatives passed this Act by a vote of 306 to 108. 147 Cong. Rec. H600-01 (daily ed.
March 1, 2001). A modified version of the House Bill passed the Senate by a vote of 82 to 16,
and was denominated simply the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001." H.R. 333, 107th Cong.
(2001) (as amended by S. Amend. 974 and S. Amend. 977). Despite conference agreements in
August 2002 and November 2002 on all other significant outstanding issues, a combination of
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has noted the variable state of retirement plan asset protection in the post-
Shumate world.266 Congress now proposes to streamline the analysis by simple
reference to the general categories by which the "carrot" of tax incentives is
bestowed.267
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments, significant asset protection expressly
grounded in the criteria of tax-qualification finally rises to the forefront in
marking the bounds of asset protection under the Federal Retirement Model.
As to the proper balancing of bankruptcy versus retirement policies, the
Bankruptcy Amendments facially reflect a congressional consensus that the tax-
qualification rules are a sufficient delineation of means by which important
federal retirement objectives are carried out.26 The Bankruptcy Amendments
at the very least reflect a determination that the tax-qualification rules provide a
reasonable benchmark by reference to which more consistent asset protection
treatment can be accorded to the retirement plan types that are encouraged
under federal tax laws.269 Moreover, on first impression, the closer tying of
postelection partisan politics and an ideological battle over the protection to be afforded
abortion protestors in bankruptcy has most recently stalled the legislation. Links to the history
of the Bankruptcy Amendments and the latest on the status of this legislation are available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d I 07:HR00333:@@@X (last visited Nov. 9,2003) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The legislation has shown remarkable
resiliency, having remained afloat despite two Clinton vetoes and significant delays in
conference action occasioned by the events of September 11,200 1. See 147 Cong. Rec. H517-
18 (daily ed. March 1, 200 1) (detailing the history of the legislation that preceded the currently
pending Bankruptcy Amendments, and noting Clinton vetoes); see also Sheila Creaton, Pro-
Creditor Bankruptcy Reform Moves Quickly Through Congress, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Feb.
19, 2001, at I (discussing a proposed bankruptcy bill and its provisions); Reni Gertner,
Bankruptcy, HMO Reform Are Stalled After Terrorists Attacks, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Oct.
15, 200 1, at I (noting delays in the passage of bankruptcy legislation following the September
1I, 2001 terrorist attacks). The latest incantation of this legislation now enjoys the support of
President George W. Bush, who has indicated he will sign the new law if presented to him. Id.
at 1.
266. The Bankruptcy Amendments actually have roots in legislation originally offered in
response to the circuit split that preceded Shumate-perhaps forestalled by that decision but
resurfacing of late due to more attentive congressional scrutiny of the continuing discrepancies
in retirement plan asset protection, notwithstanding the Shumate "resolution" of such matters.
See H.R. 3804, 1 02d Cong. § 2 (1991) (proposing to amend federal bankruptcy law to exclude
from a debtor's estate any interest in certain qualified pension plans); S. 1985, 102d Cong.
§ 202 (199 1) (proposing to establish a commission to review the Bankruptcy Code); JCS- 16-91,
supra note 35, at 6-8, 14 (discussing the pre-Shumate circuit split and the proposed house bill
aimed at addressing the retirement plan asset protection issue responsible for that split).
267. See Part IIL.C regarding the tax-incentives and the categories of plans for which these
benefits are available.
268. See infra note 271 and accompanying text (using that qualification as a criteria in
determining what types of retirement plans fall under the federal exemption).
269. For example, references in the Senate debate point to the "equal protection" of various
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asset protection to objective tax-qualification criteria seems to be a logical
course to pursue if uniformity and simplicity are among the goals of this
revisitation. In other words, when juxtaposed against the current backdrop of
various federally sanctioned but non-federally derived controls over retirement
plan asset protection, the increased uniformity in asset protection across plan
types and debtors is one of the more defensible aspects of this congressional
push towards tax-based asset protection.27°
More technically, the Bankruptcy Amendments expressly adopt tax-
qualification as the determinant of asset protection for a range of plans much
broader than those within the ambit of ERISA § 206(d)(1) and Shumate. A
preemptive federal exemption framework provides the new avenue for
protection. That protection extends specifically to:
Retirement funds to the extent that these funds are held in a fund or account
that is exempt from taxation under section 401 [profit sharing and stock
bonus plans, including those of self-employed individuals], 403 [annuity
plans, including those of certain tax-exempt organizations and educational
organizations], 408 [individual retirement accounts, 408A [Roth IRAs],
414 [multi-employer plans], 457 [certain governmental plans], or 501(a)
[tax-exempt trusts in which the bulk of tax-qualified plan assets are held] of
the Internal Revenue Code .... 271
types of retirement plans that will result under a tax-based delineation of protected accounts.
See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S1925 (daily ed. March 7, 2001)(Statement of Sen. Hatch (R-Utah))
(referencing this argument). The Bankruptcy Amendments also are consistent with the findings
of the 1997 Commission Report, which acknowledges the broad scope of protection afforded
under Shumate and then concludes that protection for other retirement plans should be tied to
tax-qualification criteria without the imposition of an extraneous "reasonable needs" standard,
which the Commission felt fostered litigation due to its subjectivity. 1997 FnAL REPORT, supra
note 184, at 139-41.
270. See, however, the discussion of shortcomings in the present retirement plan system, as
noted supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
271. Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(a)(1), amending 1978 Code 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)
(2000). More generally, § 224 amends and renumbers 1978 Code § 522(b) (as in effect on
February II, 2003) by adding a new § 522(b)(1), and then essentially renumbering the prior
subsection (b) provisions. The new § 522(b)(1) expresses the authorization for exempting
property in accordance with the newly numbered §§ 522(b)(2) and (b)(3). Renumbered
§ 522(b)(2), in turn, now embodies the applicability of federal exemptions under § 522(d),
unless the debtor resides in an opt-out state. See supra notes i 83-85 regarding the exemption
opt-out scheme. If the debtor is proceeding under the § 522(d) federal list of exemptions, the
language quoted in the text supra will govern by virtue of a new § 522(d)( 12), as added by
Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(a)(2). Newly numbered § 522(b)(3) embodies the opt-out
exemption scheme, and where applicable the governing exemptions will be those provided
under state law plus federal exemptions other than those set forth in § 522(d). In that case,
however, the language quoted in the text supra still applies, now by virtue of newly added
§ 522(b)(3)(C)-in other words, federal law controls absolutely with respect to exemptions for
the noted plans, regardless of the debtor's residence in an opt-out exemption state. Thus,
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This language relegates to the annals of history many of the analytical
considerations affecting the availability of asset protection both before and after
Shumate. For example, the new legislation omits any caveat for debtor access
or control, and it does not inquire into the likelihood that retirement uses will
actually ensue.2 2 The legislation eliminates distinctions between trust and
other plan forms, and the broad language likewise moots the issue of self-
settlement. 73 Debtors' interests in IRAs, Keogh plans, and other arrangements
previously omitted from the § 541 (c)(2) exclusion approach under Shumate will
now enjoy Shumate-like protection in a federal bankruptcy proceeding.
Further, this protection will not defer to variations in state exemption laws that
might result in inconsistencies between otherwise similarly situated debtors.274
Also significant is the seeming relegation of "reasonable needs" exemption
limits to retirement arrangements that fall outside the scope of either Shumate
or this new tax-centric protection regime. 7 But, some vestige of limitation
language substantially identical to that quoted in the text supra will govern a debtor proceeding
under the federal exemption scheme by virtue of amended § 522(b)(2) and newly added
§ 522(d)(12), and will govern a debtor opting out of the federal scheme by virtue of newly
added §522(b)(3)(C). In either event, the quoted language applies without regard to the
"reasonably necessary" limitation in current § 522(d)(I 0)(E), and thus protection for the affected
interests would seem to be beyond limitation under that standard. However, an absolute dollar
ceiling limitation does apply to a debtor's interest in an IRA, as discussed infra note 276 and
accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 212-34 and the accompanying text regarding the relevance of debtor
access and control in resolving retirement plan asset protection questions.
273. See supra Part III.B.3 regarding plan forms and asset protection under ERISA. See
supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text for discussion of self-settlement.
274. See supra note 270 (noting inconsistencies in treatment of similarly situated debtors
under various state exemption statutes). In any federal bankruptcy proceeding, the specified
exemptions under the Bankruptcy Amendments should preempt any divergent state exemption
laws relating to the affected retirement arrangements notwithstanding retention of the opt-out
scheme, as the new exemptions are provided for regardless of the applicability of federal versus
state law exemptions. In this sense, the new provisions are a limitation on a state's ability to opt
out of the federal scheme. However, state law exemptions would continue to be relevant in a
state law insolvency proceeding. See Peter Spero, Impact of Bankruptcy Reform Legislation on
Asset Protection, 28 EST. PLAN. 291, 295 (2001) (discussing the importance of state
exemptions).
275. However, nothing indicates that more generous state law exemptions have been
precluded for this more narrow category of arrangements. For example, a debtor's interest in a
so-called "top hat" plan would be left to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(I 0)(E) or a state exemption scheme.
A top hat plan generally is an unfunded arrangement designed to provide deferred compensation
to a select group of highly compensated employees, and such arrangements are excluded from
coverage under Title I of ERISA and also are not tax-qualified. Included within the rubric of
top hat plans are phantom stock arrangements and SERPs. Also outside the scope of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Shumate protections would be any excess benefit plan-meaning
a plan which exists primarily to provide benefits to employees which exceed the limitations on
contributions and benefits specified in I.R.C. § 415. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
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does remain. For example, Congress singled out standard and Roth IRAs for
special treatment, which comes in the form of an inflation-adjusted $1,000,000
cap on the aggregate account balance to be shielded from creditors.276
D. In Search of Perspective
The noted progressions in the evolution of retirement plan asset protection
continue to raise many questions, not the least of which is the logic of
subjecting such a pervasive federal policy-retirement income security for
citizens-to the vagaries of the currently bifurcated Federal Retirement Model
of asset protection. The proposed legislative solution, which calls for an
829, § 3(36) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) (2000)) (defining "excess benefit
plan"); ERISA § 4(b)(5) (exempting unfunded excess benefit plans from the scope of
Subchapter I of Title I of ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (same).
276. Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(e), amending 1978 Code § 522(n). For a more
evaluative commentary on this exemption cap, see infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
The cited provision specifies that the $1,000,000 amount "may be increased if the interests of
justice so require." Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(e)(1). Amounts rolled over from an
otherwise fully protected tax-qualified arrangement do not count against this cap. See supra
note 141 regarding rollovers. These rolled-over amounts therefore retain their creditor-
protected status notwithstanding the cap and without detracting from the limited IRA amount
the debtor might otherwise shelter. Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(a)(4), amending 1978 Code
§ 522(b)(3)(C) & (D), § 522(n). Other changes caused by the Bankruptcy Amendments and not
discussed above include provisions clarifying the extent ofjudicial inquiry into the status of a
particular plan as tax-qualified. See Bankruptcy Amendments § 224(a)(I), amending 1978
Code II U.S.C. § 522(bX4), as well as provisions exempting many plan interests from
consideration as disposable income in a Chapter 13 proceeding. See generally Spero, supra
note 274, at 294 (discussing Chapter 13 provisions).
In a surprising move given the exemption approach adopted for other arrangements,
Congress excluded IRAs and I.R.C. § 529 tax-favored plans established to further educational
(as opposed to retirement savings) pursuits from the bankruptcy estate by virtue of an
amendment to § 541 of the 1978 Code. Bankruptcy Amendments § 225(a), amending the 1978
Code by adding a new II U.S.C. § 541 (bX5),(6). Even more surprising are the lengths to which
Congress went to impose anti-abuse limitations upon this particular exclusion, such that the
protection is limited only to those education plans: (I) created for certain lineal descendants of
the debtor; (2) to the extent contributions were not in excess of statutory limitations; and
(3) with respect only to funds deposited into such a plan more than two years prior to the
bankruptcy filing, or up to $5,000 with respect to funds deposited between one and two years
prior to filing. Id. The inclusion of such "an elaborate statutory mechanism" to curtail abuse in
the case of educational arrangements relative to the absence of such limitations in the context of
more traditional arrangements prompted one asset protection author to quip that "Congress
apparently... found abusive the prospect of debtors providing for their children's education."
Spero, supra note 274, at 291. The distinction, however, most likely lies in some perceived
preeminence of retirement-oriented vehicles as sanctioned under the I.R.C., with a more
questioning grant of asset protection where a worthy but nonretirement goal is the subject of the
tax incentive. See, in that regard, the analysis set forth infra Part V.
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increased emphasis upon tax-qualification as the relevant criteria for otherwise
virtually unquestioned protection from creditor claims, also demands attention.
The ultimate issues concern both the justification for, and the proper scope of,
asset protection to be afforded a debtor's retirement plan interest. Part V
presents a concluding perspective on the matter of retirement plan asset
protection and the interactions between the Traditional, Self-Settled, and
Federal Retirement Models that have affected that issue. The interplay between
the three models in light of the particular policy choices that Congress appears
to have made (or consciously overlooked) along the way indicate that Congress
should now adopt a more comprehensive and focused federal approach to asset
protection. In particular, considering not only the theoretical but also the
pragmatic underpinnings of the Federal Retirement Model, Congress should
more thoughtfully consider the concept of asset protection as it affects national
retirement policy.
V Asset Protection Through The Lens of Federal Retirement Policy
A view of the modem asset protection environment reveals a Traditional
Model long blessed at the federal level. That blessing includes the promise of
deference, under federal bankruptcy laws, to state decisions concerning the
parameters and acceptability of protecting property conveyed in trust for the
benefit of a third-party. Likewise, the domestic emergence of the Self-Settled
Model and the inconsistencies resulting from the opt-out bankruptcy exemption
scheme have helped to inspire a burgeoning asset protection environment.1
77
Couple this with the scheduled congressional repeal of federal wealth transfer
taxes,2 78 and it seems that the privilege of accumulating wealth to be enjoyed
currently and then passed on to subsequent generations without depletion by
the claims of outsiders has never been more vibrant than today, and that federal
policy either encourages or passively favors such a state of affairs.
Yet, against this backdrop, commentators have criticized the congressional
push to more closely associate the Federal Retirement Model's asset protection
with tax-qualification. Commentators have focused particular criticism on the
characterization of many of the affected arrangements as operating more like
277. The federal influences upon the development of the Traditional and Self-Settled
Models, and the particular role played by the opt-out exemption scheme under federal
bankruptcy laws, are discussed in detail in Eason, supra note 174, at 52-69.
278. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 501; I.R.C. §§ 2210, 2264 (2000).
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personal savings accounts than retirement vehicles.279 The problem is the
potential for substantial wealth accumulation within the tax-qualified retirement
plan environment, unrelated to actual retirement or other beneficiary-specific or
societally meritorious objectives.280 The foregoing juxtaposition of asset
protection models is not intended, however, to suggest that such criticism is
unfounded, as the noted criticism on these points with respect to the Federal
Retirement Model is coherently articulated and adequately defended. 28'
Instead, these considerations suggest two distinct lines of analysis that bring
this Article to conclusion. The first examines the broader implications of using
the existing tax-qualified retirement plan regime as a benchmark for
establishing asset protection boundaries. The second suggests the need for a
more comprehensive view of the interrelationship between the Traditional,
Self-Settled, and Federal Retirement Models as affecting federal retirement
policy objectives.
A. Asset Protection with Feigned Purpose?
Consideration of the Traditional, Self-Settled, and Federal Retirement
Models suggests that it is not asset protection or even self-settlement per se that
has engendered such criticism of the movement to link retirement plan asset
279. See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 35, at 415-16 (arguing for a more inquiring grant of asset
protection for "retirement" arrangements, and lamenting in this regard, "[tlhe continuing
transformation of the private pension system into employer-sponsored tax-favored savings
arrangements (such as 401 (k) plans), whose accumulations can be easily transferred to IRAs");
Spitzer, supra note 35, at 1296 ("A terrible inequity would be created if debtors were able to
shield their funds from creditors.. . then turn around and withdraw those same funds for their
own benefit ... ."). An early characterization of retirement arrangements as constituting tax-
advantaged savings vehicles, at least in part, appears in Wohl, supra note 35, at 34. Wohl
suggests asset protection for that portion of a retirement arrangement that can be attributed to
asset accumulation for the purpose of meeting reasonable needs upon retirement, while denying
protection for the savings portion of the arrangement, Id. Although suggesting that actuarial
theory might play a role, Wohl generally defers on the question of what level of assets might be
protected in the name of ensuring that "reasonable retirement needs" will ultimately be met. Id.
at 34-35.
280. See, e.g., In re Dudley, 249 F.3d 1170,1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering whether
an IRA from which S 107,000 had been withdrawn to pay current living expenses could qualify
for an exemption by virtue of similarity to a retirement plan under a state exemption that
mirrored I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 0)(E)); Dilley, supra note 35, at 363-64 ("1 suggest that a larger
problem is the blanket protection of tax-favored retirement accounts ... which allows unlimited
accumulation of funds without regard to whether those funds will actually be used for retirement
or will even be necessary for the debtor's support in old age.").
281. See supra note 35 (noting the academic commentary on post-ERISA changes in
retirement plan asset protection).
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protection to tax-qualified status. Rather, objection lies more fundamentally in
the prospect of asset protection that is unbounded by any principled purpose,
and, in particular, protection that is unbounded by the often elusive purpose of
serving federal retirement objectives in a focused and equitable way. The
problems with the current movement towards using tax-qualification as the
standard for retirement plan asset protection, therefore, do not stem from the
elevation of federal retirement policy objectives over bankruptcy considerations
or some other balancing failure in that regard.282 The problems instead stem
from the defensibility of the tax-qualification criteria as truly serving
meritorious federal policy objectives in an equitable and efficient manner-
such that protection gauged by reference to tax-qualification is warranted. In
this view, then, criticism of asset protection in the retirement plan arena is
better directed at the nature of the interests protected as truly serving the
underlying federal goal of promoting the retirement income security of citizens.
If such criticism endures in the face of linkage to tax-qualified status, then the
broader view suggests that a more logical response lies in re-examining the
relationship between the tax-qualification criteria and the federal policy
objectives that are said to justify the underlying retirement plan tax
expenditure. 283 Given retirement policy's place atop the tax expenditure list
284
and the trail of congressional and Supreme Court pronouncements as to the
apparent superiority of retirement policy in the face of creditor claims, 8 5
identifying the problem in the foregoing manner is, pragmatically speaking, the
more useful line of inquiry.
B. Tax-Qualification as Promoting Retirement Policy Objectives
Tax-qualification criteria often have little to do with ensuring that the
affected assets will actually be directed towards the retirement income security
goals that serve as the underlying justification for both the tax expenditure and
282. See supra notes 221-22 regarding the Supreme Court's view of this balance.
283. The tax expenditure concept is discussed in more detail supra notes 150-58 and
accompanying text. Part V will show the suggested examination to be more productive than
efforts to disassociate asset protection from tax-qualification standards, or attempts to graft some
extraneous near-term "reasonable needs" or other limitation upon the asset protection so
afforded. Regarding practical issues attendant a debtor-specific "reasonable needs" approach,
see infra notes 328-33.
284. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the favorable tax treatment for
retirement plans and its impact on tax revenues).
285. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (noting legislative and Supreme Court
discussions of policies and objectives favoring retirement plan asset protection).
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asset protection. A particular problem is that of "leakage," which denotes the
diversion of retirement plan assets to nonretirement consumptive uses, like
buying a house or enhancing near-term standard of living.2 6  The tax-
qualification rules often foster leakage by permitting liberal withdrawal of plan
assets in the form of lump-sum distributions or roll-overs from traditional
pension plans to less restrictive arrangements like IRAs. 287 Among other
things, then, restricting this leakage would appear to be central to
accomplishing overriding retirement income security objectives. Permitting
creditors to seize retirement plan interests or assets suggests a form of leakage,
and asset protection can therefore align with the broader goal.
If Congress constrained the tax-qualified plan regime to minimize leakage,
then asset protection linked to that regime would be much less objectionable. 288
Interestingly, the $1,000,000 cap placed on the protection afforded IRAs under
the Bankruptcy Amendments at least evinces recognition of the issue and poses
an asset protection compromise that is perhaps reasonable in degree and
practical in its implementation. 289  But arguably, Congress should have
included Keogh plans and similar participant-controlled arrangements that
exclude non-owner employees in a more comprehensive dollar-capped category
of protected arrangements. Doing so would have delineated a distinction
between retirement-directed arrangements and mere tax-favored "retirement"
savings plans that are easily diverted to personal consumption. A predetermined
dollar cap so applied-viewed in tandem with the rationale underlying the tax-
favored status afforded Keogh plans and IRAs-would better address the
conceptual concern that protection for these plans is questionable in purpose,
different from that underlying the Self-Settled Model. 290 Leaving the more
limited universe of plans that are not tax-qualified to the "reasonable needs"
inquiry posed under the federal § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption, then, would
286. See Stein & Dilley, supra note 151, at 1402-07 (identifying three primary sources of
leakage: (1) preretirement leakage, which denotes consumption of retirement assets prior to
retirement; (2) premature exhaustion of benefits during retirement; and (3) failure to exhaust
benefits for use during retirement, thus converting retirement assets to inheritable assets for
consumption by descendants or other devisees). See generally 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at
20-21 (discussing the problem of leakage and providing statistics).
287. See supra notes 48, 216 (discussing federal laws that regulate distributions from
retirement plans).
288. For a discussion of potential mitigation of the leakage problem and the difficulty
associated with redressing the problem, see Stein & Dilley, supra note 151, at 1413-19.
289. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining that standard and Roth IRAs
are singled out for special treatment through an inflation-adjusted $1,000,000 cap).
290. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text regarding the rationale underlying the
original legislative authorization for IRAs and Keogh plans as an employer-sponsored plan
alternative.
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seemingly help round out the Federal Retirement Model with a semblance of
limitation. Moreover, by proceeding along these lines, Congress could confine
the inefficiency inherent in a global case-by-case "reasonable needs" standard
to a smaller class of debtors acting outside the tax-qualified plan regime.29'
But, true limitation here would require foreclosing the possibility of more
generous state exemptions for these arrangements, which currently thrive under
the federal bankruptcy opt-out scheme.292
C. Wealth Accumulation and the Retirement Objective
The potential for wealth accumulation within the tax-qualified retirement
plan context has been a longstanding bane of the tax-incentive nature of the
voluntary pension leg of the triadic retirement income security stool. In
discussing the evolution of the private pension system during the period
spanning from the 1930s to the 1950s, one commentator's observations reveal:
The rise of class-based pension plans, both the collectively bargained and
those serving management, were adjustments to the quickening American
state. With the federal government providing basic retirement income [i.e.,
Social Security], private pensions became supplementary benefits .... The
managerial plans emphasized asset accumulation and were often schemes
for tax-sheltered savings as much as retirement income per se .... Labor
plans stood at the opposite end. They were primarily welfare arrangements
designed to provide adequate support to those in need.293
Retirement plan asset protection therefore is quite easily criticized as potentially
serving mere wealth accumulation desires instead of retirement policy. 294 But,
this wealth accumulation potential must be more objectively evaluated because
its presence within the carrot/stick incentive framework of the tax-qualification
rules sheds light upon the particular role that asset protection might play in
furthering federal retirement policy.2 95 Understanding that role demands an
291. The continuing applicability of II U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) after passage of the
Bankruptcy Amendments is discussed supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text. Regarding
practical issues attendant a debtor-specific "reasonable needs" approach, see infra notes 328-33
and accompanying text.
292. The bankruptcy opt-out exemption scheme is the topic of supra Part IV.A.2.
293. SASS, supra note 62, at 143-44.
294. See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 35, at 369 (criticizing protection of IRAs on the basis that
such accounts allow accumulations "greatly in excess of any amounts reasonably necessary for
retirement support").
295. The carrot-stick explanation of the tax-qualified plan regime is first discussed in supra
note 121 and accompanying text.
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inquiry that probes beyond the more simplistic wealth accumulation objection.
In that regard, there are five specific observations to be noted.
First, at one time there were excise taxes that applied when distributions or
plan accumulations grew too large.296 But, Congress recently repealed these
excise taxes.297 This action could be characterized (like the repeal of wealth
transfer taxes generally) as indicative of a lessening aversion to accumulated
and potentially inheritable wealth or as a prevailing political desire to favor a
more consumption-based tax regime.298 Notwithstanding these rationales, the
excise taxes were clearly vulnerable because they acted as a burden upon the
ratio of disincentive "sticks" in the tax-qualified plan regime. In other words,
the repeal of these excise taxes represents tax-simplification that sweetens the
overall retirement plan tax-incentive pot, but at some cost to equity given the
enhanced retirement plan wealth accumulation potentials that resulted.299 The
grant of properly focused asset protection could serve a similar incentive
role.30
Second, rules requiring that certain minimum amounts must be withdrawn
from tax-qualified arrangements beginning at the participant's attainment of a
designated age mitigate, to some degree, the ongoing potential to accumulate
wealth within these arrangements, although the possibility certainly remains. 30 '
But here again, recent legislative initiatives have simplified and liberalized
certain distribution rules such that greater wealth accumulation within
retirement plans is possible.30 2 This liberalization could be cited as supporting
either equity-based concerns about tax-driven asset protection,30 3 or as
296. See I.R.C. § 4980A, repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1073, 111 Stat. 948 (1997)
(imposing an excess retirement accumulation tax).
297. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1073, 111 Stat. 948 (1997).
298. See Martin A. Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle Over Tax Expenditures,
91 TAX NOTES 701,701 (2001) (discussing tax expenditures and Republican attempts to redirect
the tax expenditure budget to more favorably impact their political preferences).
299. See Halperin, supra note 121, at 6-7 (discussing the tax incentive in relation to the
compression of the progressive tax rate schedule, and noting: "At the same time as the stick
(restrictions) has become heavier, the carrot (tax relief) has become less sweet." (footnote
omitted)).
300. See infra Part V.C (discussing the ways in which asset protection can serve as an
incentive).
301. See supra note 48 (discussing the requirements for certain minimum distributions
from retirement plans).
302. See Holt, supra note 48, at 20 (discussing the proposed regulations for qualified plans
and IRAs); Louis Mezzullo, Proposed Legislation Will Simplify Distribution Rules, TRUSTS &
EST., Jan. 2001, at 41, 43-44 (explaining the benefits of recent legislative initiatives).
303. See supra Part III.C.2 (stating that the equity objection applies because the liberalized
rules benefit higher wage earners, who are more readily able to contribute and then retain assets
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supporting the notion that some sacrifice of equitable ideals are tolerable in the
name of increasing the incentive/restriction ratio in the current tax-incentive
regime. This duality highlights the difficult task of balancing wealth
accumulation potentials, an adequate retirement benefit, and the problem of
debtor access and control over account balances in a DC plan dominated
environment.
304
A third response is more clear in its implications-the tax-qualification
regime imposes an objective limitation upon the tax-favored amounts that
participants may contribute annually to a tax-qualified DC plan or IRA, or upon
the annual amounts that may be distributed from a DB plan.3 °5 Indeed, some
commentators have viewed the wealth accumulation objection to asset
protection under Shumate skeptically, calling that objection "dangerously
myopic" and citing in support of their view the retirement plan contribution and
distribution limitations imposed under the tax laws.306 In contrast to a debtor-
specific and subjective case-by-case "reasonable needs" inquiry, 7 for example,
tying asset protection to tax-qualification and the attendant
contribution/distribution limits would provide an objective boundary for the
level of assets (in the case of a DC plan or IRA) or benefits (in the case of a DB
plan) to be protected under the Federal Retirement Model.
This reasoning suggests a fourth response, which defers quite simply to
the ease with which asset protection can be limited in the retirement plan
context such that excessive contributions and eve-of-bankruptcy asset stashing
can be thwarted.30 8 In fact, the Bankruptcy Amendments incorporate certain
in the plan); infra Part V.D (same).
304. See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text (discussing this balancing in light of
the prevalence of DC plans today). As to the distinction between DC plans and DB plans, see
supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
305. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (2000) (imposing a 10% penalty on early withdrawals); id.
§ 401(a)(14) (setting forth the required beginning date for distributions to begin from tax-
qualified plans); id. § 415 (imposing limits on contributions and benefits). Regarding the
distinction between DC plans and DB plans, see supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
306. See Sabino & Clark, supra note 35, at 66 1-62 (discussing important concerns that the
commentators objecting to Shumate fail to consider). More generally and with respect to the
savings/retirement issue, scholars have noted the lower contribution limit for IRAs relative to
employer-sponsored plans as consistent with the relationship among the three legs of the
retirement income security stool. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 58, at 901 (discussing the policy
relationship between employer-sponsored plans and IRAs).
. 307. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text regarding practical problems with a
case-by-case reasonable needs approach.
308. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their
Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
235, 269-92 (1995) (reviewing and critiquing case law that confronts these debtor tactics).
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safeguards along those lines, but for some reason restrict application of those
safeguards to educational "IRAs. ' 3 9  Expanding those safeguards to all
protected retirement plans would help mitigate wealth-based objections to this
protection.
Finally, modem trends in the prevailing types of retirement vehicles have
inspired objection to the expansion of ERISA's asset protection features based
upon the expedient of tax-qualification. Critics specifically cite the trend away
from the employer-controlled DB plan environment that existed when the
ERISA anti-alienation safeguards were originally conceived.1 ° A more
individual account-based, employee-dominated DC plan environment now
exists.3"' The problem pertains to the relatively greater access, control, and
wealth accumulation potentials attendant to DC plans.3"2 Grafting asset
protection onto this trend, however, inspires another more pragmatic
conclusion. Specifically, to the extent investment returns within a DC plan
exceed expectations such that unanticipated wealth is accumulated, the
proffered asset protection is no less objectionable for DC plans than DB plans.
This is because, from the employee-participant's viewpoint, the protection
arguably provides a fitting offset to the broader trend away from safer DB plans
(where investment and other risks lie with the employer) and towards the
modem DC plan environment, which carries with it a shift in investment and
other risks from employer to employee." 3 This linkage between increased
employee investment risk and asset protection also is responsive to those who
criticize tax-based asset protection as preserving assets rather than mere needs-
309. "IRA" is a misnomer, because the accounts have absolutely nothing to do with
retirement, despite the "Individual Retirement Account" moniker. For a discussion of the
limitations upon the protections afforded these tax-favored educational arrangements, see supra
note 276. As to the presence of these asset protection limitations for education IRAs but not for
standard or Roth IRAs, Congress perhaps deemed the fraudulent transfer provisions of the 1978
Code a sufficient direction from which other abuses might be contained, although this is far
from clear. See, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 548(a) (2000) (providing for avoidance of transfers made
within one year of filing if made with actual or constructive intent to defraud creditors). For
details of a failed proposal to limit the amount protected under the Bankruptcy Amendments,
see Press Release, Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Sessions Seek Common Sense
Reform to Protect Consumers, at http://www.abiworld.org/resources/research/ grasley.html
(May 2, 2000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
310. For an asset protection objection that is articulated by reference to the trend away
from DB plans, see Dilley, supra note 35, at 412-13.
311. For a discussion of this trend and the distinction between DB plans and DC plans, see
supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
312. For an objection to asset protection articulated by reference to these trends and the
resulting potentialities, see Dilley, supra note 35, at 412-13.
313. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the DB and
DC plans and the trend toward DC plans).
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159 (2004)
based income rights.314 Responsiveness exists because the DC plan
environment directly implicates the need to preserve a base of assets from
which retirement benefits might ultimately be paid.31 5 Wealth accumulation
and preservation therefore are inherently necessary to the operative success of
this prevailing retirement plan type. Once again, to the extent these asset
protection arguments are rejected, the objection is really a more general attack
on the overlying tax-qualified plan universe itself, and criticisms and reform
suggestions should be thusly aimed. It is to these ideas that this Article now
turns.
D. The Role of Equity and Prospects for Fundamental Reform
On the general point of retirement plan asset protection advancing policy
objectives, "[flew would refute the sound reasons for protection of pension and
retirement plans from the reach of creditors .... ,316 Yet, common to the
criticisms of the current movement towards tax-qualification as relevant to asset
protection is the overriding recognition that the grant of such protection can
serve only to compound the inequities inherent in the nature of the retirement
plan tax-incentive." 7 That incentive inures in large part to the benefit of
higher-income taxpayers.318 Hence, for the federal government to facilitate or
even condone a further disconnect between lower wage earners and those of
more substantial means would, in the eyes of many, add insult to injury by
compounding the inequities wrought under the system as it currently stands.
But the noted criticism misses the larger point. The focus should not be on
inequity as an absolutely intolerable circumstance. The focus should be on the
extent of equitable sacrifice that society can tolerate in pursuit of retirement
policy goals and whether the proposed action sufficiently advances those goals.
1. An Impetus for Reform
The prospect of more closely linking asset protection to tax qualification
provides a specific impetus for re-examining the current framework for
314. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text for a further exposition of this needs-
based argument.
315. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (explaining how DC plans work).
316. 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 184, at 139.
317. See the sources cited in supra notes 279-280 for those criticisms.
318. For a discussion of this equitable disparity, see supra Part III.D.
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pursuing retirement income security goals. Should the equitable
discrepancies-as specifically highlighted by the tying of asset protection more
directly to the tax-incentive framework-be deemed unacceptable, the call
should be for wholesale change in the current tri-part system of retirement
income security. Many suggestions posed for restructuring the current tax-
incentive retirement framework would render the system more inclusive across
a broader range of employee income levels. 319 If asset protection were grafted
upon a regime so revised, the resulting nexus between favored plans and the
stated policy objectives, coupled with the posited reductions in systemic
inequities, would make asset protection a desirable and patently inoffensive
characteristic of a system so envisioned. 320 The broader implication, then, is
that a comprehensive solution to the retirement plan asset protection question
may lie most fundamentally in revisiting the tax-incentive framework that
currently serves as a primary means to pursuing retirement income security.
Importantly, the current congressional momentum to more closely link asset
protection to the tax-qualified retirement plan framework provides a new
impetus for carrying out many of the reform suggestions aimed at improving
retirement plan coverage, equity, and service to the overriding retirement
income security goal.32'
2. Equity and Pragmatism
Short of such fundamental change, however, the extent of equitable
sacrifice that is tolerated under the existing tax-qualified regime is telling. A
walk down the pragmatic avenue of legislation in operation reveals that equity
has long been an ambiguously effected objective of the federal government's
319. See, e.g., supra note 155 (discussing mandatory retirement provisions); see also
Bankman, supra note 73, at 795-800 (discussing the regressivity of the payroll tax); Graetz,
supra note 58, at 852-53 (discussing the tripartite system). See generally 21 sr CENTURY, supra
note 57, at 4-7 (discussing federal retirement policy's focus on providing adequate income post
employment). The broader point here is that cogent ideas for reforming the existing system do
exist and are both defensible and implementable.
320. See the discussion of the protections afforded a debtor's interest in Social Security
entitlements in the text accompanying supra notes 81-82.
321. To the extent equity and redistributional objectives affect the analysis, the push should
be in the direction of a more broadly-based and effective Social Security system or perhaps
more universally mandated coverage of lower-wage employees, coextensive with asset
protection for the resulting arrangements or interests. On the other hand, to the extent comfort
exists with the notion of promoting not only minimally adequate but also living standard
maintenance retirement savings, a logical course would be to focus upon more carefully crafting
the contribution limits and withdrawal timing rules under the existing framework, and thereafter
accepting the consequences across wage-earning scales.
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approach to retirement income security.322  Moreover, while commentators
consistently keep the matter of equity in the forefront of perspectives on federal
retirement policy, 323 the pragmatic perspective again suggests that neither a
positively redistributional scheme nor absolute parity across income levels has
been a penultimate characteristic of the longstanding tri-part system of retirement
income security. As noted earlier, for example, a broad view quickly reveals that
the current retirement income security regime produces a two-class system.324
The distinction is between those who rely upon the base support of Social
Security and those who are able to elevate their postemployment standard of
living through supplemental resources like private pensions and personal
325savings. While certainly open to criticism, this reality is not simply the product
of happenstance or poorly crafted legislation. Rather, it is to some degree a
recognized incident of the "lifestyle maintenance" facet of the federal
government's three-pronged approach to accomplishing its retirement policy
objectives.326 The direct implication is that within the existing retirement policy
context, some disparate benefit is warranted so long as a lifestyle maintenance
component of the policy objective is adhered to and actively pursued.
3. A Problem at the Equitable Border
Of course, one should not overlook the possibility of defining the proper
bounds of asset protection as lying at the border between basic needs and lifestyle
322. The focus here is on vertical equity, which in tax parlance focuses on the disparate
treatment of persons across income levels. In contrast, the idea of horizontal equity examines
the treatment of similarly situated persons. See Halperin, supra note 121, at 48-49 (discussing
vertical and horizontal equity considerations in context of tax-qualified retirement plans); Stein,
supra note 130, at 226-27 (same).
323. See, e.g., supra notes 145-59 (discussing the trade-off ofequity and tax expenditure).
324. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing a two-class system of
retirement).
325. See Altman, supra note 58, at 501-02 (discussing the three-legged stool analogy to
the U.S. system of retirement income security). SASS, supra note 62, states:
Approaching private pensions from two different directions, government policy in
the 1930s thus defined an intermediate public role for employer-sponsored plans:
they would provide socially needed supplementary retirement income to an upper-
middling segment of the population. Social Security would provide the basic leg of
the elderly's new three-legged stool; the combination of tax benefits, IRS
regulations, and employer interests would maintain private pensions as the
intermediate support for middle-class Americans.
Id. at Il1.
326. See supra notes 62-63, 75-77, 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the lifestyle
maintenance aspect of the retirement income security objective).
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maintenance, as some have argued.327 This more limited grant of asset
protection clearly is the better option if absolute equity across employee income
levels is the guiding principle. Bare appeals to this equitable ideal, however,
are too superficially respectful of other considerations affecting national
retirement policy, such as the desire for some measure of lifestyle maintenance.
Moreover, certain practical problems arise when the legislature attempts to
apply a more limited grant of asset protection within the retirement plan
context.
For example, some commentators see within the § 522(d)(1 0)(E) federal
exemption framework a basis for reconciling ERISA's retirement income
security goals with the fresh start/marshalling of assets principles of bankruptcy
law. 328  Reconciliation occurs through the harmonization of competing
principles that arguably results from the case-specific and protection-limiting
"reasonable needs" analysis under current § 522(d)(10)(E). Of course, this
approach assumes in the first instance that there is some outstanding need to
reconcile the retirement income security policies of ERISA with the 1978
Code's marshalling of assets/fresh start concerns, in seeming contravention of
the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress already has made a clear policy
decision favoring retirement income security.329
From a more practical standpoint, an extensive congressionally
commissioned 1997 report expressly condemns needs-based and similar fact-
specific federal exemption standards.330 That report criticizes those standards
as being too dependent "upon subjective judicial determinations of what would
be 'reasonably necessary' for [a given] debtor. 33' The report further notes that
"[t]his fact-based test can lead to excessive litigation or intrusive and time-
consuming inquiries," and other commentators agree.332 Indeed, the evaluation
327. See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 35, at 410-13 (discussing problems with the fresh start
principle).
328. See Michelle M. Amopol, Including Retirement Benefits in a Debtor's Bankruptcy
Estate: A Proposalfor Harmonizing ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, 56 Mo. L. REv. 491,559
(1991) (stating a proposed solution that includes repeal of 1978 Code § 541 (c)(2) coupled with
exemption approach of I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(I 0)(E) but with specific guidelines to assist courts in
"reasonably necessary" determination); Dilley, supra note 35, at 410-13 (attempting to
reconcile ERISA and 1978 Code policies through the I I U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) limitation);
Wohl, supra note 35, at 31-36 (proposing reconciliation of ERISA and 1978 Code policies).
Regarding 1978 Code § 522(d)(I 0)(E), see supra notes 235-61.
329. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Shumate and Guidry).
330. See 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 184, at 139-40 (stating that fact-based tests "can
lead to excessive litigation or intrusive and time-consuming inquiries").
331. Id.
332. Id. Emanuel, supra note 20 states:
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called for under a broadly applicable reasonable needs approach reflects a
paternalistic judgment that is inconsistent with some of the philosophies
underlying the current three-legged stool of retirement income security:
The combination of private entitlements to future income in old age-such
as individual annuities and insurance as well as employer-provided
pensions-with the public entitlement of Social Security resulted in a
system of individual rights to accumulate as much or as little retirement
income as fortune or choice would allow. The earned entitlement, under
the American system, was the opportunity to accumulate. The guarantees
were not to any level of income but rather to payments from specified
sources, which might amount to adequate, inadequate, or even excessive
income, but which were designed to avoid imposition of adequacy
measures from external authority.
333
The point here is not to argue that equitable concerns are unimportant.
Rather, the point is that, in considering equitable disparities resulting from asset
protection outcomes under the Federal Retirement Model, a degree of both
reason and reasonableness exists in the guise of the retirement income security
objective, the due regard for its base income and lifestyle maintenance
parameters, and the mechanisms underlying the tri-part approach to its
achievement. Shortcomings with that logic highlight problems with the
existing retirement plan structure more so than with asset protection per se. A
more carefully tailored approach to ensuring that the retirement plan
mechanisms employed actually do serve the underlying retirement policy
objectives would go far in addressing those concerns.334  But ultimately,
viewing the question as one pertaining solely to the three-legged stool of
[W]hile a needs test would destroy much of the utility of the spendthrift provision
to the rich and answer the criticism that one should not enjoy a luxurious income
without meeting one's obligations, a needs test would impose intolerable
transaction costs by requiring the claimant to establish that the beneficiary was not
needy enough to qualify for [protection].
Id. at 191; Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 221, 224-25 (1997) (criticizing a case-by-case approach to the proper bounds of
exemption planning as leading to inconsistency, ambiguity, and frustration among both courts
and debtors); Wohl, supra note 35, at 34 ("The difficulty with this analysis [tied to II U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(I 0)(E) concepts] is that there is no analytical basis.., on which the courts have drawn
the line between those too young to have such assets protected and those too old to permit assets
to be available to creditors."); id. at 35 ("How much the 'reasonable retirement amount' should
be is difficult to say and is... beyond the scope of this Article.").
333. Dilley, supra note 66, at 1108; see also supra note 328 (discussing a reasonable needs
approach as a means of reconciling ERISA's retirement income security goals with principles of
bankruptcy law).
334. For a discussion of asset protection as an impetus for reforming the current retirement
plan structure, see the text accompanying supra notes 319-21.
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retirement income security is too narrow a focus. Instead, the other triadic
relationship revealed in this Article must be considered. That relationship is, of
course, between the Traditional, Self-Settled, and Federal Retirement Models
of asset protection.
E. There and Back Again: Resolution Across the Models
Exploration here of the evolution of asset protection within the Federal
Retirement Model revealed an initial tendency to set retirement plan asset
protection parameters by reference to traditional and self-settled spendthrift
trust considerations.33 s The 1992 Patterson v. Shumate decision caused a firm
break in that analysis, leaving a Federal Retirement Model that is disjointed in
336its approach to asset protection. As movements in the legislative arena now
promise, or threaten, to heal this rift through the clear linkage of asset
protection to retirement plan tax-qualification criteria,33 a comprehensive view
of the issue demands that interactions across the three models of asset
protection not be forgotten along the way.338 In direct contrast to the flow of
traditional influences originally affecting asset protection developments within
the Federal Retirement Model, the influence of federal retirement policies
should now dominate future movements in defining the availability of asset
protection in more traditional settings. Specifically, retirement policy concerns
demand a re-examination of asset protection as it affects the Traditional and
Self-Settled Models. That re-examination reveals that retirement policy
objectives provide a purposive benchmark by reference to which asset
protection should now be granted.
1. A Risk of Hypocrisy
An ideally purposive Federal Retirement Model would only protect
interests that are directed towards service to the goal of retirement income
security. The potential interaction between this ideally purposive Federal
Retirement Model and the merely protective Traditional and Self-Settled
Models raises an important question: Why do we deem considerations of
335. See supra Part IV.B.I (discussing the initial stage of post-ERISA protection).
336. For a discussion of Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), see supra Part IV.B.2.
337. See supra Part IV.C (discussing recent congressional action concerning retirement
plan asset protection).
338. For an explanation of the Traditional, Self-Settled, and Federal Retirement Models,
see the text accompanying supra notes 40-42.
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purpose and equity so relevant to defining and evaluating retirement plan asset
protection, yet we seem to have cast those same considerations aside for little
apparent reason (apart from federalism concerns) in the related trust contexts?
The careful effort to craft a regime of creditor-protected retirement interests
through attention to an acceptable association between those interests and
meritorious federal retirement policy goals ought to foreclose a unilateral grant
of unbounded asset protection-fostered through federal mechanisms like
§ 541 (c)(2)-absent the advancement of some similarly meritorious purpose
that goes beyond blind deference to historical federalism principles and the
property rights rationale thereby supported.339 As long as the contrast endures
through a lack of federal attention to those matters, asset protection as an end
unto itself will continue to dominate developments across the models. Those
developments include, for example, the recent acceptance of the domestic self-
settled asset protection trust.340 Extrapolating those progressions to an area of
more direct federal concern reveals that, without more comprehensive attention,
further efforts to define the proper boundaries of asset protection within the
context of federal retirement policy may be co-opted by the practical reality that
"[r]etirement plans represent a major planning opportunity for asset
protection... [pursuant to which] substantial sums can be shielded ....
Perpetuating an environment wherein participants view retirement plans as
merely one of several devices for use in thwarting creditors also circuitously
thrusts the analysis back under the weight of criticism grounded in the
characterization of retirement plans as mere wealth accumulation devices. The
proper response lies in more careful consideration of that characterization,
coupled with an approach that distinguishes retirement plans from other asset
protection devices based on service to larger federal goals.
342
For example, many have criticized the now viable Self-Settled Model as
fundamentally undermining federal bankruptcy policy by permitting
339. See supra Part II (presenting historical arguments supporting spendthrift trust asset
protection); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing 1978 Code § 541(c)(2)).
340. See the text accompanying supra notes 49-55 regarding the rise of domestic self-
settled asset protection trusts in contravention of over a century of accepted spendthrift trust
doctrine.
341. SPERO, supra note 212, at 10-41.
342. For a critical evaluation of the characterization of retirement plans as mere wealth
accumulation devices and the relationship of that characterization to asset protection, see supra
Part V.C. The author makes that evaluation by reference to retirement policy goals and asset
protection's potential service to those goals. The irony noted here is that, without more
thoughtful consideration of furthering that service, tying asset protection to tax-qualified
retirement plan status-without due regard for the broader asset protection environment--does
little to distinguish the retirement plan genre from the asset protection currently available under
the Traditional and Self-Settled Models.
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prospective debtors to essentially "endow" themselves without regard to any
fresh-start or other socially conscious concerns.343 Some have therefore
concluded that congressional action is necessary to thwart this end-run around
the debtor-creditor framework of federal bankruptcy laws.344 Were Congress to
move towards that objective without correspondingly tightening the controls on
withdrawal and non-retirement use of tax-qualified retirement plan assets-or
without at least capping the protection afforded some of the more troublesome
arrangements like IRAs (as proposed under the Bankruptcy Amendments)--a
tangible degree of hypocrisy would stem from the leakage inherent in the
existing lax retirement plan withdrawal rules.34' The inconsistency lies in the
prospect of Congress (or even the federal courts) acting to eliminate unguided
settlor asset protection in the self-settled trust context, while allowing such a
protective framework to remain essentially intact for liberally accessible
retirement plans. The association between retirement plans and self-settled
trusts arises by virtue of employee (settlor) ease of access to retirement account
funds that the employee contributed.3 6 Considering that those funds also enjoy
the added benefits of tax-qualification with respect to the accumulation process,
343. A debtor achieves this by stashing assets in a trust of which the debtor is both settlor
and beneficiary, and which will allegedly thereafter be immune from creditor claims by virtue of
jurisdictional trust legislation and bankruptcy estate exclusion under § 541 (c)(2). Supra notes
49-55.
344. See, e.g., Henry J. Lischer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to
Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROa. & TR. J. 479, 534-36 (2000) (arguing that asset protection
trusts are objectionable because they permit debtors to avoid lawful debts); Sterk, supra note 20,
at 1114-17 (contemplating whether legislation should play a role in regulating asset protection
trusts). For a discussion of self-settled trusts, see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that these self-settled trusts may have certain vulnerabilities to creditor claims
under federal bankruptcy laws. See supra note 52 (discussing conflicts of law issues); see, e.g.,
Boxx, supra note 20, at 1208-40 (discussing arguments that may undermine effectiveness of
self-settled trusts); Sterk, supra note 20, at 1074-1104 (same). As to calls for congressional
action and even criminal sanctions in the arena of asset protection trusts, see Randall J. Gingiss,
Putting a Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 987, 1005-08 (1999) (stating
that congressional action is appropriate when contempt of court actions fail as deterrents); Sterk,
supra note 20, at 1114-17 (concluding that criminal sanctions may be the only viable deterrent).
345. For the cap on asset protection for IRAs as proposed under the Bankruptcy
Amendments, see supra note 276 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the idea of
retirement plan "leakage," see supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. For an argument
against capping even the amount sheltered in IRAs, see the remarks of Senator Kennedy (D-
Mass.) in 147 Cong. Rec. $2151-$2152 (daily ed. Mar.12, 2001) ("The provision in the
bankruptcy bill that would cap the amount of retirement savings held in individual retirement
accounts that can be exempted from a debtor's bankruptcy estate is a step backwards .... The
IRA was developed as a retirement account basically for working families.").
346. Regarding employees as retirement plan "settlors," see supra notes 55 and 212-13.
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the irony of addressing only non-"retirement" self-settled arrangements is
evident.
3 47
At a minimum, a course more consistent with a purposive Federal
Retirement Model would be to impose a dollar cap upon the protection
afforded traditional and self-settled trust arrangements under federal
bankruptcy principles-just as in the case of IRA treatment under the
Bankruptcy Amendments.348 To the extent federalism concerns continue to
push for some recognition of state law trust protections, the government
can still respect donors' freedom to craft protective trust interests by
continuing to recognize those interests that terminate upon creditor
action.349 This would confine to the retirement context the idea of ongoing
beneficiary enjoyment garnered through spendthrift protection. In short,
the growing attention paid to the proper bounds of asset protection in the
retirement plan context suggests that freedom to accumulate and to dispose
fall short of compelling justifications for bestowing federally sanctioned
but unlimited asset protection upon traditional or self-settled spendthrift
trust vehicles. The absence of such limitations is by no means a necessary
characteristic of the existing framework.a '
347. For a discussion of the idea of retirement plans as mere wealth accumulation devices,
see supra Part V.C. Retirement plan tax incentives are the topic of supra Part III.C.
348. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing the cap imposed on standard
and Roth IRAs).
349. The reference is to protection afforded a trust beneficiary through operation of what is
commonly referred to as a forfeiture restraint, which is less objectionable than asset protection
obtained through operation of spendthrift restraints. Most simply, a forfeiture restraint provides
that the beneficiary's interest will terminate upon the beneficiary's bankruptcy or any attempt by
the beneficiary or her creditors to alienate the beneficiary's equitable trust interest. Through
default gifts over to other beneficiaries named in the trust instrument, the settlor directs the
successor to the beneficiary's interest. The law has long permitted trusts including such indirect
restraints, notwithstanding the continued rejection in England of the more direct spendthrift
restraint. See, e.g,, I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 150 (1959) (describing and
recognizing that type of forfeiture provision as valid); IIA Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 18,
§ 150 (1987) (discussing forfeiture provisions). Spendthrift restraints are more likely than
forfeiture restraints to achieve the settlor's dual goals of providing for the beneficiary while
thwarting creditors because the beneficiary protected by virtue of a spendthrift restraint need not
forfeit her interest when faced with a creditor claim. Instead, the beneficiaries retain the
prospect of flirther enjoyment of their trust interests notwithstanding the thwarted creditors'
efforts to reach those interests or the trust property supporting them.
350. Regarding objections to the protected but retained enjoyment of a spendthrifted trust
interest, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
351. See G~uSWOLD, supra note 20, § 552 ("[T]he major premise [underlying this
spendthrift trust justification]-that the owner of property may dispose of it as he desires-is
patently fallacious."). With regard to the freedom of disposition rationale for spendthrift trusts,
see the text accompanying supra note 27.
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2. Protecting the Incentive
The availability of asset protection to motivate people to participate in
federally sanctioned retirement plans also deserves more direct consideration.
This incentive potential informs the question of why Congress should more
carefully consider the undercurrent of influence among the three asset
protection models and why that consideration should ripen into a less passive,
more comprehensive approach to asset protection. To the extent the incentive
potential of asset protection is not self-evident, it is easily extrapolated by
analogy to the premise underlying the retirement plan tax incentive.352 The
New York Bar Association's Special Committee on Pension Simplification
recently spun that premise quite practically:
It would be naive to minimize the lure of a tax shelter as an important
contributor to the success of the private pension system, which, in the small
plan universe at least, is often due at least as much to the owner's search for
personal financial security as to his concern for the retirement security of
his employees.
353
Indeed, other commentators have more directly stated that the special
status derived from the ERISA anti-alienation and preemption provisions
"enhances the value of compensation paid in the form of retirement benefits
and thus promotes retirement plan participation and sponsorship." 35 4 This asset
protection incentive also comes at no detriment to the federal budget, in
contrast to the tax expenditure cost associated with the retirement plan tax-
based incentive.355 While some might argue that the cost of retirement plan
asset protection would be more subtle in terms of impact upon the market for
consumer credit with further implications on the market economy, those
assertions are unfounded, or at best, tenuous.356
352. See supra Part llI.C regarding the tax incentives for retirement plan participation.
353. Alvin D. Lurie, ERISA: A Process Still Awry, A Need to Simplify, 83 TAX NoTEs
1053, 1055 (1999).
354. van Zante, supra note 119, at 144; see Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997)
(describing ERISA's express preemption clause).
355. See the discussion of tax expenditures supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
356. See In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1997) ("When it extended the credit that
it [now] seeks to collect from [the debtor's] (remaining) interest in [a retirement plan that was a
spendthrift trust], the [creditor] knew or should have recognized that this wealth could not be
reached in a bankruptcy action."); JCS- 16-9 1, supra note 35, at 11 ("Plan benefits generally are
not taken into account in credit extension decisions because they are not available as security.");
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start ", 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 175, 194 (1994) ("[L]awmakers have found compelling policy reasons for denying creditors
the opportunity to rely on certain interests of the debtor in the event she becomes insolvent.");
Ponoroff, supra note 332, at 233 ("Creditors make credit decisions with full knowledge of the
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 159 (2004)
Viewing the asset protection component of the retirement plan legal
structure as a potential incentive leads to another important conclusion that can
be derived by analogy to the operation of the retirement plan tax incentive.
That analogy directly supports the notion that Congress should incorporate a
more comprehensive view of asset protection into federal retirement policy.
Specifically, in the context of the retirement plan tax-incentive, a corresponding
denial of similar tax benefits outside the tax-favored plan universe is critical to
the effectiveness of that tax incentive.a5 In other words, the reasoning goes,
there would be a general disinclination to subject oneself to the restrictions and
operative rules (i.e., the "sticks") that accompany retirement plan tax-
qualification if equivalent tax-deferral and tax-free earnings potential (i.e., the
"carrots") were available outside the strictures of the tax-qualified plan
universe .3" Similar to the tax-incentive "carrot," dangled before taxpayers as
an offset to the restrictive rules that encourage the funding and maintenance of
particular types of retirement plans, uniquely available asset protection might
serve a similar incentive role. The availability of multiple avenues to asset
protection via the Traditional and Self-Settled Models, in turn, would then
blunt the ability of Congress to employ the concept of asset protection in
furtherance of federal retirement policy objectives. As one noted commentator
specifically observed regarding the tax incentive: "the existence of...
equivalent [advantages not directed towards retirement] ... through less
applicable exemption scheme, and, absent a valid security interest, with knowledge of the
debtor's right to freely alienate his or her property. . . ."). Ponoroff further observes that the
failure to respect the debtor's planning opportunity in this regard would result in an unwarranted
windfall to creditors. Id. at 233. In the context of creditor access to property held in a
traditional spendthrift trust, Professor Costigan observed that it would be "curious to have the
creditor of a cestui [i.e., beneficiary] so exalted in position and honor ... that he must be given
even all the property," and that "the creditor is seeking to reap where he has not sown .... It is
moral theft .... " Costigan, supra note 23, at 476-77.
357. Graetz states this point directly:
It is clear that the private pension system depends upon encouragement by high-
earning employees for the creation and maintenance of employer-sponsored
retirement plans that redistribute to low- and moderate-income workers at least a
portion of the tax savings .... This goal is made more difficult, however, whenever
there exist other opportunities for high wage earners to achieve equivalent tax
savings without the kind of restrictions applicable to employer-provided pension
plans.
Graetz, supra note 58, at 87; see also Halperin, supra note 121, at 38 ("If... qualified plans are
threatened by a potential shift to nonqualified arrangements, greater penalties on nonqualified
deferred compensation should be considered.").
358. For the initial discussion of the carrot-stick explanation of the tax-qualified plan
regime, see supra note 119 and accompanying text. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of tax
deferral and tax-free earnings.
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restrictive alternatives. may inhibit the ability of Congress to fashion those
restrictions on tax-preferred savings that would best serve national retirement
security policy." "9
Similarly, to the extent Congress curtails less restrictive planning
opportunities such as those offered through the Traditional and Self-Settled
Models, the availability of retirement plan asset protection becomes both more
noticeable and more enticing to anyone able to grasp the benefits of setting
aside funds today in a tax-favored, creditor-sheltered vehicle in order to better
finance a retirement promise that is widely recognized as a mantra of modem
American life.3 ° Simply stated, federal retirement policy objectives can be
advanced through a more comprehensive understanding and treatment of asset
protection. Equitable concerns attributable to differences across wage scales
and the relative opportunity to capitalize upon the retirement plan asset
protection enticement affect this assertion, but neither defeat it nor necessarily
imply that retirement plan asset protection extending beyond mere base-level
income maintenance is ill-conceived. 36' Rather, those concerns suggest broader
social policy choices that Congress should expressly consider in the context of
the objectives and mechanisms underlying retirement income security, with
asset protection informing important aspects of that debate.
VI. Conclusion
Traditional and self-settled spendthrift trust concerns, coupled with
seemingly disjointed congressional actions, have shaped a divided landscape of
retirement plan asset protection. Certain retirement plans currently receive a
grant of blanket asset protection without further inquiry, while others continue
to receive careful scrutiny based upon criteria derived from analysis typically
ascribed to the Traditional and Self-Settled Models or to exemption laws more
generally. The movement to gauge retirement plan asset protection by
reference to tax-qualified status raises questions about how well that status, or
asset protection linked thereto, truly serves the broader goal of retirement
income security. Focusing upon the broader asset protection landscape from a
view tinted by federal retirement policy concerns ultimately draws attention to
the need for a less passive, more comprehensive congressional treatment of
359. Graetz, supra note 58, at 902.
360. See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 35, at 368 (noting "the cultural significance of the
retirement phenomenon, which has taken on the status of a right, rather than a choice").
361. See, in this regard, the discussion of the anti-poverty and lifestyle maintenance
components of the retirement income security objective set forth in supra notes 62-64.
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those species of asset protection that are unbounded by any principled purpose.
Retirement policy objectives provide that purpose. Congress should view those
objectives as a benchmark for defining asset protection boundaries, thus placing
the concept of asset protection in direct service to federal retirement policy
goals. That benchmark, in turn, should then guide: (1) the grant of federally-
sanctioned asset protection within the retirement plan setting; and (2) the denial
of such protection in the context of more traditional trust devices that do not
further any discernable federal purpose.
